Sinica https://thechinaproject.com/series/sinica/ Reporting on China with neither fear nor favor Mon, 01 Apr 2024 16:51:36 +0000 en-US © 2023 The China Project Reporting on China with neither fear nor favor The China Project Reporting on China with neither fear nor favor The China Project office@thechinaproject.com false https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/podcast_sinicablack_square.png Sinica https://thechinaproject.com/ yes 02c0b371-340f-52b0-a4df-83e2c81655a9 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.5.5 Live from New York: China and the Global South, with Maria Repnikova and Eric Olander https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/live-from-new-york-china-and-the-global-south-with-maria-repnikova-and-eric-olander/ Thu, 09 Nov 2023 21:53:28 +0000 http://thechinaproject.com/?post_type=podcast&p=289378 Recommendations: Jeremy: Empire podcast William Dalrymple and Anita Anand, about how empires rise, fall, and shape the world around us Maria: A Day in the Life of Abed SalamaAnatomy of a Jerusalem Tragedy by Nathan Thrall Eric: Eat Bitter, a documentary by Ningyi Sun, a filmmaker from China, and Pascale Appora Gnekindy, from the Central African Republic Kaiser: Wellnessan ambitious novel by Nathan Hill about a Gen X couple in Wicker Park, Chicago; and the NOVA documentary Inside China's Tech Boom, of which Kaiser is correspondent, narrator, and co-producer.]]> Recommendations: Jeremy: Empire podcast William Dalrymple and Anita Anand, about how empires rise, fall, and shape the world around us Maria: A Day in the Life of Abed SalamaAnatomy of a Jerusalem Tragedy by Nathan Thrall Eric: Eat Bitter, a documentary by Ningyi Sun, a filmmaker from China, and Pascale Appora Gnekindy, from the Central African Republic Kaiser: Wellnessan ambitious novel by Nathan Hill about a Gen X couple in Wicker Park, Chicago; and the NOVA documentary Inside China's Tech Boom, of which Kaiser is correspondent, narrator, and co-producer.]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/MariaEric.jpg Live from New York: China and the Global South, with Maria Repnikova and Eric Olander false no 0:00 No no In Memoriam: Jeffrey A. Bader, from February 2022 https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/in-memoriam-jeffrey-a-bader-from-february-2022/ Thu, 26 Oct 2023 15:45:05 +0000 http://thechinaproject.com/?post_type=podcast&p=288511 Obama and China’s Rise: An Insider’s Account of America’s Asia Strategy. In this conversation, he offers a candid critique of the Biden China policy to date. Note that this conversation was taped in mid-February — before the Russian invasion of Ukraine began, and before the Department of Justice announced the end of the “China Initiative.” Note that this conversation was taped in mid-February — before the Russian invasion of Ukraine began, and before the Department of Justice announced the end of the “China Initiative.” 3:23 – How viewing China over 40 years of rapid development has shaped the way Jeff thinks about China 8:54 – Jeff Bader’s critique of the Biden administration’s China policy 19:40 – Is it important to have a China strategy? 24:55 – Right-sizing China’s ambitions: Is Rush Doshi right? 31:17 – Defining China’s legitimate interests 38:31 – Has China already concluded that the U.S., irrespective of who is in power, seeks to thwart China’s rise? 43:16 – How can China participate in the rules-based international order? 47:52 – Is it still possible for Biden to change his tune on China? 52:57 – How much room does Biden have politically? Can he exploit to electorate’s partisan divide on China? 59:54 – What is the “low-hanging fruit” that Biden could pluck to signal a lowering of temperature? 1:12:09 – Jeff Bader’s precepts for better understanding of — and better policy toward — China Recommendations Jeff: Autumn in the Heavenly Kingdom, a book by Stephen Platt about the Taiping Civil War focusing on Hong Rengan. Kaiser: Re-recommending two previous guests’ recommendations: Iaian McGilchrists’s The Master and his Emissary recommended by Anthea Roberts; and Unfabling the East: The Enlightenment’s Encounter with Asia by Jurgen Osterhammel, recommended by Dan Wang. TRANSCRIPT: Kaiser Kuo: Welcome to the Sinica Podcast, a weekly discussion of current affairs in China, produced in partnership with The China Project. Subscribe to The China Project’s daily Access newsletter to keep on top of all the latest news from China, from hundreds of different news sources, or check out all the original writing on our website at supchina.com. We’ve got reported stories, essays, and editorials, great explainers, and trackers, regular columns, and, of course, a growing library of podcasts. We cover everything from China’s fraught foreign relations to its ingenious entrepreneurs, from the ongoing repression of Uyghurs and other Muslim peoples in China’s Xinjiang region to the tectonic shifts underway, as China rolls out what we call the Red New Deal. It’s a feast of business, political, and cultural news about a nation that is reshaping the world. We cover China with neither fear nor favor. I’m Kaiser Kuo, coming to you from Chapel Hill, North Carolina. It’s a rare thing that I read anything these days and find myself in emphatic agreement with every bit of it, the descriptive and prescriptive alike. But that’s how I felt about a recent piece for the Brookings website by Jeff Bader, a veteran diplomat, who was senior director for Asian Affairs at the National Security Council during the first years of the Obama presidency until 2011. Ambassador Bader served as U.S. ambassador to Namibia and is now a senior fellow at the John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings. But he was deeply involved in the U.S.-China relationship at the State Department from his first posting to Beijing back in 1981 for the next 21 years, really through 2002, before being tapped to head Asian Affairs at NSC after Obama took office. After leaving the Obama administration, he wrote a fascinating book on Obama’s China policy, Obama and China’s Rise: An Insider’s Account of America’s Asia Strategy. The Brookings piece in question was titled “Biden’s China policy needs to be more than just Trump lite.” And in the next hour, we’ll talk about that piece and much else. Ambassador Bader, Jeff, if I may, welcome to Sinica. Jeff Bader: Thank you, Kaiser. That’s fine, I prefer Jeff. Kaiser: So, Jeff, I want to focus today on U.S.-China policy and specifically on your critique of the Biden administration’s policy to date. But I should note that first there’s an excellent podcast interview with you that was actually conducted by James Green, another diplomat with a lot of China experience, who runs — ran, rather — the U.S.-China dialogue podcast that went from 2019 to 2020. Yours is a two-parter. In fact, it covers a lot of ground. I highly recommend that [interview to] listeners who are interested in Jeff Bader’s storied career, his relationship with Richard Holbrooke, his experiences in China in the 1980s, and the management of the Tiananmen crisis, the participation in the WTO accession negotiations at the turn of the millennium. And, of course, his decision to back the young Illinois senator rather than the former first lady, who everyone was sure was going to win the Democratic nomination. You should check that out. It’s fantastic. Wait until we have Jeff back on Sinica and we can really do a deep dive into his career. But I do want to point out that by coincidence, you and I actually, Jeff, we have in common the fact that our first stints in China were in the year 1981. I was just a teenager back then and only stayed for that one summer, while you were on your first extended posting to China for the State Department. How has seeing the extent of change in China and watching it unfold in person over these several decades, how has that shaped the way that you approach China, that you think about China? Jeff: Well, I was there from 1981 to 1983 as a political officer. I was responsible for China’s internal politics, which essentially was an impossible job in those days. There was no publicly available literature beyond the People’s Daily, which had its limitations in value. Talking to people was highly risky. People didn’t want to talk to you and if they did, they were taking a risk. So the job itself had, let’s say a low ceiling in what you could accomplish. The city itself was a pretty dreary, dismal place. My main recollections are of about 4 million people in identical blue suits, riding around on bicycles in the bicycle lanes every day down the Jiànguómén Wài 建国门外 Boulevard. And a handful of cars weaving their way through. There were no restaurants, no publicly available restaurants at all. I had every meal essentially in the Peking Hotel for two years, which is a fate I wouldn’t wish on anyone. So it was a dreary place, it was hard to understand. I remember Dèng Xiǎopíng 邓小平 saying that China planned to increase its GDP fourfold in the next, I think 20 years was his target. And that seemed impossible as one looked around at what was a state dominated, Stalinist society. You couldn’t travel anywhere. While I was there, there were about 27 cities that were opened up for travel without prior permission. And even there, you were tracked pretty closely. So when I came back from my first subsequent visit in 1987, when I was deputy director of China at State, in just four short years, I was astonished by the visual changes in the city, the dynamism, the neon lights, the restaurants, the variations in people’s dress, the opening of malls. You could see the direction China was going, it was going much, much faster than one could have imagined. Kaiser: It’s a bit like going from black and white to color suddenly. Jeff: Yeah, I came to Beijing from Taipei. I had been studying Chinese in Taipei. And Taipei was a modern Chinese city. It was like Hong Kong in those days. And so the shock of going from Taipei to Beijing was all the more stark because of the different levels of development and the different levels of dynamism. Kaiser: So how has that shaped the way you think now, just seeing the rapidity of change, the sort of compressed nature of China’s development experience? Jeff: Oh, in several respects. I mean, one is never underestimate the Chinese people. I mean, that’s my main conclusion. You had a population that had gone through 30 years of the People’s Republic of China and Maoism, essentially a totalitarian system. Before that, the civil war and occupation of the 1930s and ’40s. And before that, the chaos of the Republic of China and the Qing dynasty. And yet, in just a few short years, they were on their way to creating a modern society and it was readily apparent. So I never underestimate what Chinese people can accomplish. I mean, when I was there in 1981, 1983, my feeling was, from what I observed, that Chinese people only could accomplish great things when they were outside of China. Because of course we all know that overseas Chinese are dynamos in every country that they serve in. But that there was something about the Chinese system that made it impossible to have that kind of achievement at home. But I clearly was wrong on that. In three or four years, just tremendous achievements. I guess the second conclusion I draw from that is that many Chinese who were alive during that period and it’s 35, 40 years ago, remember the bad old days, remember what the life of poverty and grayness and being cut off from the outside world was like. And they have a sense of appreciation for what’s been accomplished and a sense of gratitude. Gratitude to the leadership for the changes that have been brought about. Now to the degree to which that extends to the younger generation is a whole ‘nother question. But for older people, the contrast between the China that they grew up in and the China today is very apparent. Kaiser: Absolutely. It really parallels my own experience because I took my second trip there in 1986, I was in college. And that experience, just seeing the trajectory really changed the trajectory of my own life. I decided I really needed to sort of take a front seat to watch this happening and decided there and then that I would be back and I would spend a lot of time watching what happened, what unfolded in China. Fantastic. Let’s get into your critique now, fast forwarding a couple of decades now to the Biden administration’s policy, as you laid it out in that piece for Brookings. The piece calls that policy Trump-lite, and I’ve heard people refer to it, quoting people even within the administration saying, “Trump, but with allies.” But to be fair, there are other points of departure besides the multilateral approach, right? Could you identify first where do you think credit is due? The ways in which Biden, Tony Blake, and Jake Sullivan, Kurt Campbell even, and the rest have actually moved away from Trump. Jeff: Well, what’s striking to me, Kaiser, is if I were writing a defense of the administration, which I was not, and do not intend to do, I could identify changes from the Trump administration. And I’ll mention a few of them. But what’s striking to me is that the administration does not do that. And that was one of the things that inspired me to write this piece. The administration emphasizes continuity. They emphasize, as you just said, that they are looking to compete, using allies and partners. If you ask a senior administration official, “how is your policy different from Trump’s?” And I’ve heard many of them answer this question. The answer is invariably what you just said, “Oh, we do it with partners. We’re not doing it unilaterally.” So to me that suggests a certain bashfulness or a certain shyness about embracing any change from the Trump policy. They are, I think, looking over their shoulder at the Republican party, at their right wing and are deathly afraid of being seen as having departed from a ‘tough on China policy’, getting directly to your question, what are the actual differences? There are a few. For example, the climate change bilateral agreement that John Kerry signed with his counterpart, Xiě Zhènhuá 解振华 at the Glasgow summit. I mean, the Trump administration didn’t believe in climate change, no less in cooperating with the Chinese on the subject. So that was one big example. I think that the most fundamental difference is on the issue of regime change. I think that the Trump administration tiptoed up to the line of calling for regime change in China. If you look at the series of speeches that were given by Mike Pence, Mike Pompeo, and other senior Trump administration officials, they had a whole slew of them. They all left the impression that living with China, under communist part of the leadership was impossible. That in the Chinese communist party DNA, that they’re not only thieves and predators, but they had the nerves to dominate internationally and that they could not coexist with the United States in a manner that serves our national interest, unless their regime were toppled. That’s the way I read their speeches and I think that’s a fair reading of them. This administration, I think, clearly he does not believe that. They won’t say they don’t believe it, but their speeches aren’t filled with the same kind of vocabulary that calls into question the legitimacy of the Chinese regime. They seem to accept that. I think that those are the principle differences so far. I think that this administration also is a little bit more cautious on the subject of Taiwan. Its actions have been kind of all over the place, but I felt that the Trump administration, towards the end, were in the process of basically tearing up the rule book. They essentially threw out the policy on contact with Taiwan officials. They had scheduled a visit by the U.S. ambassadors, the United Nations to Taiwan, which was would’ve been an event revelant with symbolism, if not absolute recognition of Taiwan as a sovereign state in the international community. So this administration has been more assertive in talking about a one China policy. And although there’s some missteps, I think they do believe in it. Kaiser: So I’m going to want to ask you about the extent to which Biden finds himself constrained, looking over his shoulder onto his right wing, as you said. And I will ask you about what space there is for him. And you’ve addressed quite a bit of that in your posting for Brookings. But before we do that, let me give you an opportunity to simply lay out what you think is missing or misguided in terms of the Biden administration’s approach to China. What is the heart of your critique? Jeff: I think that Secretary Blinken’s formulation of a relationship with China that is largely competitive, that is collaborative when possible and adversarial when it must be, is not a bad formulation. I think that those three aspects of a modern U.S.-China relationship are realities. You can accept that framework and still wonder about the administration’s approach to implementation of it. If your approach is one in which, first of all, you’ll notice they never use the word cooperate. They use collaborate in that instance. And most of the time, since then they talk about interests being aligned. It’s as if it’s a, I don’t know, it’s the C word. It’s a word they’re not willing to use, as if they think that talking about cooperating with China, leaves them open to the charge of being soft on China, which is quite amazing to me. I mean, the thought that we can’t cooperate with another major power on issues like combating the current or the next pandemic, which there’s a decent chance it will come from Asia, since the last two did. Cooperating with China on climate change, which this administration has identified as an existential challenge. And where China and the United States are the two chief emitters of greenhouse gases. Cooperation on non-proliferation, which essentially means North Korea and Iran, where we’ve cooperated in the past. Our interests aren’t wholly aligned, but there’s a significant area of overlap, and we’re not going to solve those problems without working with China. I think that one can reapportion those three buckets in a different way than they have. If you look at the comments that senior leaders in the administration make, they are invariably all about competition, severe competition, extreme competition, strategic competition, never about cooperation, never about common interests. I think that they need to think much longer and harder than they have about economic issues, and particularly about the issue of decoupling. They’ve said almost nothing on the subject. They’ve just sort of trundled along with individual agencies, adding Chinese companies to the entity list, which forbids them to interact with American companies, with maintaining the tariffs inherited from the Trump administration, 20, 25% on Chinese products with a substantial cost for American companies and American consumers. And if you listen to administration officials, they will acknowledge, they don’t have a trade policy. They don’t have a trade policy towards China. They don’t have a trade policy towards Asia. They don’t have a trade policy globally. And what Asians care most about in their relationship with the U.S., frankly, is economic and trade issues. I mean, security issues matter to them, but if you don’t have an economic and trade policy, you’re not an actor in Asia. I mean, all the countries in Asia have intensive economic relationships with China. In almost all cases, China is their number one trading partner. In many cases, it’s becoming a leading investor. And if all we can do is carp about the spread of Chinese influence and not offer anything of our own, then it’s no surprise that the objective of making friends and influencing people among partners and allies is going to have a very low ceiling. I mean, take one example, this isn’t in Asia, but the recent switch of Nicaragua from recognizing Taiwan to recognizing the PRC. This seemed to shock the administration. The State Department put out a statement saying that Nicaragua had excluded itself from democratic nations of the western hemisphere by doing so. Actually, not only just the United States, but virtually every country in Latin America recognizes the PRC. But just leave that aside for a moment. Leave aside the hypocrisy of the statement. Why should we be surprised? The PRC is waving lots of money at Nicaragua for development projects, as they are with all recipients of the Belt and Road Initiative. They are ready, willing, and able to provide infrastructure projects. Whereas, the United States has imposed a series of sanctions on Nicaragua because the Ortega regime is undemocratic, authoritarian, and frankly, a terrible regime, okay? So there, there are reasons for imposing sanctions and I accept those. But don’t be surprised if a country, when it’s given the choice between someone who’s imposing sanctions every chance they have and someone who’s waving a lot of money at them, make a choice that is contrary to what we’re seeking. Kaiser: Indeed, indeed. To your point about what we are bringing to the table when it comes to Asia, Evan Feigenbaum had a very clever turn of phrase. He said that, “Oh yes, we are bringing security, right? But that makes us sort of the Hessians of Asia. All we’re doing is just sort of being mercenary soldiers.” In my day-to-day work, I hear a lot of people complain that the Biden team doesn’t have a real China strategy or variations on what one heard during Trump, like the administration doesn’t have China strategy as a China attitude. Is it though, an unalloyed good to have an explicit strategy? And if so, is it wise to talk about it explicitly and publicly? Jeff: Kaiser, I think you’ve got to have a strategy. Day-to-day, the strategy does not drive every single decision, a tremendous number of decisions you make are tactical decisions. But they’ve got to be within a broad framework. Now, administrations always pride themselves on putting out national security strategies and Indo-Pacific strategies. And if not China strategies, then at least China military reports. To be candid, these reports, a lot of effort goes into them, a lot of clearances, a lot of actors and different agencies. And then they go into the safe and they are referred to only when someone writes a speech. If you’re in a principal’s meeting of the National Security Council, the thought that someone would pull out a national security strategy paper or a China strategy paper and say, “But aha, here the strategy paper says such and such, we’ve got to do that.” That doesn’t happen. But it does condition the way everyone in the administration, different agencies thinks about China. And so if you don’t have a general strategy, you have different agencies running off in different directions, doing different things, which conflict with each other. I think back to probably the best national security advisor we ever had was Brent Scowcroft. He was very clear with other agencies about what the objectives were on China. It was the White House that was very clear about what they wanted done. And agencies essentially fell in line, whether it was because of a document or because of a general effective coordination, which didn’t really require a document, although one can argue about that. But I think you need to have some kind of a framework. And I mean, I tried to spell out some of the elements of the framework in my paper, talking about seeking a limit to decoupling, the understanding the decoupling comes at a great cost. Trying to narrow the areas of decoupling to those who are vital to U.S. interests rather than making it a reflex. Talking about the recognition of China as a major power with its own legitimate interests in which it’s highly unlikely there’s going to be a winner and loser in sporting sense in international affairs going forward. The chances are in 20 years, in 30 years, in 40 years, we’re still going to be dealing with an international system in which the United States, and China, and quite a few other countries are major actors. So we need to think about how we’re going to compete with China, but also live with China and coexist and cooperate with China. I think we need to think much more and be more vocal about people-to-people ties. That’s a phrase that generally gets short shrift among serious strategists. They think, “Oh, people-to-people, that’s for tourists.” People-to-people is at the core of U.S.-China relations. The U.S. technology revolution of the last 20 years in Silicon Valley wouldn’t exist without Asians of which Chinese are a large part. All you have to do is go onto any campus in the United States, in the engineering school, in the mathematics, science, technology department and look at a number of Asians and look at number of Chinese who are making major contributions to American innovation in those institutions. And the thought that we can descend into a hostile relationship with China and expect that they’ll continue to be an open spigot of top quality educated Chinese coming to the United States and being the backbone of most disciplines, either at some point, the Chinese party state will crack down on it because of the level of hostility or ordinary Chinese will decide they don’t want to come here anymore. It’s just not worth it. It’s a country that disrespects them. And then they’re all reading about anti-Asian violence in the United States and about attitudes in the United States. And they’ll either stay at home or they’ll go somewhere else. There are other countries that would love to have them and that will be our loss. That’s an area where I’m frankly, baffled that the administration has not been more vocal and more forthcoming, particularly given the level as a practical political matter, the Asian American support for the Democratic Party in recent elections. They’re aware of that in this administration. And that isn’t something that can be taken for granted. Kaiser: Yeah. Your words, Jeff, truly warm my heart. I mean, I’m in such profound agreement with you, everything that you’ve just said. It seems to me that there are some unavoidable assumptions that underlie and you might even say practically define one’s approach to China. And these are always questions that I like to put to people in conversations like this. First is, what do you reckon China’s ambitions to be? Because if you think China is hellbent on displacing the U.S. as the global hegemon, you’re going to come to very different conclusions about what we need to do than if you assume China only seeks primacy regionally and doesn’t desire the whole enchilada. So let’s start with that one. I mean, because these days it looks like, I mean, what I keep hearing is that while that strategy document isn’t even tucked into a safe, there is a book that people do come out with at the principles meetings, and that is Rush Doshi’s The Long Game. And apparently it’s now required reading on the Biden-China team. It seems to be sort of regarded as gospel when it comes to the question of Chinese intentions. Do you get that sense? And what do you personally see China’s scope of ambitions to be? Jeff: Well, I think Rush wrote a good book. Rush is a fine fellow. He did great research, it’s well documented. I think that Rush’s three stages of Chinese development, building, blunting, and displacement as I recall. Building China to compete with U.S., blunting U.S. aggression, and displacing the U.S. as a global leader is how he conceives of it. I think the building is about right, the blunting is about right. And the displacement is made up. It’s a guess, okay? His guess could be right. His guess could be wrong. But the evidence for it is, let’s say is lacking. I don’t see, in China’s behavior, something that suggests the ability to become the hegemon to use the popular IRR phrasing of a global system. They have no allies in the world. If you get past Pakistan and question marks about Cambodia. Chinese soft power is basically economic-commercial. There is not global admiration for the Chinese system of governance. Among Chinese speaking peoples in Asia, Taiwan, and Singapore there’s no admiration for it and no desire to emulate it, no less elsewhere. I don’t see China as effectively having the ability to pursue a global ideological agenda of spreading its system beyond its borders. There’s a lot of discussion about the degree to which China wants to explore this model. Xí Jìnpíng 习近平 said some things in various addresses to Party congress’s and plenums about the utility of aspects of Chinese governance that other countries might find valuable. That’s a long way from Stalin did in 1945 to 1953, where he basically imposed communist systems upon all of Eastern Europe and then attempted to do it elsewhere. And what China has been doing is, it has been exporting some of its systems of surveillance, which I think authoritarian countries find valuable. And frankly, so do some democratic countries, for law enforcement purposes. But that isn’t driving countries into making ideological choices about the kind of governance system they’re going to have. Those are driven by internal dynamics. And I don’t see Chinese missionary efforts to affect that. The Chinese, I think, are equal opportunity traders. Their relationship with Europe, with countries in Latin America and Asia is not related to regime type. And in the rule system, generally, if you look at all the international institutions that have been built up since 1945, China has not been the dominant rule maker in any of them. At least until the last few years, the rules have been basically written by the U.S. and allies. Now it’s another question about the degree to which China should be brought in as rule maker and I hope we can talk about that a bit. But they have not played that role historically in the thought that China is going to show up in the WTO, or WHO, or the UN, or any of these other organizations and suddenly going to attract a vast following in rewriting charters and objectives, I think is fanciful. So I think like great powers generally throughout history, their objective is to maximize their influence. Now historically, that’s mainly been Asia-Pacific region, the area of greatest concern and interest to them from a security point of view and also from an economic point of view. But clearly their ambitions for influence and for interaction do go beyond Asia. And I regard that as normal. I don’t see that there is anything exclusive about the U.S. relationship with, let’s say Saudi Arabia and the Chinese relationship with Saudi Arabia. The relationships may be competitive to a degree, but the thought that China is one day going to be the dominant actor in these relationships around the world, I find very unlikely. And I think that they have a realistic sense of their own limitations and they are not expecting or anticipating doing that. They do want to expand influence, but China’s got enough problems at home so that a hell-bent effort on becoming a global hegemon in the face of the major challenges of home, which are going to determine the future of their governance and the future of their society, that seems to me an unlikely choice. Kaiser: Yeah. Again, in full agreement with you. A second question, and I do want to get to talk about China’s role in the so-called rules-based international order and whether it will become more of a rule maker rather than a rule taker. But there is a second sort of foundational question, and that is what are China’s legitimate interests? Where should the United States draw the line? What is out of bounds and what is in bounds? Because it seems to me any form of coexistence involves a recognition of those interests from both sides. And that is going to involve a compromise and departure, certainly, from where we are right now. Jeff: Great question, Kaiser. I say legitimate interests, certainly one obviously is their economic commercial relationships with other countries in the world. Those are a legitimate interest of China. The United States should accept the reality and we frankly have no choice but to accept the reality that China’s going to be a big actor in its economic and commercial relationships around the world. And we should not be wasting our time with speeches the way the Trump administration did, denouncing the Belt and Road Initiative and denouncing China’s predatory economic behavior here and there as imperialists thinking that countries in the world will somehow, the scales will fall from their eyes and they will suddenly see the light. And they’ll say, “Oh, we’re not interested in trade and investment ties with China anymore.” It’s a nonsensical approach and we may as well accept the reality, okay? That’s one. Second, we need to understand that China is going to be a great power, if it isn’t already. And I would say it probably is already. And being a great power means a military that matches its national security needs. Now, I think we need to watch to see do they develop a military capability that is purely based upon the wishes of projection of great powers. That is, “Gee, we are a great power and therefore, we need to have a military commensurate with our great power status, so that we can act around the world as a great power.” I don’t think that that’s a standard that they should seek or that we should accept. I think that China’s legitimate military interests are those consistent with a reasonable national security strategy for China rather than be a global military competitor. I think the third is the right of China to have its own political, economic, and social system. Clearly the Chinese have a fear of so-called color revolutions that we’ve seen in the 20 years, where states in Central Asia, the Middle East have been subject to internal pressures that have attempted to convert them from autocracies into more democratic systems. The Chinese have tended to attribute that to American pressure. I think wrongly, these generally come from domestic reasons. But one can’t control perceptions. The Chinese perceive that we are a threat to the stability and the sanctity of their system. And certainly, there’s enough evidence in American political speeches for them to believe that. And I said, during the Trump administration, it would’ve been a logical conclusion, frankly. I think that whatever we may think of the communist system and whatever wishes we may have for China to develop a more participatory pluralistic and democratic system. And that’s not something I strongly believe in, I imagine you do, and all of us in the United States do. Kaiser: Yes. Jeff: We need, at the same time, to recognize that these decisions are not going to be made by you and me or by anyone in the United States. They never are. And when we attempt to make them, we both frustrate ourselves and we create turmoil that we may be able to affect outcomes, but not in the way we want. There are unforeseen consequences from what we do, when we try to destabilize countries. We should accept that China is going to determine its own future, while without the wisdom or the guidance of the United States. And finally, and this one I think is complicated. China’s territorial claims, which means at this point, primarily Taiwan, somewhat the South China Sea and the East China Sea. I think we need to acknowledge them. We need to show respect for them. And let me define the word respect for the moment. But we do not need to accept them. And then these verbs are hard to parse for Americans who like straight talk. We established relations with China on the basis of acknowledging the Chinese position, that Taiwan was a part of China. We didn’t accept the Chinese position that Taiwan is a part of China. And by acknowledging it, what we were saying was, “We are not going to be frontal in challenging your claim. Your claim is your claim and we are not denying your claim. We are not asserting the validity of your claim, at the same time. We are basically recognizing it is an extremely sensitive issue for China because of history that these areas are all areas that historically were claimed by China and the Chinese nationalism is not going to quietly surrender these claims.” So we need to respect them in the sense that we need to understand they come out of Chinese history and that they are supported, overwhelmingly, by the people of China. But at the same time, we do not endorse or accept them in the sense that we do not think that PRC rule should be imposed upon Taiwan until and unless there is a voluntary, uncoerced agreement between Taiwan and Beijing, so it’s a recognition. The Chinese use the term core interests. That was a term that we didn’t much like. I don’t think that we should be using it, but we should understand that these are the most sensitive national issues for China, which means a high degree of care in the way we handle these issues. Kaiser: Thank you for that very thoughtful answer. Implicit in that is the answer to another question, which is really about what American national interests are and whether we are able to accept a genuinely multi-polar world. I think that we sort of pay lip service to the idea, but we don’t really change our behavior and continue to behave in ways that has Beijing concluding something. This is what really keeps me up at night and has me worried. I am genuinely afraid that Beijing has concluded or is close to concluding at this point, and by that I mean that a critical mass of influential Party leaders have reached the conclusion that the U.S. position, irrespective of what party is in power, who occupies the White House, is now fundamentally hostile to the idea of China emerging as a peer competitor, as a great power. The forwarding of China’s rise, the preservation of unipolar hegemony. I mean, do you think that this idea has or might soon to be so unchallenged within Xi’s inner circle, that we’re at a point of no return? Jeff: That’s another really hard question to answer. Gosh, my sense is that that notion on the Chinese side has gained widespread acceptance, that it is not unchallenged, but that it is the dominant view at the moment. That it reflects views on the Chinese side and also reflects perceptions of the way the U.S. has behaved, that persuade them that there is nothing that can be done to prevent a basically zero sum conflict of interests. Now to me, there are lots of shades of gray and the Chinese Communist Party certainly is capable of nuanced thinking. On the one hand, I think they think that containment of China which is sort of the favorite word they’ve developed over the decades, is deep in the heart of U.S. policy. And that is going to remain the case. The question of the degree to which that policy requires that the U.S. seek to hold back China rather than simply compete or out-compete China, I think that’s an open question. I think that’s an open question, frankly, on both sides. Is it onto the Trump administration? I felt that it was, picture a couple of sprinters running a 400 meter dash and there are two ways you can run. And one is outrun the other guy and the other is to try to trip the other guy. And I felt that the Trump administration thought that tripping the other guy was a pretty useful way of winning the race. I think in this administration, there’s more of an emphasis on the straightforward competition, but there hasn’t been a complete abrogation of the thought that we have to hold China back in some ways. And look, I mean, inevitably we’re going to hold China back on its access to military technology, that’s a certainty. No matter who’s in power in the United States. And inevitably, in the area of technology, access to technology, technology sales, technology transfer, there’s going to be constraints that go beyond purely military, that are going to find ways of trying to ensure a dominant role for U.S. technology in key areas going forward. And that, in some cases, will mean depriving China of access to technology. So there are a lot of gray areas in the middle here, but it doesn’t require that every decision be in terms of, is this helping the United States and thereby hurting China? Or is it helping China and thereby hurting the United States? There needs to be some understanding that there are going to be some decision areas where maybe it’s mutually beneficial. Kaiser: So let’s talk about how you see China in its relationship with the international system, the rules-based international order, some call it. And here, we’re talking about not just things like multinational organizations, like the United Nations and all of the organizations underneath that, not just about standard setting bodies as well, but also about the Bretton Woods system. You’ve made clear that you wouldn’t like to see China supplant the U.S. as the main rule maker, but you also believe that Americans will have to accept that China is going to be a rule shaper, that’s the term that you’ve used. And given China’s sheer size and its economic clout, that seems only fair. Do you think that current Biden administration policy is making the accommodations that will be necessary to allow China to take its rightful place as a rule shaper? And what are your ideas about how to get China involved, invested in international system as a participant? Jeff: I haven’t seen any indication that the Biden administration has thought about acceptance of China or ways to induce China to participate constructively in the international system. Every senior level statement I see from the administration talks about ways in which China defies the international system, and then does not proceed to, “Here’s what they need to be in conformity.” There’s obviously a certain arrogance about this, leaving aside the degree to which we conform with the international system. We can leave that aside for the moment, but things like the UN Convention and the law of the sea, which we have never ratified or the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty which we have never ratified, or any of a number of ways in which we have chosen to define the international rules-based system, in a manner consistent with our immediate objectives and interests. I have not seen that from the administration, but you remember back under Bush II, George W. Bush administration, Bob Zelek, who was then deputy Secretary of State gave a speech talking about China as a responsible stakeholder in the international system. He was talking about that as an aspirational objective. He wasn’t describing a present reality. And the Chinese reaction to that at first was baffled. They had trouble with the translation of it and some trouble with the concept. But over time they, I think, began to understand that this was, from their perspective, a constructive formulation that allowed them to play a role in, I don’t think Zelek talked specifically about rule making, but it was implicit in the concept. Now, President Obama was quite explicit about the need to take countries like China, and India, and Brazil, countries that had been relatively minor actors when the whole Bretton Woods system was set up and give them a role commensurate with their newfound power. That was an explicit objective of administration policy. Trump with America First, obviously didn’t believe in that. And the Biden people have frankly been silent on that. They’ve just been focusing on the negative side. So there’s a number of aspects to this issue, Kaiser. And one is the whole weakness of the institutional framework of the international system. China criticizes the UN Conception, which emphasizes alliances and partnerships. Says, “That’s all irrelevant.” That says a small clique of countries. What really matters is the UN, okay? That’s what they say. Well, the UN is a pretty feckless body as we know. All of the major bodies in the UN system, whether it’s the UNGA, the UN General Assembly, the IMF, the World Bank, the World Health Organization, the World Trade Organization, all are in need of fundamental reform and fundamental restructuring if they’re to play the kind of role that they played for a while and that they need to play. I think that’s an enormous agenda. The thought that we could both bring China into a system of those institutions and at the same time reform those institutions, that’s probably asking too much. But I think as a theoretical and as a policy objective, we need to be thinking in terms of both. Kaiser: Do you think that it’s too late, Jeff, for Biden to change his tune on China? Already the administration has used China to push so much of its agenda, the Innovation and Competition Act, the infrastructure plan. It seems like everything the administration announces is couched in this language of competition with China. So has he left any space for himself to be able to, if not make a 180, at least to turn in a less oblique angle? Jeff: Yeah. I think you’ve framed it right, Kaiser. I think that first of all, this year is an election year in the United States, leaving aside what’s going on in China with Party congress. And so the thought that we’re going to see serious adjustments in China policy and election year when the Democrats feel highly vulnerable seems unlikely. But at some stage, we discussed earlier the fact that this administration doesn’t have an economic trade policy. At some point they’re going to have to have one. Yeah, you can’t go four years without a trade policy. And when the economic agencies are heard from, in particular treasury and commerce, both of whom have secretaries who are Janet Yellen and Gina Armando are going to be heard from. And they are more preachers of openness, and market access, and the international system than the voices we’ve heard so far. Now, that doesn’t mean a reversion to 20 years ago, but it does mean that there’s going to have to be a greater balance in policy between economic interests and other interests, where the economic interests at the moment are not represented at the table, frankly. So I think that that’s one thing that’s going to happen at some stage, I don’t know when. Kaiser: Likely after November. I mean – Jeff: Yeah. I mean, after November I think is right. I think that the fundamentals of what Biden wants to do are in place, but personalities matter. I don’t believe in the school of the extreme realist thought that countries are just sort of Newtonian objects moving through space. Actors matter and like in this administration, for example, I think John Kerry has played a role. I think obviously he played a central role in formulating the U.S.-China Climate Change Agreement with Xie Zhenhua, that wouldn’t have happen without him, without his determined efforts. But beyond that, I think that the phone call, I guess it was a Zoom meeting or they don’t use Zoom, whatever they use. The encrypted webinar that Biden and Xi Jinping had. I think that John Kerry had a lot to do with that as well is my guess. I think that Biden pays attention to John Kerry. John Kerry used to be his Senate colleague and was chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. And he’s someone who Biden regards as a peer. And I don’t think that Kerry has been altogether satisfied with the overall framing of policy. I’m speaking from 3,000 miles away in Venice, California. But rumors do make it across the country. So I think that that’s… I’ve mentioned Yellen, I’ve mentioned Armando, and Kerry, these are people whose voices have been somewhat muted, but who may have different views. I think the general framework is in place. I don’t expect, as you say, a 180. I think as you put it an acute angle or an oblique angle of that is possible. I think that one of the reasons that Biden did that virtual meeting with Xi Jinping, was he was concerned about the degree to which the relationship was off the tracks. Succession of shouting matches by senior officials in meetings with poorly prepared agendas, where both sides were posturing to each other’s domestic audiences, I think that that did not impress Biden. And I think that Kerry probably helped reinforce the perception on Biden’s part. So when there is a concern that a relationship is going to run off the tracks, I think that that’s when one sees Biden become more personally, directly involved, which I don’t think is a bad thing. I think that Biden’s own instincts on China are a balance of competition and cooperation. I’ve noticed that he seems to be unafraid of using the word cooperation, unlike the people who work for him. Kaiser: Yeah, yeah. He’s a little looser in the vocabulary in both directions. So a good portion of the piece that we’re discussing today is about, of course, Biden’s domestic political circumstances. And the extent to which his choices are circumscribed by Congress and by the voters who will go to the polls in November. So the conventional wisdom is that he has his hands tied, but are they really tied? I mean, you cite that Chicago Council poll on American attitudes toward China as evidenced that the so-called bipartisan consensus on China isn’t maybe as pronounced, at least within the public certainly, as people would have you believe. And I certainly agree. I’m sure that you still talk to lots of people in the Democratic Party, whether in Congress or in the White House, and I assume that you’ve raised these poll results with them. Do Democrats feel like this gives them more space when it comes to China? Do you get any sense that maybe there is a little bit of an opening? Jeff: I mean, I talked to people who were going into the Biden administration before January of 2021, and I made the argument that there was nothing that they could do to satisfy the hard Republican right on China. And we named names and they wholeheartedly agreed and understood that point. I was pushing on an open door when I made that point. It doesn’t matter what Biden does, he will continue to be attacked from the right on China. You look at the ads that are coming out already now, in congressional races around the United States and Republicans in primaries are denouncing the Democrats or even their own primary opponents in the Republican Party as being stooges of the Chinese Communist Party. That will happen no matter what. So the question then becomes, how much do you feel the need to accommodate that perception of people who are never going to be with you anyway and who are going to use China as a political weapon, no matter what? Now, it’s complicated because within Washington, I wrote that there is not a consensus within the Democratic Party on attitude towards China. And I was showing that Chicago Global Council poll, which showed numbers on whether China’s an adversary, whether China-U.S. policy should be aimed at preventing Chinese influence around the world, whether Chinese researchers and students should be blocked from coming to the United States, whether tariffs should be raised. And in every single case, there was a very large gap between Democratic responses and Republican responses. With Democratic responses being, let’s say calmer about China than Republicans. But that is candidly not reflected inside the Congress. I think that I will give the administration credit for correctly reading the Congress, that there is a reasonably hard line consensus within the Congress for a policy which focuses on strategic competition with China, to the exclusion of other issues. That said, in my experience in the U.S. government and through the odd years, administrations are perfectly capable of leading on China policy, preferably with Congress, but also it can be done without Congress. And I could cite many, many instances, obviously in the George H. W. Bush years when Congress kept passing legislation demanding conditions upon most favored nation status. And President Bush kept vetoing it every year and continued with his policy, despite a torrent of congressional criticism. In my time in the White House, from 2009 to 2011, I did not find congressional pressure close to unbearable on any aspect of China policy. China policy on The Hill has always been more hawkish and always been tougher than the administration policy forever, forever. That will never change. But an administration that knows what it wants, can get where it wants by leadership, by finding the right people in Congress to bring them along. And yes, congressional [inaudible] are a constraint, but they need not drive policy. That’s not what our constitution intended and not what any administration should want. There are a couple of pieces of legislation now, the Compete with China Act, which is mostly involved in building up U.S. industrial capabilities. It’s mostly what it does. And uses China as sort of a talisman. Look at China, we have to compete with them. Let’s do all of these things at home. Let’s rebuild our semiconductor industry. Let’s rebuild our educational system, let’s rebuild our manufacture capacity. Let’s rebuild here and there. That’s all good, frankly. I mean, it’s unfortunate that we have to use an excuse to do these thing, which we should be doing anyway. There’s some language in that legislation, there’s money. There’s a lot of money for propaganda against China for pointing out the flaws in the Chinese system. I’m not sure that that’s particularly good use of taxpayer money. I think that the time in which people look to BBC and VOA for the truth around the world has long passed in the era of globalization of news and the private news. So I think that’s frankly, mostly a waste of money. But that’s the main bit of legislation we’re looking at this year, which I don’t think need do too much damage to the relationship. If it’s looked at carefully, there’s a house version and a senate version with different language, with different consequences for the relationship in it. There are down the road, depending upon what happens in 2022 elections, there are other possibilities being discussed, such as limitations of scrutiny of U.S. outbound investment to China, which would be a big deal. It would be the first time in the world we have imposed broad scrutiny of outbound investments anywhere, aside from well – Kaiser: Cuba, Libya, North Korea. Jeff: Countries like Iran and North Korea. And I think that is something that bears close watching and where the business community, which is already deeply, deeply invested in China, needs to keep a close eye on that and needs to let the Congress know what they think of that before that creates a whole new reality. Kaiser: So if the Biden administration wanted to lower the temperature, what would you identify as some of the, let’s say more politically feasible things? I mean, because we do have to kind of acknowledge that yeah, they’re not completely constrained, but there are political hurdles that they would need to overcome. What are some of the things that they could do to signal an intention to lower the temperatures and things that the administration could do that might stand a chance at bringing congressional Democrats, at least, along with them? Jeff: Everything has risks and everything will get criticism. They need to start by understanding that. There’s not going to be a free ride in anything to do with China. I would say one obvious one is the Department of Justice, FBI, China Initiative, which is – Kaiser: On its last legs – Jeff: Creating a climate of fear on campuses around the United States. No other way of putting it. It’s a kind of Neo‐​McCarthyism in my view. The FBI denies it, but it’s frankly singling out Chinese and Chinese Americans for particular scrutiny and for, in some cases, ridiculous, trumped up legal charges and it is hurting us. It’s hurting individuals and it is hurting the United States as a nation. We talked about that a little bit earlier. That is one that, I mean, I’ve talked to people on The Hill, at least some people on The Hill on the foreign affairs side, understand one of them used the phrase abomination to me in talking about that program. Kaiser: That’s good to hear. Jeff: I think that there are going to have to be some compromises, but I’d start there. Secondly, tariffs, the Trump tariffs were completely arbitrary. Trump said repeatedly, “I love tariffs. Tariff wars are easy to win.” I don’t know an economist in the world who believes that, okay? None, we are to take Donald Trump’s ignorant rants on the subject of tariffs as guidance for U.S. policy in perpetuity? That’s ridiculous. There are thousands of businesses and millions of consumers in the United States who are being hurt by these tariffs. I’m not suggesting that these tariffs should just be lifted in a negotiation. They were put in place for reasons, but I don’t see any, at the moment, disposition on the part of the administration to negotiate on market access and on Chinese practices, like IPR violations or subsidies, export subsidies, subsidies for Chinese companies. I don’t see that they have a plan for negotiation on that, that might be usefully made part of a discussion about tariffs. Yeah, you don’t lift them all. You look around and see which ones will have the greatest impact, particularly at a time when we’re running 7.5% inflation. So I think those are two ripe candidates. I mean, the administration did negotiate a loosening of restrictions on journalists going in both directions. And they have made some minor adjustments in visas to, I think, make H-1B1 visas in the United States a little more secure and a little more available. But I think they can go much further on these. We shut down the Fulbright Program with China. That needs to be reversed. I mean, that should not be controversial. Kaiser: The Peace Corps too, yeah. Jeff: Peace Corps, we shut down as well. I mean, these are not national security issues. I mean, over the 50 years since Nixon went to China, we’ve built up tremendous people-to-people ties between our two countries, across every domain. And since Trump, we’ve been in the process of shutting them down. I think that the administration needs to come up with a sensible definition of what decoupling entails, what it entails in the military area, what entails in the technology area, what it entails in the economic area and try to limit that. I mean, the phrase has been high walls, small yards. I think that’s a good way of thinking about it. But I think they need to have a conception about decoupling that is much more constrained. It goes back to your question, Kaiser, earlier, do they need a strategy? Yeah, that’s one of the reasons you need a strategy. You need to know how you think about China in order to decide how you think about Chinese coming to the United States. And how you need to think about Chinese researchers and how you need to think about the attitude of ordinary Chinese towards America and what impact that has on the future of the planet. I mean, I have good friends at Brookings who have looked quite intensively at popular Chinese attitudes towards the United States, it is very dismaying what has happened in recent years. I mean, the years I lived in China, I have said many times that I never once encountered a manifestation of anti-Americanism, ever, in China. I’m not talking about editorials in the Global Times or things like that. I’m talking about in interpersonal activity, just none. Great warmth on the part of ordinary Chinese towards Americans, I fear that’s dissipating. And what I hear from friends who’ve looked at it closely is that there is evidence that that’s the case, maybe documentable evidence. And the thought that we can have a manageable relationship with China and the administration does talk about managing the relationship with China, I respect that. They don’t just talk about pulverizing China. They talk about managing the relationship, okay? But the thought that you can manage a relationship when the population of that country is moving towards outright hostility. And the same thing is happening on our side of course, if you look at ad polls, we’re creating a monster on both sides. This would be harder and harder to manage. That’s one of the reasons for example, the Chinese government has difficulty managing its relationship with Japan. I think China could manage a much more sensible, constructive relationship with Japan, except they’re always looking over their shoulder at the citizenry who bear long memories about Japanese atrocities in China and xenophobic attitudes among the broader population towards Japan in China. I would hate to see us reach the same point where the Chinese leadership is looking over its shoulder at its own population about whether it can have a constructive relationship with the United States. Kaiser: I worry about that too. And I think the point that you made about the importance of people to people relations is certainly not lost on this listenership anyway. In your estimation though, for the leadership, is Beijing eager for, or would it at least be receptive to and willing to reciprocate if we did pluck some of that lower hanging fruit that you enumerated? Things like restoration of Fulbrights or the Peace Corps. I mean, maybe at a higher tier, dropping some of the more onerous tariffs. If we did make clear our intention to lower the temperature, would Beijing be receptive and would it be willing to reciprocate? Jeff: The short answer is it’s hard to say unless you’re actually involved in a diplomatic negotiation because from the outside, you just see the hard line posturing and you don’t know what their degree of actual flexibility is until you get in the room with them over some months. But I mean, just two broad comments. Number one is that the Chinese system, historically, is not so much interested in low hanging fruit. Historically, their interest is in defining the overall character of the relationship. They want to know how do you see China? And they’ll go on at great length about how they see the United States. And their attitude is once we have each sincerely demonstrated our attitude towards the others, in terms of our objectives and our interests, the specific issues will fall into place. And historically, frankly, Americans have tended kind of in the opposite direction. Americans, historically, have figured, “Well, we’ve got big barriers in relationships. Let’s try to see what we can do. Let’s find the low hanging fruit. And we will build confidence as we accomplish small things, so that when we get to harder things we’ll have a basis for trust,” okay? I mean, you can transpose that to the Middle East, it’s our historic approach to Middle East peace negotiations. Kaiser: And you can transpose China’s attitude in that way to the India relationship. I was talking to a good friend of mine, who has been a reporter for the Hindu for a very long time, he’s based in Beijing. And one thing that he said was that India’s position is that they’ve got to resolve the border disputes, Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh, before the overall relationship can improve. And Beijing’s position has always been, “No, let’s get the entire relationship right and then the border will be resolved.” Yeah, so no, you’re absolutely right. That is a perfect characterization of how Beijing approaches it, which worries me, because that’s a profound disconnect. Jeff: Yes, that’s fascinating. Henry Kissinger talks quite a bit about this and his sympathy for the Chinese approach runs this way. He says that the Chinese attitude is that you can just solve a problem and then you can solve another problem. And doesn’t matter how many problems you solve, there’ll just be new problems that arise. So you’re always facing new problems. Whereas, if you agree on the framework, in their view, all the problems can be prioritized and dealt with. Not personally, I hate to be so wishy-washy, I think there’s wisdom in both frameworks, frankly speaking. But the Chinese have, in their discussions with the United States over much of the last year, have been quite adamant that they need signs, clear indications of the overall U.S. approach to China. And that we can’t just pick off climate change, or pick off this, or pick off that and expect cooperation when we have an overall policy of hostility. That’s what they’re saying. Well, that’s fine for them to say that. I don’t believe it. I mean, because in fact they did reach an agreement with Kerry on climate change after saying, “we can’t do these things.” So clearly they can do these things, but they still have a, if you will, cultural orientation away from the low hanging fruit approach. Kaiser: One last question for you before we move to recommendations. Even though you headed Asian Affairs at the NSC, one thing that’s consistent across all your writings on China, one thing that I think is a source of my admiration for all the work that you’ve done is that you never seem to view China or our bilateral relationship with China through that one singular lens of national security. And it strikes me, and this has been a consistent theme on the show, that we’re in a time where there is this kind of single lens view. Everyone only looks at China through this national security lens or too many people do in any case. Can you share with our listeners maybe, some of the precepts that you live by when it comes to thinking about China? You clearly have a broader and maybe, more holistic view of the relationship. And I’d love to hear what some of the maxims you live by are. Jeff: I guess my starting point in thinking about China comes back to what I said earlier, and that’s an appreciation of what the Chinese people and Chinese nation can accomplish. And never underestimating that, you are underestimate it at your peril. And that is not meant to conjure up a China threat. It is simply a statement of reality of the last 40 years, what they have accomplished from such a low base. And the way in which they set their minds to achieving an objective and the way in which they can marshal resources from all across the society to achieving it. We all remember when COVID-19 first struck in Wuhan and the Chinese government announced they were building a, I can’t remember, I’ll get the numbers wrong. But either it was a 10,000 bed hospital in, I can’t remember how many days, a few weeks. Kaiser: Like a week yeah. Jeff: It was ridiculous, okay? Kaiser: 3,000 bed I think it was, yeah. But yeah, yeah. Jeff: Whatever it was, okay. Well, whatever it was, no one else could do it. And they did it, okay? I remember when I was stationed in Hong Kong in the mid 1990s, there was a famous China watcher there who said he wasn’t worried about Chinese technology he said somewhat dismissively. He said, because anytime he went to China, he couldn’t find a functioning flush toilet. So that’s one of the reasons why he was not confident about their nuclear power plant, just 40 miles away from Hong Kong. I always got a laugh when he said that. And here we are, 25 years later and they’ve circled the dark side of the moon, they have a space program to Mars. They’ve identified all of the major technologies of the 21st century and asserted their desire to be leaders in many or most. They’re leading the world in construction of electrically powered vehicles. So I start with, so never underestimating the nation. Then the second place I go to is trying to come up with a realistic assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the Chinese Communist Party. And I know that when we say the Chinese Communist Party, we’re all supposed to tremble and it’s a fairly complex operation. It does some things well, and it does some other things terribly and oppressively, but it’s a mixture. And if we just caricature it, we’re not going to react to it sensibly. It’s got 90 million members. It is capable of tremendous message discipline and of carrying out plans and directives decided by the center at provincial and regional levels in the way that other countries can’t. It’s able to think longer term than Democratic systems find comfortable or normal. And it has overseen this spectacular rise of China into economic middle class prosperity and great power status in 30, 40 years. The weaknesses, it’s oppressive, information flow is uncertain towards the center. Who is talking to Xi Jinping? Is he hearing what he should be hearing? In a system like that, it cracked up under Mao. No one was willing to tell Mao what Mao needed to hear, everyone was terrified of him. One doesn’t hear encouraging signs of the readiness of people to offer different views to Xi Jinping, since he has acquired leadership of all aspects of the Chinese system in a way that hasn’t been the case for some years. Its treatment of minorities, the absence of rule of law, we know all of these things well, and the absence of human right protection. So I think we need to understand what China is about and then understand what the Communist Party is about in a serious way instead of just having a comic book picture of it. Kaiser: It’s just astonishing to me how consistently people are only able to focus on one side of the ledger, either the plus column or the minus column and to the exclusion of the other. Jeff: I think we’ve covered a lot of the issues in previous questions when you talked about what are China’s international ambitions? And I think that that is one that we, as Americans, need to focus on. But I don’t think it serves our interests or it’s intellectually honest to imagine an end state of China’s international ambitions. And so the teleological way that, 40 the years from now, they intend to dominate the world. I think that’s a ridiculous way of thinking about countries in a multi-polar world, which this world is going to be in the coming century. China is a major power, it’s feeling its oats. It’s throwing its elbows around, but it’s got severe limitations at home. We haven’t gotten into those, well, I’m sure you’ve done those in your other broadcasts about the demographic crisis China faces and whether China’s going to continue to be wage competitive at the low end of the income scale. Whether China can continue to create the jobs they need to, for all the kids coming out of universities. Whether a heavy handed approach to regulation of the business community, that has been in evidence for the last year, is going to be successful in creating the kind of moral society that Xi Jinping is talk about or rather is going to stamp out innovation. I mean, all sensible Chinese leaders know that the private sector is driving China’s economic growth and private sector and foreign investment. And they’re not a straight line, innovation doesn’t work in straight lines. You have to allow for innovation. And something happens way over in the corner there that then affects your progress in areas you really care about. And if you’re just, as they are now, saying, “We’re not going to tolerate unfettered growth in social media, internet technology, home tutoring, financial services.” I mean, they need to be very, very careful thinking that you can just squeeze one end of the economy and it’s not going to come out in ways that you don’t like elsewhere. Kaiser: Yeah. No, that’s another can of worms. I mean, we can spend another hour talking about the ins and outs of this Red New Deal. But thank you so much, Ambassador Jeffrey Bader, for taking the time to speak with me and for sharing the fruits of your truly formidable intellect and your very rich experience with our audience. I’m really honored and it’s just been such a great pleasure. Before I let you go, let’s give some recommendations as we do on every show. But first, a very quick reminder that Sinica Podcast is powered by The China Project. And if you like the work that we do here, the best way to support us is by subscribing to The China Project’s daily Access newsletter. I’ll leave it at that. You know the drill. Okay, recommendations. Jeff, what do you have for us? Jeff: Sure, Kaiser. I think, well, I just read a book by a gentleman named Stephen Platt called Autumn in the Heavenly Kingdom. Kaiser: Fantastic book. I love it. Jeff: Yeah, there’s a lot to learn from that. When you read of 15 years, 20 years of mayhem in Central and Southern China, with 20 or 30 million people killed, you gain an appreciation for the obsession with stability that Chinese, high and low have. You also are reminded of the gaps between North and South China. North China was Manchu dominated, South China was Han dominated. And you also are reminded of the remnants of imperialism and the impact of imperialism on China in terms ofoutside powers in the 1850s and 1860s, which was horrendous. And which Chinese see in disguised form in much 20th century behavior. So I think that’s well worth a read. Kaiser: Absolutely. Stephen Platt has another book that I absolutely loved as well, Imperial Twilight it’s called. And it’s sort of about China on the brink of the Opium War and the run up to the Opium War. That’s a fantastic book. But Autumn in the Heavenly Kingdom was so very, very good. It focuses on the Shield King, on Hóng Xiùquán ‘s 洪秀全 cousin and – Jeff: The Shield King, yes. Kaiser: His story, yeah. Which is an angle that I wouldn’t have thought to take. Because the focus is always on Hong Xiuquan himself, but his cousin’s experience and I’m spacing his name right now, I’ll maybe go back – Jeff: Hóng Réngān 洪仁玕. Kaiser: Yeah, yeah. Okay. Jeff: Yeah, it’s fascinating. I agree. I tell you why it’s fascinating for you, and me, and many others, Kaiser, is that he was the guy in the middle. He was here, he had lived with the missionaries in Hong Kong and he understood how Westerners thought and he wanted to bring Western ways to China, Western industry, Western knowledge to China. On the other hand, he was the cousin of the Qing king, of Hong Xiuquan. And he was the chief actor for the Taipings and then ultimately in resisting Imperial forces, which allied themselves with the Manchu dynasty to try to crush the Taipings. And so these, if you will, well-intentioned people who one understood both sides got ripped apart. That’s the – Kaiser: I know how he feels. I mean, it’s astonishing to me how close he came to succeeding in bringing in the British on the side of the Taiping. I mean, it reminds me so much of that contemporaneous war that was being fought on the other side of the world, where we almost, I mean, it was touch and go there for a little while. So dependent on American cotton exports that the Brits almost sided with the American South, still sort of smiting about 1776 too. So yeah, yeah. It just reminds you of just so much contingency in history and yeah. Yeah, fantastic book and great recommendation. I have a couple of historical books that I want to recommend as well. And I’m going to sort of re-recommend things that were recommended by other recent guests, because that’s all I’ve had time to do. I’ve been trying to be good about reading the books that other guests have been recommending. Thank you for recommending one I’ve already read. Let me just second too, excellent, excellent recommendations from recent shows. I’ve plunged into them, and reading them in parallel. One was Anthea Roberts’ recommendation of the book, The Master and His Emissary by the psychiatrist, Iain McGilchrist, which it was fascinating enough at first, just talking about the two hemispheres of the brain and really upending so much of the popular understanding of the function of the right and left hemispheres of the brain. But most intriguing of all, he is relating it to culture and to the historical development of the West versus the rest. And that part is just more speculative for sure, but more intriguing as well. You’ll be hearing more on this sort of thing on a big show that I’m working on for this series. The other is this fabulous book recommended by Dan Wong of Gavekal Dragonomics, who was on the show a few weeks ago, that’s called Unfabling the East. And, Jeffrey, if you haven’t read this, I highly recommend it. It’s called Unfabling the East: The Enlightenment’s Encounter with Asia by Jürgen Osterhammel, translated from the German. For my money, literally for my money, I went and bought it in hardcover, it’s just the best work of history I have read in years. Again, this one has already made its way into my prep notes for this show that I have planned. So stay tuned for that. Jeffrey, thank you once again. It’s just been an honor to be able to have you on the program. And I do hope that we can have you back again because there’s still so very much to talk about. And I so enjoyed this. Jeff: Well, thank you so much, Kaiser. I really enjoyed it. Enjoyed hearing your perceptions, no doubt in large part, since they’re similar to mine. And I hope that next time we do this, we’ll be able to report on a China and a U.S. that have moved in different directions from where they are right now. And we can have a happy, more upbeat conversation. Kaiser: Well, here’s to that. The Sinica Podcast is powered by The China Project and is a proud part of the Sinica Network. Our show is produced and edited by me, Kaiser Kuo. We would be delighted if you drop us an email at sinica@thechinaproject.com or just give us a rating and a review on Apple Podcasts, as this really does help people discover the show. Meanwhile, follow us on Twitter or on Facebook at @supchinanews. And be sure to check out all the shows in the Sinica Network. Thanks for listening and see you next week. Take care.]]> Obama and China’s Rise: An Insider’s Account of America’s Asia Strategy. In this conversation, he offers a candid critique of the Biden China policy to date. Note that this conversation was taped in mid-February — before the Russian invasion of Ukraine began, and before the Department of Justice announced the end of the “China Initiative.” Note that this conversation was taped in mid-February — before the Russian invasion of Ukraine began, and before the Department of Justice announced the end of the “China Initiative.” 3:23 – How viewing China over 40 years of rapid development has shaped the way Jeff thinks about China 8:54 – Jeff Bader’s critique of the Biden administration’s China policy 19:40 – Is it important to have a China strategy? 24:55 – Right-sizing China’s ambitions: Is Rush Doshi right? 31:17 – Defining China’s legitimate interests 38:31 – Has China already concluded that the U.S., irrespective of who is in power, seeks to thwart China’s rise? 43:16 – How can China participate in the rules-based international order? 47:52 – Is it still possible for Biden to change his tune on China? 52:57 – How much room does Biden have politically? Can he exploit to electorate’s partisan divide on China? 59:54 – What is the “low-hanging fruit” that Biden could pluck to signal a lowering of temperature? 1:12:09 – Jeff Bader’s precepts for better understanding of — and better policy toward — China Recommendations Jeff: Autumn in the Heavenly Kingdom, a book by Stephen Platt about the Taiping Civil War focusing on Hong Rengan. Kaiser: Re-recommending two previous guests’ recommendations: Iaian McGilchrists’s The Master and his Emissary recommended by Anthea Roberts; and Unfabling the East: The Enlightenment’s Encounter with Asia by Jurgen Osterhammel, recommended by Dan Wang. TRANSCRIPT: Kaiser Kuo: Welcome to the Sinica Podcast, a weekly discussion of current affairs in China, produced in partnership with The China Project. Subscribe to The China Project’s daily Access newsletter to keep on top of all the latest news from China, from hundreds of different news sources, or check out all the original writing on our website at supchina.com. We’ve got reported stories, essays, and editorials, great explainers, and trackers, regular columns, and, of course, a growing library of podcasts. We cover everything from China’s fraught foreign relations to its ingenious entrepreneurs, from the ongoing repression of Uyghurs and other Muslim peoples in China’s Xinjiang region to the tectonic shifts underway, as China rolls out what we call the Red New Deal. It’s a feast of business, political, and cultural news about a nation that is reshaping the world. We cover China with neither fear nor favor. I’m Kaiser Kuo, coming to you from Chapel Hill, North Carolina. It’s a rare thing that I read anything these days and find myself in emphatic agreement with every bit of it, the descriptive and prescriptive alike. But that’s how I felt about a recent piece for the Brookings website by Jeff Bader, a veteran diplomat, who was senior director for Asian Affairs at the National Security Council during the first years of the Obama presidency until 2011. Ambassador Bader served as U.S. ambassador to Namibia and is now a senior fellow at the John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings. But he was deeply involved in the U.S.-China relationship at the State Department from his first posting to Beijing back in 1981 for the next 21 years, really through 2002, before being tapped to head Asian Affairs at NSC after Obama took office. After leaving the Obama administration, he wrote a fascinating book on Obama’s China policy, Obama and China’s Rise: An Insider’s Account of America’s Asia Strategy. The Brookings piece in question was titled “Biden’s China policy needs to be more than just Trump lite.” And in the next hour, we’ll talk about that piece and much else. Ambassador Bader, Jeff, if I may, welcome to Sinica. Jeff Bader: Thank you, Kaiser. That’s fine, I prefer Jeff. Kaiser: So, Jeff, I want to focus today on U.S.-China policy and specifically on your critique of the Biden administration’s policy to date. But I should note that first there’s an excellent podcast interview with you that was actually conducted by James Green, another diplomat with a lot of China experience, who runs — ran, rather — the U.S.-China dialogue podcast that went from 2019 to 2020. Yours is a two-parter. In fact, it covers a lot of ground. I highly recommend that [interview to] listeners who are interested in Jeff Bader’s storied career, his relationship with Richard Holbrooke, his experiences in China in the 1980s, and the management of the Tiananmen crisis, the participation in the WTO accession negotiations at the turn of the millennium. And, of course, his decision to back the young Illinois senator rather than the former first lady, who everyone was sure was going to win the Democratic nomination. You should check that out. It’s fantastic. Wait until we have Jeff back on Sinica and we can really do a deep dive into his career. But I do want to point out that by coincidence, you and I actually, Jeff, we have in common the fact that our first stints in China were in the year 1981. I was just a teenager back then and only stayed for that one summer, while you were on your first extended posting to China for the State Department. How has seeing the extent of change in China and watching it unfold in person over these several decades, how has that shaped the way that you approach China, that you think about China? Jeff: Well, I was there from 1981 to 1983 as a political officer. I was responsible for China’s internal politics, which essentially was an impossible job in those days. There was no publicly available literature beyond the People’s Daily, which had its limitations in value. Talking to people was highly risky. People didn’t want to talk to you and if they did, they were taking a risk. So the job itself had, let’s say a low ceiling in what you could accomplish. The city itself was a pretty dreary, dismal place. My main recollections are of about 4 million people in identical blue suits, riding around on bicycles in the bicycle lanes every day down the Jiànguómén Wài 建国门外 Boulevard. And a handful of cars weaving their way through. There were no restaurants, no publicly available restaurants at all. I had every meal essentially in the Peking Hotel for two years, which is a fate I wouldn’t wish on anyone. So it was a dreary place, it was hard to understand. I remember Dèng Xiǎopíng 邓小平 saying that China planned to increase its GDP fourfold in the next, I think 20 years was his target. And that seemed impossible as one looked around at what was a state dominated, Stalinist society. You couldn’t travel anywhere. While I was there, there were about 27 cities that were opened up for travel without prior permission. And even there, you were tracked pretty closely. So when I came back from my first subsequent visit in 1987, when I was deputy director of China at State, in just four short years, I was astonished by the visual changes in the city, the dynamism, the neon lights, the restaurants, the variations in people’s dress, the opening of malls. You could see the direction China was going, it was going much, much faster than one could have imagined. Kaiser: It’s a bit like going from black and white to color suddenly. Jeff: Yeah, I came to Beijing from Taipei. I had been studying Chinese in Taipei. And Taipei was a modern Chinese city. It was like Hong Kong in those days. And so the shock of going from Taipei to Beijing was all the more stark because of the different levels of development and the different levels of dynamism. Kaiser: So how has that shaped the way you think now, just seeing the rapidity of change, the sort of compressed nature of China’s development experience? Jeff: Oh, in several respects. I mean, one is never underestimate the Chinese people. I mean, that’s my main conclusion. You had a population that had gone through 30 years of the People’s Republic of China and Maoism, essentially a totalitarian system. Before that, the civil war and occupation of the 1930s and ’40s. And before that, the chaos of the Republic of China and the Qing dynasty. And yet, in just a few short years, they were on their way to creating a modern society and it was readily apparent. So I never underestimate what Chinese people can accomplish. I mean, when I was there in 1981, 1983, my feeling was, from what I observed, that Chinese people only could accomplish great things when they were outside of China. Because of course we all know that overseas Chinese are dynamos in every country that they serve in. But that there was something about the Chinese system that made it impossible to have that kind of achievement at home. But I clearly was wrong on that. In three or four years, just tremendous achievements. I guess the second conclusion I draw from that is that many Chinese who were alive during that period and it’s 35, 40 years ago, remember the bad old days, remember what the life of poverty and grayness and being cut off from the outside world was like. And they have a sense of appreciation for what’s been accomplished and a sense of gratitude. Gratitude to the leadership for the changes that have been brought about. Now to the degree to which that extends to the younger generation is a whole ‘nother question. But for older people, the contrast between the China that they grew up in and the China today is very apparent. Kaiser: Absolutely. It really parallels my own experience because I took my second trip there in 1986, I was in college. And that experience, just seeing the trajectory really changed the trajectory of my own life. I decided I really needed to sort of take a front seat to watch this happening and decided there and then that I would be back and I would spend a lot of time watching what happened, what unfolded in China. Fantastic. Let’s get into your critique now, fast forwarding a couple of decades now to the Biden administration’s policy, as you laid it out in that piece for Brookings. The piece calls that policy Trump-lite, and I’ve heard people refer to it, quoting people even within the administration saying, “Trump, but with allies.” But to be fair, there are other points of departure besides the multilateral approach, right? Could you identify first where do you think credit is due? The ways in which Biden, Tony Blake, and Jake Sullivan, Kurt Campbell even, and the rest have actually moved away from Trump. Jeff: Well, what’s striking to me, Kaiser, is if I were writing a defense of the administration, which I was not, and do not intend to do, I could identify changes from the Trump administration. And I’ll mention a few of them. But what’s striking to me is that the administration does not do that. And that was one of the things that inspired me to write this piece. The administration emphasizes continuity. They emphasize, as you just said, that they are looking to compete, using allies and partners. If you ask a senior administration official, “how is your policy different from Trump’s?” And I’ve heard many of them answer this question. The answer is invariably what you just said, “Oh, we do it with partners. We’re not doing it unilaterally.” So to me that suggests a certain bashfulness or a certain shyness about embracing any change from the Trump policy. They are, I think, looking over their shoulder at the Republican party, at their right wing and are deathly afraid of being seen as having departed from a ‘tough on China policy’, getting directly to your question, what are the actual differences? There are a few. For example, the climate change bilateral agreement that John Kerry signed with his counterpart, Xiě Zhènhuá 解振华 at the Glasgow summit. I mean, the Trump administration didn’t believe in climate change, no less in cooperating with the Chinese on the subject. So that was one big example. I think that the most fundamental difference is on the issue of regime change. I think that the Trump administration tiptoed up to the line of calling for regime change in China. If you look at the series of speeches that were given by Mike Pence, Mike Pompeo, and other senior Trump administration officials, they had a whole slew of them. They all left the impression that living with China, under communist part of the leadership was impossible. That in the Chinese communist party DNA, that they’re not only thieves and predators, but they had the nerves to dominate internationally and that they could not coexist with the United States in a manner that serves our national interest, unless their regime were toppled. That’s the way I read their speeches and I think that’s a fair reading of them. This administration, I think, clearly he does not believe that. They won’t say they don’t believe it, but their speeches aren’t filled with the same kind of vocabulary that calls into question the legitimacy of the Chinese regime. They seem to accept that. I think that those are the principle differences so far. I think that this administration also is a little bit more cautious on the subject of Taiwan. Its actions have been kind of all over the place, but I felt that the Trump administration, towards the end, were in the process of basically tearing up the rule book. They essentially threw out the policy on contact with Taiwan officials. They had scheduled a visit by the U.S. ambassadors, the United Nations to Taiwan, which was would’ve been an event revelant with symbolism, if not absolute recognition of Taiwan as a sovereign state in the international community. So this administration has been more assertive in talking about a one China policy. And although there’s some missteps, I think they do believe in it. Kaiser: So I’m going to want to ask you about the extent to which Biden finds himself constrained, looking over his shoulder onto his right wing, as you said. And I will ask you about what space there is for him. And you’ve addressed quite a bit of that in your posting for Brookings. But before we do that, let me give you an opportunity to simply lay out what you think is missing or misguided in terms of the Biden administration’s approach to China. What is the heart of your critique? Jeff: I think that Secretary Blinken’s formulation of a relationship with China that is largely competitive, that is collaborative when possible and adversarial when it must be, is not a bad formulation. I think that those three aspects of a modern U.S.-China relationship are realities. You can accept that framework and still wonder about the administration’s approach to implementation of it. If your approach is one in which, first of all, you’ll notice they never use the word cooperate. They use collaborate in that instance. And most of the time, since then they talk about interests being aligned. It’s as if it’s a, I don’t know, it’s the C word. It’s a word they’re not willing to use, as if they think that talking about cooperating with China, leaves them open to the charge of being soft on China, which is quite amazing to me. I mean, the thought that we can’t cooperate with another major power on issues like combating the current or the next pandemic, which there’s a decent chance it will come from Asia, since the last two did. Cooperating with China on climate change, which this administration has identified as an existential challenge. And where China and the United States are the two chief emitters of greenhouse gases. Cooperation on non-proliferation, which essentially means North Korea and Iran, where we’ve cooperated in the past. Our interests aren’t wholly aligned, but there’s a significant area of overlap, and we’re not going to solve those problems without working with China. I think that one can reapportion those three buckets in a different way than they have. If you look at the comments that senior leaders in the administration make, they are invariably all about competition, severe competition, extreme competition, strategic competition, never about cooperation, never about common interests. I think that they need to think much longer and harder than they have about economic issues, and particularly about the issue of decoupling. They’ve said almost nothing on the subject. They’ve just sort of trundled along with individual agencies, adding Chinese companies to the entity list, which forbids them to interact with American companies, with maintaining the tariffs inherited from the Trump administration, 20, 25% on Chinese products with a substantial cost for American companies and American consumers. And if you listen to administration officials, they will acknowledge, they don’t have a trade policy. They don’t have a trade policy towards China. They don’t have a trade policy towards Asia. They don’t have a trade policy globally. And what Asians care most about in their relationship with the U.S., frankly, is economic and trade issues. I mean, security issues matter to them, but if you don’t have an economic and trade policy, you’re not an actor in Asia. I mean, all the countries in Asia have intensive economic relationships with China. In almost all cases, China is their number one trading partner. In many cases, it’s becoming a leading investor. And if all we can do is carp about the spread of Chinese influence and not offer anything of our own, then it’s no surprise that the objective of making friends and influencing people among partners and allies is going to have a very low ceiling. I mean, take one example, this isn’t in Asia, but the recent switch of Nicaragua from recognizing Taiwan to recognizing the PRC. This seemed to shock the administration. The State Department put out a statement saying that Nicaragua had excluded itself from democratic nations of the western hemisphere by doing so. Actually, not only just the United States, but virtually every country in Latin America recognizes the PRC. But just leave that aside for a moment. Leave aside the hypocrisy of the statement. Why should we be surprised? The PRC is waving lots of money at Nicaragua for development projects, as they are with all recipients of the Belt and Road Initiative. They are ready, willing, and able to provide infrastructure projects. Whereas, the United States has imposed a series of sanctions on Nicaragua because the Ortega regime is undemocratic, authoritarian, and frankly, a terrible regime, okay? So there, there are reasons for imposing sanctions and I accept those. But don’t be surprised if a country, when it’s given the choice between someone who’s imposing sanctions every chance they have and someone who’s waving a lot of money at them, make a choice that is contrary to what we’re seeking. Kaiser: Indeed, indeed. To your point about what we are bringing to the table when it comes to Asia, Evan Feigenbaum had a very clever turn of phrase. He said that, “Oh yes, we are bringing security, right? But that makes us sort of the Hessians of Asia. All we’re doing is just sort of being mercenary soldiers.” In my day-to-day work, I hear a lot of people complain that the Biden team doesn’t have a real China strategy or variations on what one heard during Trump, like the administration doesn’t have China strategy as a China attitude. Is it though, an unalloyed good to have an explicit strategy? And if so, is it wise to talk about it explicitly and publicly? Jeff: Kaiser, I think you’ve got to have a strategy. Day-to-day, the strategy does not drive every single decision, a tremendous number of decisions you make are tactical decisions. But they’ve got to be within a broad framework. Now, administrations always pride themselves on putting out national security strategies and Indo-Pacific strategies. And if not China strategies, then at least China military reports. To be candid, these reports, a lot of effort goes into them, a lot of clearances, a lot of actors and different agencies. And then they go into the safe and they are referred to only when someone writes a speech. If you’re in a principal’s meeting of the National Security Council, the thought that someone would pull out a national security strategy paper or a China strategy paper and say, “But aha, here the strategy paper says such and such, we’ve got to do that.” That doesn’t happen. But it does condition the way everyone in the administration, different agencies thinks about China. And so if you don’t have a general strategy, you have different agencies running off in different directions, doing different things, which conflict with each other. I think back to probably the best national security advisor we ever had was Brent Scowcroft. He was very clear with other agencies about what the objectives were on China. It was the White House that was very clear about what they wanted done. And agencies essentially fell in line, whether it was because of a document or because of a general effective coordination, which didn’t really require a document, although one can argue about that. But I think you need to have some kind of a framework. And I mean, I tried to spell out some of the elements of the framework in my paper, talking about seeking a limit to decoupling, the understanding the decoupling comes at a great cost. Trying to narrow the areas of decoupling to those who are vital to U.S. interests rather than making it a reflex. Talking about the recognition of China as a major power with its own legitimate interests in which it’s highly unlikely there’s going to be a winner and loser in sporting sense in international affairs going forward. The chances are in 20 years, in 30 years, in 40 years, we’re still going to be dealing with an international system in which the United States, and China, and quite a few other countries are major actors. So we need to think about how we’re going to compete with China, but also live with China and coexist and cooperate with China. I think we need to think much more and be more vocal about people-to-people ties. That’s a phrase that generally gets short shrift among serious strategists. They think, “Oh, people-to-people, that’s for tourists.” People-to-people is at the core of U.S.-China relations. The U.S. technology revolution of the last 20 years in Silicon Valley wouldn’t exist without Asians of which Chinese are a large part. All you have to do is go onto any campus in the United States, in the engineering school, in the mathematics, science, technology department and look at a number of Asians and look at number of Chinese who are making major contributions to American innovation in those institutions. And the thought that we can descend into a hostile relationship with China and expect that they’ll continue to be an open spigot of top quality educated Chinese coming to the United States and being the backbone of most disciplines, either at some point, the Chinese party state will crack down on it because of the level of hostility or ordinary Chinese will decide they don’t want to come here anymore. It’s just not worth it. It’s a country that disrespects them. And then they’re all reading about anti-Asian violence in the United States and about attitudes in the United States. And they’ll either stay at home or they’ll go somewhere else. There are other countries that would love to have them and that will be our loss. That’s an area where I’m frankly, baffled that the administration has not been more vocal and more forthcoming, particularly given the level as a practical political matter, the Asian American support for the Democratic Party in recent elections. They’re aware of that in this administration. And that isn’t something that can be taken for granted. Kaiser: Yeah. Your words, Jeff, truly warm my heart. I mean, I’m in such profound agreement with you, everything that you’ve just said. It seems to me that there are some unavoidable assumptions that underlie and you might even say practically define one’s approach to China. And these are always questions that I like to put to people in conversations like this. First is, what do you reckon China’s ambitions to be? Because if you think China is hellbent on displacing the U.S. as the global hegemon, you’re going to come to very different conclusions about what we need to do than if you assume China only seeks primacy regionally and doesn’t desire the whole enchilada. So let’s start with that one. I mean, because these days it looks like, I mean, what I keep hearing is that while that strategy document isn’t even tucked into a safe, there is a book that people do come out with at the principles meetings, and that is Rush Doshi’s The Long Game. And apparently it’s now required reading on the Biden-China team. It seems to be sort of regarded as gospel when it comes to the question of Chinese intentions. Do you get that sense? And what do you personally see China’s scope of ambitions to be? Jeff: Well, I think Rush wrote a good book. Rush is a fine fellow. He did great research, it’s well documented. I think that Rush’s three stages of Chinese development, building, blunting, and displacement as I recall. Building China to compete with U.S., blunting U.S. aggression, and displacing the U.S. as a global leader is how he conceives of it. I think the building is about right, the blunting is about right. And the displacement is made up. It’s a guess, okay? His guess could be right. His guess could be wrong. But the evidence for it is, let’s say is lacking. I don’t see, in China’s behavior, something that suggests the ability to become the hegemon to use the popular IRR phrasing of a global system. They have no allies in the world. If you get past Pakistan and question marks about Cambodia. Chinese soft power is basically economic-commercial. There is not global admiration for the Chinese system of governance. Among Chinese speaking peoples in Asia, Taiwan, and Singapore there’s no admiration for it and no desire to emulate it, no less elsewhere. I don’t see China as effectively having the ability to pursue a global ideological agenda of spreading its system beyond its borders. There’s a lot of discussion about the degree to which China wants to explore this model. Xí Jìnpíng 习近平 said some things in various addresses to Party congress’s and plenums about the utility of aspects of Chinese governance that other countries might find valuable. That’s a long way from Stalin did in 1945 to 1953, where he basically imposed communist systems upon all of Eastern Europe and then attempted to do it elsewhere. And what China has been doing is, it has been exporting some of its systems of surveillance, which I think authoritarian countries find valuable. And frankly, so do some democratic countries, for law enforcement purposes. But that isn’t driving countries into making ideological choices about the kind of governance system they’re going to have. Those are driven by internal dynamics. And I don’t see Chinese missionary efforts to affect that. The Chinese, I think, are equal opportunity traders. Their relationship with Europe, with countries in Latin America and Asia is not related to regime type. And in the rule system, generally, if you look at all the international institutions that have been built up since 1945, China has not been the dominant rule maker in any of them. At least until the last few years, the rules have been basically written by the U.S. and allies. Now it’s another question about the degree to which China should be brought in as rule maker and I hope we can talk about that a bit. But they have not played that role historically in the thought that China is going to show up in the WTO, or WHO, or the UN, or any of these other organizations and suddenly going to attract a vast following in rewriting charters and objectives, I think is fanciful. So I think like great powers generally throughout history, their objective is to maximize their influence. Now historically, that’s mainly been Asia-Pacific region, the area of greatest concern and interest to them from a security point of view and also from an economic point of view. But clearly their ambitions for influence and for interaction do go beyond Asia. And I regard that as normal. I don’t see that there is anything exclusive about the U.S. relationship with, let’s say Saudi Arabia and the Chinese relationship with Saudi Arabia. The relationships may be competitive to a degree, but the thought that China is one day going to be the dominant actor in these relationships around the world, I find very unlikely. And I think that they have a realistic sense of their own limitations and they are not expecting or anticipating doing that. They do want to expand influence, but China’s got enough problems at home so that a hell-bent effort on becoming a global hegemon in the face of the major challenges of home, which are going to determine the future of their governance and the future of their society, that seems to me an unlikely choice. Kaiser: Yeah. Again, in full agreement with you. A second question, and I do want to get to talk about China’s role in the so-called rules-based international order and whether it will become more of a rule maker rather than a rule taker. But there is a second sort of foundational question, and that is what are China’s legitimate interests? Where should the United States draw the line? What is out of bounds and what is in bounds? Because it seems to me any form of coexistence involves a recognition of those interests from both sides. And that is going to involve a compromise and departure, certainly, from where we are right now. Jeff: Great question, Kaiser. I say legitimate interests, certainly one obviously is their economic commercial relationships with other countries in the world. Those are a legitimate interest of China. The United States should accept the reality and we frankly have no choice but to accept the reality that China’s going to be a big actor in its economic and commercial relationships around the world. And we should not be wasting our time with speeches the way the Trump administration did, denouncing the Belt and Road Initiative and denouncing China’s predatory economic behavior here and there as imperialists thinking that countries in the world will somehow, the scales will fall from their eyes and they will suddenly see the light. And they’ll say, “Oh, we’re not interested in trade and investment ties with China anymore.” It’s a nonsensical approach and we may as well accept the reality, okay? That’s one. Second, we need to understand that China is going to be a great power, if it isn’t already. And I would say it probably is already. And being a great power means a military that matches its national security needs. Now, I think we need to watch to see do they develop a military capability that is purely based upon the wishes of projection of great powers. That is, “Gee, we are a great power and therefore, we need to have a military commensurate with our great power status, so that we can act around the world as a great power.” I don’t think that that’s a standard that they should seek or that we should accept. I think that China’s legitimate military interests are those consistent with a reasonable national security strategy for China rather than be a global military competitor. I think the third is the right of China to have its own political, economic, and social system. Clearly the Chinese have a fear of so-called color revolutions that we’ve seen in the 20 years, where states in Central Asia, the Middle East have been subject to internal pressures that have attempted to convert them from autocracies into more democratic systems. The Chinese have tended to attribute that to American pressure. I think wrongly, these generally come from domestic reasons. But one can’t control perceptions. The Chinese perceive that we are a threat to the stability and the sanctity of their system. And certainly, there’s enough evidence in American political speeches for them to believe that. And I said, during the Trump administration, it would’ve been a logical conclusion, frankly. I think that whatever we may think of the communist system and whatever wishes we may have for China to develop a more participatory pluralistic and democratic system. And that’s not something I strongly believe in, I imagine you do, and all of us in the United States do. Kaiser: Yes. Jeff: We need, at the same time, to recognize that these decisions are not going to be made by you and me or by anyone in the United States. They never are. And when we attempt to make them, we both frustrate ourselves and we create turmoil that we may be able to affect outcomes, but not in the way we want. There are unforeseen consequences from what we do, when we try to destabilize countries. We should accept that China is going to determine its own future, while without the wisdom or the guidance of the United States. And finally, and this one I think is complicated. China’s territorial claims, which means at this point, primarily Taiwan, somewhat the South China Sea and the East China Sea. I think we need to acknowledge them. We need to show respect for them. And let me define the word respect for the moment. But we do not need to accept them. And then these verbs are hard to parse for Americans who like straight talk. We established relations with China on the basis of acknowledging the Chinese position, that Taiwan was a part of China. We didn’t accept the Chinese position that Taiwan is a part of China. And by acknowledging it, what we were saying was, “We are not going to be frontal in challenging your claim. Your claim is your claim and we are not denying your claim. We are not asserting the validity of your claim, at the same time. We are basically recognizing it is an extremely sensitive issue for China because of history that these areas are all areas that historically were claimed by China and the Chinese nationalism is not going to quietly surrender these claims.” So we need to respect them in the sense that we need to understand they come out of Chinese history and that they are supported, overwhelmingly, by the people of China. But at the same time, we do not endorse or accept them in the sense that we do not think that PRC rule should be imposed upon Taiwan until and unless there is a voluntary, uncoerced agreement between Taiwan and Beijing, so it’s a recognition. The Chinese use the term core interests. That was a term that we didn’t much like. I don’t think that we should be using it, but we should understand that these are the most sensitive national issues for China, which means a high degree of care in the way we handle these issues. Kaiser: Thank you for that very thoughtful answer. Implicit in that is the answer to another question, which is really about what American national interests are and whether we are able to accept a genuinely multi-polar world. I think that we sort of pay lip service to the idea, but we don’t really change our behavior and continue to behave in ways that has Beijing concluding something. This is what really keeps me up at night and has me worried. I am genuinely afraid that Beijing has concluded or is close to concluding at this point, and by that I mean that a critical mass of influential Party leaders have reached the conclusion that the U.S. position, irrespective of what party is in power, who occupies the White House, is now fundamentally hostile to the idea of China emerging as a peer competitor, as a great power. The forwarding of China’s rise, the preservation of unipolar hegemony. I mean, do you think that this idea has or might soon to be so unchallenged within Xi’s inner circle, that we’re at a point of no return? Jeff: That’s another really hard question to answer. Gosh, my sense is that that notion on the Chinese side has gained widespread acceptance, that it is not unchallenged, but that it is the dominant view at the moment. That it reflects views on the Chinese side and also reflects perceptions of the way the U.S. has behaved, that persuade them that there is nothing that can be done to prevent a basically zero sum conflict of interests. Now to me, there are lots of shades of gray and the Chinese Communist Party certainly is capable of nuanced thinking. On the one hand, I think they think that containment of China which is sort of the favorite word they’ve developed over the decades, is deep in the heart of U.S. policy. And that is going to remain the case. The question of the degree to which that policy requires that the U.S. seek to hold back China rather than simply compete or out-compete China, I think that’s an open question. I think that’s an open question, frankly, on both sides. Is it onto the Trump administration? I felt that it was, picture a couple of sprinters running a 400 meter dash and there are two ways you can run. And one is outrun the other guy and the other is to try to trip the other guy. And I felt that the Trump administration thought that tripping the other guy was a pretty useful way of winning the race. I think in this administration, there’s more of an emphasis on the straightforward competition, but there hasn’t been a complete abrogation of the thought that we have to hold China back in some ways. And look, I mean, inevitably we’re going to hold China back on its access to military technology, that’s a certainty. No matter who’s in power in the United States. And inevitably, in the area of technology, access to technology, technology sales, technology transfer, there’s going to be constraints that go beyond purely military, that are going to find ways of trying to ensure a dominant role for U.S. technology in key areas going forward. And that, in some cases, will mean depriving China of access to technology. So there are a lot of gray areas in the middle here, but it doesn’t require that every decision be in terms of, is this helping the United States and thereby hurting China? Or is it helping China and thereby hurting the United States? There needs to be some understanding that there are going to be some decision areas where maybe it’s mutually beneficial. Kaiser: So let’s talk about how you see China in its relationship with the international system, the rules-based international order, some call it. And here, we’re talking about not just things like multinational organizations, like the United Nations and all of the organizations underneath that, not just about standard setting bodies as well, but also about the Bretton Woods system. You’ve made clear that you wouldn’t like to see China supplant the U.S. as the main rule maker, but you also believe that Americans will have to accept that China is going to be a rule shaper, that’s the term that you’ve used. And given China’s sheer size and its economic clout, that seems only fair. Do you think that current Biden administration policy is making the accommodations that will be necessary to allow China to take its rightful place as a rule shaper? And what are your ideas about how to get China involved, invested in international system as a participant? Jeff: I haven’t seen any indication that the Biden administration has thought about acceptance of China or ways to induce China to participate constructively in the international system. Every senior level statement I see from the administration talks about ways in which China defies the international system, and then does not proceed to, “Here’s what they need to be in conformity.” There’s obviously a certain arrogance about this, leaving aside the degree to which we conform with the international system. We can leave that aside for the moment, but things like the UN Convention and the law of the sea, which we have never ratified or the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty which we have never ratified, or any of a number of ways in which we have chosen to define the international rules-based system, in a manner consistent with our immediate objectives and interests. I have not seen that from the administration, but you remember back under Bush II, George W. Bush administration, Bob Zelek, who was then deputy Secretary of State gave a speech talking about China as a responsible stakeholder in the international system. He was talking about that as an aspirational objective. He wasn’t describing a present reality. And the Chinese reaction to that at first was baffled. They had trouble with the translation of it and some trouble with the concept. But over time they, I think, began to understand that this was, from their perspective, a constructive formulation that allowed them to play a role in, I don’t think Zelek talked specifically about rule making, but it was implicit in the concept. Now, President Obama was quite explicit about the need to take countries like China, and India, and Brazil, countries that had been relatively minor actors when the whole Bretton Woods system was set up and give them a role commensurate with their newfound power. That was an explicit objective of administration policy. Trump with America First, obviously didn’t believe in that. And the Biden people have frankly been silent on that. They’ve just been focusing on the negative side. So there’s a number of aspects to this issue, Kaiser. And one is the whole weakness of the institutional framework of the international system. China criticizes the UN Conception, which emphasizes alliances and partnerships. Says, “That’s all irrelevant.” That says a small clique of countries. What really matters is the UN, okay? That’s what they say. Well, the UN is a pretty feckless body as we know. All of the major bodies in the UN system, whether it’s the UNGA, the UN General Assembly, the IMF, the World Bank, the World Health Organization, the World Trade Organization, all are in need of fundamental reform and fundamental restructuring if they’re to play the kind of role that they played for a while and that they need to play. I think that’s an enormous agenda. The thought that we could both bring China into a system of those institutions and at the same time reform those institutions, that’s probably asking too much. But I think as a theoretical and as a policy objective, we need to be thinking in terms of both. Kaiser: Do you think that it’s too late, Jeff, for Biden to change his tune on China? Already the administration has used China to push so much of its agenda, the Innovation and Competition Act, the infrastructure plan. It seems like everything the administration announces is couched in this language of competition with China. So has he left any space for himself to be able to, if not make a 180, at least to turn in a less oblique angle? Jeff: Yeah. I think you’ve framed it right, Kaiser. I think that first of all, this year is an election year in the United States, leaving aside what’s going on in China with Party congress. And so the thought that we’re going to see serious adjustments in China policy and election year when the Democrats feel highly vulnerable seems unlikely. But at some stage, we discussed earlier the fact that this administration doesn’t have an economic trade policy. At some point they’re going to have to have one. Yeah, you can’t go four years without a trade policy. And when the economic agencies are heard from, in particular treasury and commerce, both of whom have secretaries who are Janet Yellen and Gina Armando are going to be heard from. And they are more preachers of openness, and market access, and the international system than the voices we’ve heard so far. Now, that doesn’t mean a reversion to 20 years ago, but it does mean that there’s going to have to be a greater balance in policy between economic interests and other interests, where the economic interests at the moment are not represented at the table, frankly. So I think that that’s one thing that’s going to happen at some stage, I don’t know when. Kaiser: Likely after November. I mean – Jeff: Yeah. I mean, after November I think is right. I think that the fundamentals of what Biden wants to do are in place, but personalities matter. I don’t believe in the school of the extreme realist thought that countries are just sort of Newtonian objects moving through space. Actors matter and like in this administration, for example, I think John Kerry has played a role. I think obviously he played a central role in formulating the U.S.-China Climate Change Agreement with Xie Zhenhua, that wouldn’t have happen without him, without his determined efforts. But beyond that, I think that the phone call, I guess it was a Zoom meeting or they don’t use Zoom, whatever they use. The encrypted webinar that Biden and Xi Jinping had. I think that John Kerry had a lot to do with that as well is my guess. I think that Biden pays attention to John Kerry. John Kerry used to be his Senate colleague and was chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. And he’s someone who Biden regards as a peer. And I don’t think that Kerry has been altogether satisfied with the overall framing of policy. I’m speaking from 3,000 miles away in Venice, California. But rumors do make it across the country. So I think that that’s… I’ve mentioned Yellen, I’ve mentioned Armando, and Kerry, these are people whose voices have been somewhat muted, but who may have different views. I think the general framework is in place. I don’t expect, as you say, a 180. I think as you put it an acute angle or an oblique angle of that is possible. I think that one of the reasons that Biden did that virtual meeting with Xi Jinping, was he was concerned about the degree to which the relationship was off the tracks. Succession of shouting matches by senior officials in meetings with poorly prepared agendas, where both sides were posturing to each other’s domestic audiences, I think that that did not impress Biden. And I think that Kerry probably helped reinforce the perception on Biden’s part. So when there is a concern that a relationship is going to run off the tracks, I think that that’s when one sees Biden become more personally, directly involved, which I don’t think is a bad thing. I think that Biden’s own instincts on China are a balance of competition and cooperation. I’ve noticed that he seems to be unafraid of using the word cooperation, unlike the people who work for him. Kaiser: Yeah, yeah. He’s a little looser in the vocabulary in both directions. So a good portion of the piece that we’re discussing today is about, of course, Biden’s domestic political circumstances. And the extent to which his choices are circumscribed by Congress and by the voters who will go to the polls in November. So the conventional wisdom is that he has his hands tied, but are they really tied? I mean, you cite that Chicago Council poll on American attitudes toward China as evidenced that the so-called bipartisan consensus on China isn’t maybe as pronounced, at least within the public certainly, as people would have you believe. And I certainly agree. I’m sure that you still talk to lots of people in the Democratic Party, whether in Congress or in the White House, and I assume that you’ve raised these poll results with them. Do Democrats feel like this gives them more space when it comes to China? Do you get any sense that maybe there is a little bit of an opening? Jeff: I mean, I talked to people who were going into the Biden administration before January of 2021, and I made the argument that there was nothing that they could do to satisfy the hard Republican right on China. And we named names and they wholeheartedly agreed and understood that point. I was pushing on an open door when I made that point. It doesn’t matter what Biden does, he will continue to be attacked from the right on China. You look at the ads that are coming out already now, in congressional races around the United States and Republicans in primaries are denouncing the Democrats or even their own primary opponents in the Republican Party as being stooges of the Chinese Communist Party. That will happen no matter what. So the question then becomes, how much do you feel the need to accommodate that perception of people who are never going to be with you anyway and who are going to use China as a political weapon, no matter what? Now, it’s complicated because within Washington, I wrote that there is not a consensus within the Democratic Party on attitude towards China. And I was showing that Chicago Global Council poll, which showed numbers on whether China’s an adversary, whether China-U.S. policy should be aimed at preventing Chinese influence around the world, whether Chinese researchers and students should be blocked from coming to the United States, whether tariffs should be raised. And in every single case, there was a very large gap between Democratic responses and Republican responses. With Democratic responses being, let’s say calmer about China than Republicans. But that is candidly not reflected inside the Congress. I think that I will give the administration credit for correctly reading the Congress, that there is a reasonably hard line consensus within the Congress for a policy which focuses on strategic competition with China, to the exclusion of other issues. That said, in my experience in the U.S. government and through the odd years, administrations are perfectly capable of leading on China policy, preferably with Congress, but also it can be done without Congress. And I could cite many, many instances, obviously in the George H. W. Bush years when Congress kept passing legislation demanding conditions upon most favored nation status. And President Bush kept vetoing it every year and continued with his policy, despite a torrent of congressional criticism. In my time in the White House, from 2009 to 2011, I did not find congressional pressure close to unbearable on any aspect of China policy. China policy on The Hill has always been more hawkish and always been tougher than the administration policy forever, forever. That will never change. But an administration that knows what it wants, can get where it wants by leadership, by finding the right people in Congress to bring them along. And yes, congressional [inaudible] are a constraint, but they need not drive policy. That’s not what our constitution intended and not what any administration should want. There are a couple of pieces of legislation now, the Compete with China Act, which is mostly involved in building up U.S. industrial capabilities. It’s mostly what it does. And uses China as sort of a talisman. Look at China, we have to compete with them. Let’s do all of these things at home. Let’s rebuild our semiconductor industry. Let’s rebuild our educational system, let’s rebuild our manufacture capacity. Let’s rebuild here and there. That’s all good, frankly. I mean, it’s unfortunate that we have to use an excuse to do these thing, which we should be doing anyway. There’s some language in that legislation, there’s money. There’s a lot of money for propaganda against China for pointing out the flaws in the Chinese system. I’m not sure that that’s particularly good use of taxpayer money. I think that the time in which people look to BBC and VOA for the truth around the world has long passed in the era of globalization of news and the private news. So I think that’s frankly, mostly a waste of money. But that’s the main bit of legislation we’re looking at this year, which I don’t think need do too much damage to the relationship. If it’s looked at carefully, there’s a house version and a senate version with different language, with different consequences for the relationship in it. There are down the road, depending upon what happens in 2022 elections, there are other possibilities being discussed, such as limitations of scrutiny of U.S. outbound investment to China, which would be a big deal. It would be the first time in the world we have imposed broad scrutiny of outbound investments anywhere, aside from well – Kaiser: Cuba, Libya, North Korea. Jeff: Countries like Iran and North Korea. And I think that is something that bears close watching and where the business community, which is already deeply, deeply invested in China, needs to keep a close eye on that and needs to let the Congress know what they think of that before that creates a whole new reality. Kaiser: So if the Biden administration wanted to lower the temperature, what would you identify as some of the, let’s say more politically feasible things? I mean, because we do have to kind of acknowledge that yeah, they’re not completely constrained, but there are political hurdles that they would need to overcome. What are some of the things that they could do to signal an intention to lower the temperatures and things that the administration could do that might stand a chance at bringing congressional Democrats, at least, along with them? Jeff: Everything has risks and everything will get criticism. They need to start by understanding that. There’s not going to be a free ride in anything to do with China. I would say one obvious one is the Department of Justice, FBI, China Initiative, which is – Kaiser: On its last legs – Jeff: Creating a climate of fear on campuses around the United States. No other way of putting it. It’s a kind of Neo‐​McCarthyism in my view. The FBI denies it, but it’s frankly singling out Chinese and Chinese Americans for particular scrutiny and for, in some cases, ridiculous, trumped up legal charges and it is hurting us. It’s hurting individuals and it is hurting the United States as a nation. We talked about that a little bit earlier. That is one that, I mean, I’ve talked to people on The Hill, at least some people on The Hill on the foreign affairs side, understand one of them used the phrase abomination to me in talking about that program. Kaiser: That’s good to hear. Jeff: I think that there are going to have to be some compromises, but I’d start there. Secondly, tariffs, the Trump tariffs were completely arbitrary. Trump said repeatedly, “I love tariffs. Tariff wars are easy to win.” I don’t know an economist in the world who believes that, okay? None, we are to take Donald Trump’s ignorant rants on the subject of tariffs as guidance for U.S. policy in perpetuity? That’s ridiculous. There are thousands of businesses and millions of consumers in the United States who are being hurt by these tariffs. I’m not suggesting that these tariffs should just be lifted in a negotiation. They were put in place for reasons, but I don’t see any, at the moment, disposition on the part of the administration to negotiate on market access and on Chinese practices, like IPR violations or subsidies, export subsidies, subsidies for Chinese companies. I don’t see that they have a plan for negotiation on that, that might be usefully made part of a discussion about tariffs. Yeah, you don’t lift them all. You look around and see which ones will have the greatest impact, particularly at a time when we’re running 7.5% inflation. So I think those are two ripe candidates. I mean, the administration did negotiate a loosening of restrictions on journalists going in both directions. And they have made some minor adjustments in visas to, I think, make H-1B1 visas in the United States a little more secure and a little more available. But I think they can go much further on these. We shut down the Fulbright Program with China. That needs to be reversed. I mean, that should not be controversial. Kaiser: The Peace Corps too, yeah. Jeff: Peace Corps, we shut down as well. I mean, these are not national security issues. I mean, over the 50 years since Nixon went to China, we’ve built up tremendous people-to-people ties between our two countries, across every domain. And since Trump, we’ve been in the process of shutting them down. I think that the administration needs to come up with a sensible definition of what decoupling entails, what it entails in the military area, what entails in the technology area, what it entails in the economic area and try to limit that. I mean, the phrase has been high walls, small yards. I think that’s a good way of thinking about it. But I think they need to have a conception about decoupling that is much more constrained. It goes back to your question, Kaiser, earlier, do they need a strategy? Yeah, that’s one of the reasons you need a strategy. You need to know how you think about China in order to decide how you think about Chinese coming to the United States. And how you need to think about Chinese researchers and how you need to think about the attitude of ordinary Chinese towards America and what impact that has on the future of the planet. I mean, I have good friends at Brookings who have looked quite intensively at popular Chinese attitudes towards the United States, it is very dismaying what has happened in recent years. I mean, the years I lived in China, I have said many times that I never once encountered a manifestation of anti-Americanism, ever, in China. I’m not talking about editorials in the Global Times or things like that. I’m talking about in interpersonal activity, just none. Great warmth on the part of ordinary Chinese towards Americans, I fear that’s dissipating. And what I hear from friends who’ve looked at it closely is that there is evidence that that’s the case, maybe documentable evidence. And the thought that we can have a manageable relationship with China and the administration does talk about managing the relationship with China, I respect that. They don’t just talk about pulverizing China. They talk about managing the relationship, okay? But the thought that you can manage a relationship when the population of that country is moving towards outright hostility. And the same thing is happening on our side of course, if you look at ad polls, we’re creating a monster on both sides. This would be harder and harder to manage. That’s one of the reasons for example, the Chinese government has difficulty managing its relationship with Japan. I think China could manage a much more sensible, constructive relationship with Japan, except they’re always looking over their shoulder at the citizenry who bear long memories about Japanese atrocities in China and xenophobic attitudes among the broader population towards Japan in China. I would hate to see us reach the same point where the Chinese leadership is looking over its shoulder at its own population about whether it can have a constructive relationship with the United States. Kaiser: I worry about that too. And I think the point that you made about the importance of people to people relations is certainly not lost on this listenership anyway. In your estimation though, for the leadership, is Beijing eager for, or would it at least be receptive to and willing to reciprocate if we did pluck some of that lower hanging fruit that you enumerated? Things like restoration of Fulbrights or the Peace Corps. I mean, maybe at a higher tier, dropping some of the more onerous tariffs. If we did make clear our intention to lower the temperature, would Beijing be receptive and would it be willing to reciprocate? Jeff: The short answer is it’s hard to say unless you’re actually involved in a diplomatic negotiation because from the outside, you just see the hard line posturing and you don’t know what their degree of actual flexibility is until you get in the room with them over some months. But I mean, just two broad comments. Number one is that the Chinese system, historically, is not so much interested in low hanging fruit. Historically, their interest is in defining the overall character of the relationship. They want to know how do you see China? And they’ll go on at great length about how they see the United States. And their attitude is once we have each sincerely demonstrated our attitude towards the others, in terms of our objectives and our interests, the specific issues will fall into place. And historically, frankly, Americans have tended kind of in the opposite direction. Americans, historically, have figured, “Well, we’ve got big barriers in relationships. Let’s try to see what we can do. Let’s find the low hanging fruit. And we will build confidence as we accomplish small things, so that when we get to harder things we’ll have a basis for trust,” okay? I mean, you can transpose that to the Middle East, it’s our historic approach to Middle East peace negotiations. Kaiser: And you can transpose China’s attitude in that way to the India relationship. I was talking to a good friend of mine, who has been a reporter for the Hindu for a very long time, he’s based in Beijing. And one thing that he said was that India’s position is that they’ve got to resolve the border disputes, Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh, before the overall relationship can improve. And Beijing’s position has always been, “No, let’s get the entire relationship right and then the border will be resolved.” Yeah, so no, you’re absolutely right. That is a perfect characterization of how Beijing approaches it, which worries me, because that’s a profound disconnect. Jeff: Yes, that’s fascinating. Henry Kissinger talks quite a bit about this and his sympathy for the Chinese approach runs this way. He says that the Chinese attitude is that you can just solve a problem and then you can solve another problem. And doesn’t matter how many problems you solve, there’ll just be new problems that arise. So you’re always facing new problems. Whereas, if you agree on the framework, in their view, all the problems can be prioritized and dealt with. Not personally, I hate to be so wishy-washy, I think there’s wisdom in both frameworks, frankly speaking. But the Chinese have, in their discussions with the United States over much of the last year, have been quite adamant that they need signs, clear indications of the overall U.S. approach to China. And that we can’t just pick off climate change, or pick off this, or pick off that and expect cooperation when we have an overall policy of hostility. That’s what they’re saying. Well, that’s fine for them to say that. I don’t believe it. I mean, because in fact they did reach an agreement with Kerry on climate change after saying, “we can’t do these things.” So clearly they can do these things, but they still have a, if you will, cultural orientation away from the low hanging fruit approach. Kaiser: One last question for you before we move to recommendations. Even though you headed Asian Affairs at the NSC, one thing that’s consistent across all your writings on China, one thing that I think is a source of my admiration for all the work that you’ve done is that you never seem to view China or our bilateral relationship with China through that one singular lens of national security. And it strikes me, and this has been a consistent theme on the show, that we’re in a time where there is this kind of single lens view. Everyone only looks at China through this national security lens or too many people do in any case. Can you share with our listeners maybe, some of the precepts that you live by when it comes to thinking about China? You clearly have a broader and maybe, more holistic view of the relationship. And I’d love to hear what some of the maxims you live by are. Jeff: I guess my starting point in thinking about China comes back to what I said earlier, and that’s an appreciation of what the Chinese people and Chinese nation can accomplish. And never underestimating that, you are underestimate it at your peril. And that is not meant to conjure up a China threat. It is simply a statement of reality of the last 40 years, what they have accomplished from such a low base. And the way in which they set their minds to achieving an objective and the way in which they can marshal resources from all across the society to achieving it. We all remember when COVID-19 first struck in Wuhan and the Chinese government announced they were building a, I can’t remember, I’ll get the numbers wrong. But either it was a 10,000 bed hospital in, I can’t remember how many days, a few weeks. Kaiser: Like a week yeah. Jeff: It was ridiculous, okay? Kaiser: 3,000 bed I think it was, yeah. But yeah, yeah. Jeff: Whatever it was, okay. Well, whatever it was, no one else could do it. And they did it, okay? I remember when I was stationed in Hong Kong in the mid 1990s, there was a famous China watcher there who said he wasn’t worried about Chinese technology he said somewhat dismissively. He said, because anytime he went to China, he couldn’t find a functioning flush toilet. So that’s one of the reasons why he was not confident about their nuclear power plant, just 40 miles away from Hong Kong. I always got a laugh when he said that. And here we are, 25 years later and they’ve circled the dark side of the moon, they have a space program to Mars. They’ve identified all of the major technologies of the 21st century and asserted their desire to be leaders in many or most. They’re leading the world in construction of electrically powered vehicles. So I start with, so never underestimating the nation. Then the second place I go to is trying to come up with a realistic assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the Chinese Communist Party. And I know that when we say the Chinese Communist Party, we’re all supposed to tremble and it’s a fairly complex operation. It does some things well, and it does some other things terribly and oppressively, but it’s a mixture. And if we just caricature it, we’re not going to react to it sensibly. It’s got 90 million members. It is capable of tremendous message discipline and of carrying out plans and directives decided by the center at provincial and regional levels in the way that other countries can’t. It’s able to think longer term than Democratic systems find comfortable or normal. And it has overseen this spectacular rise of China into economic middle class prosperity and great power status in 30, 40 years. The weaknesses, it’s oppressive, information flow is uncertain towards the center. Who is talking to Xi Jinping? Is he hearing what he should be hearing? In a system like that, it cracked up under Mao. No one was willing to tell Mao what Mao needed to hear, everyone was terrified of him. One doesn’t hear encouraging signs of the readiness of people to offer different views to Xi Jinping, since he has acquired leadership of all aspects of the Chinese system in a way that hasn’t been the case for some years. Its treatment of minorities, the absence of rule of law, we know all of these things well, and the absence of human right protection. So I think we need to understand what China is about and then understand what the Communist Party is about in a serious way instead of just having a comic book picture of it. Kaiser: It’s just astonishing to me how consistently people are only able to focus on one side of the ledger, either the plus column or the minus column and to the exclusion of the other. Jeff: I think we’ve covered a lot of the issues in previous questions when you talked about what are China’s international ambitions? And I think that that is one that we, as Americans, need to focus on. But I don’t think it serves our interests or it’s intellectually honest to imagine an end state of China’s international ambitions. And so the teleological way that, 40 the years from now, they intend to dominate the world. I think that’s a ridiculous way of thinking about countries in a multi-polar world, which this world is going to be in the coming century. China is a major power, it’s feeling its oats. It’s throwing its elbows around, but it’s got severe limitations at home. We haven’t gotten into those, well, I’m sure you’ve done those in your other broadcasts about the demographic crisis China faces and whether China’s going to continue to be wage competitive at the low end of the income scale. Whether China can continue to create the jobs they need to, for all the kids coming out of universities. Whether a heavy handed approach to regulation of the business community, that has been in evidence for the last year, is going to be successful in creating the kind of moral society that Xi Jinping is talk about or rather is going to stamp out innovation. I mean, all sensible Chinese leaders know that the private sector is driving China’s economic growth and private sector and foreign investment. And they’re not a straight line, innovation doesn’t work in straight lines. You have to allow for innovation. And something happens way over in the corner there that then affects your progress in areas you really care about. And if you’re just, as they are now, saying, “We’re not going to tolerate unfettered growth in social media, internet technology, home tutoring, financial services.” I mean, they need to be very, very careful thinking that you can just squeeze one end of the economy and it’s not going to come out in ways that you don’t like elsewhere. Kaiser: Yeah. No, that’s another can of worms. I mean, we can spend another hour talking about the ins and outs of this Red New Deal. But thank you so much, Ambassador Jeffrey Bader, for taking the time to speak with me and for sharing the fruits of your truly formidable intellect and your very rich experience with our audience. I’m really honored and it’s just been such a great pleasure. Before I let you go, let’s give some recommendations as we do on every show. But first, a very quick reminder that Sinica Podcast is powered by The China Project. And if you like the work that we do here, the best way to support us is by subscribing to The China Project’s daily Access newsletter. I’ll leave it at that. You know the drill. Okay, recommendations. Jeff, what do you have for us? Jeff: Sure, Kaiser. I think, well, I just read a book by a gentleman named Stephen Platt called Autumn in the Heavenly Kingdom. Kaiser: Fantastic book. I love it. Jeff: Yeah, there’s a lot to learn from that. When you read of 15 years, 20 years of mayhem in Central and Southern China, with 20 or 30 million people killed, you gain an appreciation for the obsession with stability that Chinese, high and low have. You also are reminded of the gaps between North and South China. North China was Manchu dominated, South China was Han dominated. And you also are reminded of the remnants of imperialism and the impact of imperialism on China in terms ofoutside powers in the 1850s and 1860s, which was horrendous. And which Chinese see in disguised form in much 20th century behavior. So I think that’s well worth a read. Kaiser: Absolutely. Stephen Platt has another book that I absolutely loved as well, Imperial Twilight it’s called. And it’s sort of about China on the brink of the Opium War and the run up to the Opium War. That’s a fantastic book. But Autumn in the Heavenly Kingdom was so very, very good. It focuses on the Shield King, on Hóng Xiùquán ‘s 洪秀全 cousin and – Jeff: The Shield King, yes. Kaiser: His story, yeah. Which is an angle that I wouldn’t have thought to take. Because the focus is always on Hong Xiuquan himself, but his cousin’s experience and I’m spacing his name right now, I’ll maybe go back – Jeff: Hóng Réngān 洪仁玕. Kaiser: Yeah, yeah. Okay. Jeff: Yeah, it’s fascinating. I agree. I tell you why it’s fascinating for you, and me, and many others, Kaiser, is that he was the guy in the middle. He was here, he had lived with the missionaries in Hong Kong and he understood how Westerners thought and he wanted to bring Western ways to China, Western industry, Western knowledge to China. On the other hand, he was the cousin of the Qing king, of Hong Xiuquan. And he was the chief actor for the Taipings and then ultimately in resisting Imperial forces, which allied themselves with the Manchu dynasty to try to crush the Taipings. And so these, if you will, well-intentioned people who one understood both sides got ripped apart. That’s the – Kaiser: I know how he feels. I mean, it’s astonishing to me how close he came to succeeding in bringing in the British on the side of the Taiping. I mean, it reminds me so much of that contemporaneous war that was being fought on the other side of the world, where we almost, I mean, it was touch and go there for a little while. So dependent on American cotton exports that the Brits almost sided with the American South, still sort of smiting about 1776 too. So yeah, yeah. It just reminds you of just so much contingency in history and yeah. Yeah, fantastic book and great recommendation. I have a couple of historical books that I want to recommend as well. And I’m going to sort of re-recommend things that were recommended by other recent guests, because that’s all I’ve had time to do. I’ve been trying to be good about reading the books that other guests have been recommending. Thank you for recommending one I’ve already read. Let me just second too, excellent, excellent recommendations from recent shows. I’ve plunged into them, and reading them in parallel. One was Anthea Roberts’ recommendation of the book, The Master and His Emissary by the psychiatrist, Iain McGilchrist, which it was fascinating enough at first, just talking about the two hemispheres of the brain and really upending so much of the popular understanding of the function of the right and left hemispheres of the brain. But most intriguing of all, he is relating it to culture and to the historical development of the West versus the rest. And that part is just more speculative for sure, but more intriguing as well. You’ll be hearing more on this sort of thing on a big show that I’m working on for this series. The other is this fabulous book recommended by Dan Wong of Gavekal Dragonomics, who was on the show a few weeks ago, that’s called Unfabling the East. And, Jeffrey, if you haven’t read this, I highly recommend it. It’s called Unfabling the East: The Enlightenment’s Encounter with Asia by Jürgen Osterhammel, translated from the German. For my money, literally for my money, I went and bought it in hardcover, it’s just the best work of history I have read in years. Again, this one has already made its way into my prep notes for this show that I have planned. So stay tuned for that. Jeffrey, thank you once again. It’s just been an honor to be able to have you on the program. And I do hope that we can have you back again because there’s still so very much to talk about. And I so enjoyed this. Jeff: Well, thank you so much, Kaiser. I really enjoyed it. Enjoyed hearing your perceptions, no doubt in large part, since they’re similar to mine. And I hope that next time we do this, we’ll be able to report on a China and a U.S. that have moved in different directions from where they are right now. And we can have a happy, more upbeat conversation. Kaiser: Well, here’s to that. The Sinica Podcast is powered by The China Project and is a proud part of the Sinica Network. Our show is produced and edited by me, Kaiser Kuo. We would be delighted if you drop us an email at sinica@thechinaproject.com or just give us a rating and a review on Apple Podcasts, as this really does help people discover the show. Meanwhile, follow us on Twitter or on Facebook at @supchinanews. And be sure to check out all the shows in the Sinica Network. Thanks for listening and see you next week. Take care.]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Sinica_10.26.jpg In Memoriam: Jeffrey A. Bader, from February 2022 false no 0:00 No no Live from Chicago: Decoding China — China’s economic miracle interrupted? https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/live-from-chicago-decoding-china-chinas-economic-miracle-interrupted/ Thu, 19 Oct 2023 11:00:48 +0000 http://thechinaproject.com/?post_type=podcast&p=287974 Transcript Kaiser Kuo: Welcome to this special live recording of the Sinica Podcast here in Chicago, Illinois. Hello, Chicago. I am Kaiser Kuo, and we are here tonight with this terrific and very handsome and well-appointed crowd from Chicago at an event put on by the University of Chicago’s Becker Friedman Institute for Economics, a program that pulls together folks from Chicago’s Booth School of Business with its Kenneth G. Griffin Department of Economics, its Harris School of Public Policy, and its law school. Becker Friedman has partnered with the Paulson Institute, and its in-house think tank MacroPolo — still, the cleverest name ever given to an organization dedicated to research on China, MacroPolo. Let that sink in for a little while. It’s amazing. And with The China Project, of which this podcast is a proud part. We are all joining together to bring you tonight’s program — “Decoding China: China’s economic miracle interrupted?” A huge thank-you to our friends at the Becker Friedman Institute and at the Paulson Institute for making this happen in this magical spot. The sun’s coming down, and you look at the beauty of just the amazing Chicago skyline, what a view. If I am, sort of, not listening and wandering off, distracted, you’ll know exactly why. There’s so much to talk about, so let’s jump in. All summer long, we have heard deep pessimism about the state of the Chinese economy. There is a long litany of woes that have been repeated and amplified to the extent that I’ve gotten, frankly, kind of suspicious. Flagging consumer demand. We all know the stubbornly high savings rate accompanying that, the obvious problems faced now by major residential realty developers like Evergrande and Country Garden, high levels of youth unemployment, and, of course, enormous local government debt. Now, none of my guests today are the economists that American presidents and CEOs have often wished they had at hand. That is, economists with only one hand, and they don’t always say, "On the one hand, and, on the other hand." As for me, I don’t mind hearing or engaging a little, on the one hand, myself. So, on the one hand, ordinarily, when I do hear this level of hyper-pessimism, this sheer volume of doomsaying, much of it built on, frankly, motivated reasoning, my instinct is to be very skeptical. China, after all, has defeated, has defied predictions of doom many a time, including in the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and in the great recession after 2008, the crisis of 2015 when the Chinese stock market plummeted. It seems like it’s always able to muddle through. On the other hand, as a growing number of people whose views I very much trust have come back from trips to China recently, it’s clear to me that the pessimism isn’t by any means limited just to these distant economists or reporters writing about China from the outside. When we hear about the PTSD, the shell shock caused in places like Shanghai by the lockdowns and by the chaotic, confusing end to the COVID restrictions, coupled with this kind of flagging exports, weak signals from the manufacturing sector, unemployment, and, of course, confusion in policy direction overall, I do worry. I take the bears a little more seriously.  Yet, back to that other hand, an economist whom I greatly respect, Arthur Kroeber from Gavekal Dragonomics, gave a very good talk at Harvard recently. He said that this bad news has been enlisted by some in claiming that their grand narratives, going back decades, were correct all along [cough], Gordon Chang. A relatively small amount of data, he notes, is being made to do an awful lot of work. That’s true. Today is really all about right-sizing the problem where the negativity might perhaps be warranted, and where it certainly is not, as well as identifying problems that perhaps aren’t being given sufficient attention in the reportage that we’re all reading. We’ll talk about the nature of the crisis and the nature of the state response, such as it is. Joining me to attack this important question with both hands, as it were, and to try to get this right is Chang-Tai Hsieh, who is the Phyllis and Irwin Winkelried Distinguished Service Professor of Economics at the Booth School, who specializes in development and growth in the developing world. He’s an elected member of the Academia Sinica, I like that name, and a two-time recipient of the Sun Ye-Fang Prize. Chang-Tai, welcome to Sinica, again.  Chang-Tai Hsieh: Thank you. Great to be here. Kaiser: Good up. Also joining is Lizzi Lee, who’s well known to folks who listen to Sinica or who follow The China project. She is the host of our YouTube show, The Signal With Lizzi Lee, where she does interviews with amazing people. She’s just a really expert interviewer. Lizzi also hosts the Chinese language show, Wall Street TV, Wall Street Today rather, 今日華爾街 [Jīnrì huá'ěrjiē], which is something I highly recommend. It’s about the only non-lunatic Chinese-language programming. I mean, everything else is either like hardcore party line or freaking Falun Gong, or what’s that cook’s name? Guo Wengui, right? And then there’s Lizzi, who’s like an island of sanity on YouTube. Lizzi Lee: The bar is pretty low. Kaiser: Anyway, the last time that we were together with Damien was here in Chicago. Our friends at the Chicago Council summoned us to do a sort of roundup of the 20th Party Congress, where some very, very interesting remarks were made. That takes us, of course, to Damien Ma, who is director of MacroPolo, the think tank of the Paulson Institute. Damien is the co-author of a great book, which I’m still constantly recommending to people. It’s really stood the test of time. It’s called In Line Behind a Billion People. It really looks at a lot of issues related to China’s economy and politics through the lens of scarcity. It’s a very, very good book. I highly recommend it. Damien is always one of the people I turn to for the straight dope on what’s happening in the Chinese economy. Damien, great to see you, man. Damien Ma: Very good to see you. Kaiser: Lizzi, Chang-Tai, what a great crowd we’ve had. Damien, let me start with you. You were just in China. You got back just a little over a week ago. You had both high-level meetings and some means or boots on the ground, some shoe leather work. Just talking to people who are either decision makers, economic decision makers at the enterprise level or above, and people who are just directly affected by the economy in China, people who’ve experienced the chaotic end of COVID and everything. What’s the skinny? What’s your overall takeaway from talking to people? Are things as bad as they say? Damien: Well, let me give a sort of two quick, but different observations. I think Kaiser, like you or Lizzi, when we go to China, we tend to not just stay in the hotel. I got there a few days early, so I could, first, walk around, do my own observations. Small things like, are the malls full? Right? Are people buying things? How normal does Beijing look? And caveat that, I mostly interacted with a very small slice of Beijing elites, so they’re not what I would call the true 老百姓 [lǎobǎixìng], right? They are still Beijing elites. So take that with a grain of salt. I talked to Chinese colleagues and talked to the dwindling number of foreign correspondents who are still fighting the good fight in Beijing, just to get a pulse from the people. And had my share of cabby conversations. Kaiser: Oh, those cabby conversations.  Damien: The reason I wanted to have the cabby conversations, this is probably one interesting tangential observation, is that something like 90% of Beijing cabs are now electric vehicles made by a stand-owned enterprise. This really happened over the last several years. So, if you want to see the transformation in electric vehicles, look no further than Beijing City itself. And this is purely a stay-mandated drive. They basically wanted to help the state-owned enterprise. If you went to China prior to the pandemic, you would’ve probably ridden in a South Korean Hyundai. Those basically do not exist anymore. They’re all-electric vehicles now. So, if you want to get a little small slice of that change, Beijing does give you that little insight. But in terms of the economy, I’ll just say a couple things, and I think they’re the things we’re going to get into quite a bit with the other guests as well. Talking to people, talking to friends and colleagues, there does seem to be a sense of just things not going that well. People are not seeing the bright light at the end of the tunnel in terms of the economy. In this sense, the Chinese government is probably correct in diagnosing that there is a lack of confidence among households about where the economy is going. The malls were full, but you do not see a lot of purchasing behavior, which I thought was kind of interesting. There was a lot of more window shopping, so to speak, than people actually pulling out their credit cards. Although, I guess not credit card — paying with Alipay or WeChat. Because that’s all you can do these days in Beijing. I think that struggle is real. At the policy level what’s interesting is I think they understand that this is a problem. But there is, from what I can tell, a very strong debate about really what to do about it because there’s a lot of arguments, and we’re going to get into the different arguments. But I think it’s tough to turn around a consumer and household competence. It takes a while. It takes a combination of policy, it’s a combination of incentives, and also sending very credible consistent signals for a period of time to get people to understand where the economy is going. Part of the problem that the current leadership has is that it’s sending very mixed signals about what’s happening to the economy and what they intend to do about it. I think that’s injecting more confusion to average Chinese households. It’s a very tough conundrum. And if they don’t turn that around, it’s very, very hard to sustain the growth rate that they want, which is why they may want to stimulate, but stimulus will get you a very short-term bump. That might allow them to meet their 5% target for the year. But what happens in 2024? This is something that they’re truly grappling with, and I really got that sense from talking to average Chinese, Beijingers. Kaiser: Excellent. Now, not surprisingly, there are two other historical financial crises that the current situation is often compared to. One of them, of course, is the 2008 financial crisis that started in the U.S. retail housing market, but also the malaise that beset Japan beginning right around 1990. That one is brought up an awful lot. Lizzi, I know you have some thoughts on this. I’m wondering whether you think that China is also about to enter a long period of stagnation and painfully slow growth. Are there meaningful ways in which China right now is comparable to Japan then? Lizzi: In general, I’m always against making those quick and dirty historical analogies because I think they usually are more misleading than educational. In terms of Japan, my argument is that Japan’s problem is not really an asset market problem. It’s a structural problem in the sense that the Japanese economy has its interlinked financial sector and corporate sector, all collateralized by its lent value. If a piece of asset prices goes down, the entire system goes down with it. It reminds me of Charleston, those historical buildings in Charleston. If there were a sparkle fire, the entire city would burn down. The problem is not the fire, the problem is how the city is structured. In China, the system is much more fragmented, actually intentionally so. There’s not much financial linkage between China’s corporate sector and its financial sector. China’s problems are much more fragmented pockets of problems. You have cysts and tumors in local governments, in rural banks, but those problems tend to be separate from each other. The potential of a horizontal, like all-out contagion, I would say is low. People talk about whether China is going to lose in their 20 years and their 30 years like Japan. The fundamental problem is quite different. The similarity is only on the surface. That’s Japan. For the 2008 analogy, I would actually argue that the property market in China now is less like the pre-2008 United States than a few years ago, say 2015. And that’s a deliberate policy choice. China has been aggressively reducing its corporate sector's exposure to property market loans for the past few years. I mean, yes, property market loans are still a substantial part of commercial banks’ assets, but those are individual house mortgages quite unlike the United States. And we know Chinese households pay hefty, hefty down payments, and those loans are recourse loans. So, banks can claim alternate assets if they default. It was said to be like a safe net for banks. Commercial banks, if you look at their balance sheet, they’re actually quite solid. That’s very different from pre-2008 in the United States. So, just make those two.  Kaiser: Yeah. Let me turn to Chang-Tai and ask you about the 2008 comparisons that are so often made. Let’s start by looking at the amount of leverage in the system. That’s one thing. We all probably are aware of the very high percentage of the cost of a home that you have to put down, whether you’re a first timer or a multiple-time home buyer in China, and the amount actually of equity that people have in their homes right now. But the other thing that seems to be missing is we don’t have mortgage-backed securities in China. We don’t have collateralized debt obligations and credit default swaps that we’re betting against those CDOs, right? Is China less vulnerable in that regard? Chang-Tai: Let me just say three things. First, let me just repeat what Lizzi said, that it is always dangerous, but it’s very easy to draw analogies, right? But most of the time, the world is complicated, and they can be very misleading. If I think about two views that I see, it is that China needs a stimulus, and then China has a confidence problem. That is a misleading way to think about what’s going on now. Really, the way I think about what China is going through now, it’s a combination of two things. First, specifically, on Kaiser’s question, I think about the first issue. And I like to think about that as a reallocation problem. I think that there’s no question that there has been over-expansion in the housing sector in China. What does that mean? It means that because of the housing price bubble and because of other factors, too much resources have been dedicated to the real estate sector, say, in the last 15 or so years. Right? What do you do about that? Well, exactly the wrong thing to be doing is to double up. That’s exactly what you don’t want to do because that’s going to make the reallocation problem down the line even worse. Kaiser: What would constitute doubling down on this right now? You mean stimulating? Chang-Tai: Yeah. Either some form of stimulus that supports the real estate sector. Part of the problem is that there’s always going to be short-run pain whenever there is an adjustment process. Let me just say some of that has already taken place. The beginning of this process was really starting in 2018 when you started to see the crackdown of some of the largest Chinese conglomerates, the crackdown on arm bound, the crackdown on the… Kaiser: The gray rhinos. Chang-Tai: Right, the gray rhinos. Actually, since we’re here, for those of you who can look across the street, if you see those three towers right across the street, that was initially a Wanda project. Kaiser: Dalian Wanda. Chang-Tai: The three towers that you see just across the river, 200 yards from where we are. One of the consequences of the crackdown on the Wanda Group starting in 2018, was that they were forced to sell off those three towers. It’s now called Vista Towers, right? Vista Towers, and the new owners got it on the cheap because the Wanda group was forced to sell that, not just that property, but lots of the other stuff. Now, there’s still a lot left to be done. I’m not privy to the internal discussions of the Party on how they’re planning to deal with this. But let me just give you what I think is the right historical analogy to think about this issue, which is that it’s really not 2008, but it’s 1998. If you think about what happened in 1998, China put in place this program. I don’t know whether this was the official name of the program, but this is what people started to call it, which is ‘grasp the large, let go the small.’ It was essentially a program put in place by Premier Zhu Rongji to deal with another big reallocation problem.  Kaiser: Bloated state-owned enterprise. Chang-Tai: It was a bloated state-owned enterprise. It was that you had a very large number. I mean, there’s some dispute about what the precise number is, like a very large share of capital, a very large share of the resources of the economy was going to inefficient state-owned firms. I think it’s the same question, which is, what do you do with that? There is going to be short-run pain, companies need to be closed, people are going to lose their jobs. You can postpone the pain by continuing to subsidize these companies by just renewing the loans and just kicking the can down the road. That’s not what China chose to do in 1998. It put this plan in place, which led to a lot of short-run pain. It led to a tremendous amount of short-run pain, but it was the largest closure and privatization program that I’ve ever seen in the world. A large number of firms were closed down. A large number of firms were privatized. There are interesting details about what privatization meant. We can talk about that next, but lots of people lost their jobs. This was the beginning of the process where it released the resources eventually for the millions of entrepreneurs, private firms to eventually emerge and grow in China. There are lots of details about what happened there. There were these institutions that were built on the financial side. We can talk about the asset management companies that were built in place. There are all kinds of that. It's not just that program, but it was coupled with lots of other things that were put in place at the same time. Now, I want to say I don’t know whether something like this is in the cards. That really is a short-run issue. The question is whether this short-run issue could eventually become a long-run issue if it’s not resolved. Kaiser: Actually, since the scale of it is very different, I mean, we’re talking about breaking and resetting a bone, right? It’s not just pulling off a bandaid. We’re talking about something, a major structural readjustment. Let’s look at what happened in ’99 when China was a much smaller portion of the global economy, and already it was incredibly painful. Domestically, I think you could draw a direct line to the Falun Gong, rise of Falun Gong and the sit-ins, or potentially politically destabilizing events in that time, right? Today, much bigger, much more integrated, much more risk of global contagion. Chang-Tai: In terms of the effect of the world, I think it’s absolutely right. But in terms of the scale of the problem in China, I think it’s much smaller. Kaiser: Okay.  Chang-Tai: In terms of the scale, now, whether there is, I’m going to say the equivalent of Zhu Rongji and the people that were around him at the time, one of the key people at the time was Wang Qishan. Whether there’s that team now, I don’t know, right? I don’t know. But I’ll just say that when I look at other countries of the world, the vast majority of the countries around the world that face this kind of problem, they never solve it, right? Because it’s painful. And if things are painful, you just don’t do it. Kaiser: I want to drill down on this a little bit with Lizzi. You know that there’s nothing that shakes confidence in the economy more than uncertainty. And I think what I hear a lot of complaints about are the lack of clear signals and intention to backstop, coming from the leadership. In 1998, to Chang-Tai’s point, we had Zhu Rongji, a fairly firm hand on the tiller. We had Wang Qishan. Today, we’re just coming out of the transition. We have a relatively new premier, Li Qiang, and He Lifeng, just now appointed. Do we have the same sort of caliber of administrative management to the economy? Lizzi: That’s a really good question. I’ve been pondering this term crisis of confidence, as people talk about it in the media a lot. What do we actually mean by crisis of confidence? Like Damien, I also had the opportunity to interact with a cross-section of Chinese citizens. Some of them are entrepreneurs, some of them are low government officials, some of them are recent college grads. And I do get the sense that there is this general sense of anxiety and unease, which I have not seen before. I mean, we Chinese are a grumpy bunch. We complain about parents, about our kids, about our neighbors, etc. But this time I feel like the grudge is very much pointed toward current policymakers, even to the top leadership. The general sense is that there’s something amiss, and they’re not quite sure the direction this country is heading is what they imagined it to be. So, there’s that real sense of anxiety here. Kaiser: The product of the COVID closure and the lockdowns. Lizzi: Yeah, we can definitely talk about that. But my point is, that is actually not consistent with the raw economic data you see. If you look at the data, in the first half of the year, consumption actually went up by more than 8%. Wage and disposable income went up more than 6%. It’s not breakneck pace by any stretch of imagination, but it’s not that bad. I mean, it’s not great by Chinese standards, but it’s not a picture of doom and gloom. So, where does this sense of anxiety, this sense of we are completely in the wrong direction, there’s no hope, there’s no tomorrow coming from? Again, my thinking on this is still very much fluid, but I think it’s not quite a crisis of confidence. It’s more like what happens when there’s this huge gap between your expectation and reality. If you were born into a middle-class Chinese household, there are certain things that you take to be true, right? Your parents worked really hard, they bought a house, they already paid down the mortgage. You have your family wealth stored in your house, which will appreciate quite a lot, and that’s going to be a decent inheritance to you. And your parents invest really heavily in your education. Most of the college graduates now are from one child household. So, we study really hard. Your parents invest in your education. You go to a really good college, and you expect to be able to get a job in the tech sector, in the financial sector upon graduation, and have a really lucrative career. That’s the expectation that has been building in people’s minds for the past 10 plus years. But now, that equilibrium has been broken, right? First, you have these years of tech crackdowns. All the high-flying tech companies and financial companies are cutting. They’re not recruiting anymore. Those kinds of lucrative jobs are just not there. And then you have three years of lockdowns. And then you have this problem of a market thing where family wealth is now in jeopardy. Basically every single piece of that equation is no longer there. What you take to be 100% certain in the future is just not there. So, I would say it’s not really a crisis of confidence. It’s that gap between reality, between what you currently see and dream. I think that helps explain one puzzling phenomena. If you go to those recruiting fairs in China, they’re all empty, right? If youth unemployment is at 20%, you would imagine that people are eager to find jobs. They will take whatever is available out there, but why aren’t people not showing up at those recruiting fairs? That’s because those jobs that are offered are not the kind of jobs they want. So, when we talk about Chinese youth unemployment at 20%, which is a historical level for China, I think, by some standard, people should be on the street, right? People should be causing all kinds of social unrest. But that’s not what we see in China. I think people are disillusioned, but it’s not like they cannot find jobs and they have to starve on the street. That’s not what’s really going on. But back to Shanghai’s point, I think what’s really different this time is, when the central leadership, when Xi Jinping and Li Qiang announced this piecemeal measures to stimulate, to remedy the economy, the market doesn’t really take that, which is quite interesting. There are multiple hypotheses of what’s actually going on. But one thing that I think is quite different from Zhu Rongji’s time and now is that Zhu Rongji is not one single person. Zhu Rongji has a team of capable economic lieutenants who can actually execute his plans, right? Wang Qishan, people like that. Many of those people have been purged by Xi Jinping during past years of anti-corruption campaigns, especially Guang Da Xi (光大系) and 国开行 [the Guangming banking system and the China Development Bank], all those Zhu Rongji lieutenants. They were hit really hard during the anti-corruption campaign. There’s this general sense that the people who can do this are just not there. And I would say the opposite. There are so many people sitting on their hands basically waiting for directions from the very top leadership because they are afraid of the potential retributions. Like, “What if I do this and something went wrong? I might as well just listen to whatever the top dictates to me.” That kind of inaction, that kind of inertia, is what’s really pragmatic this time. I don’t have a really good solution to that, but this is what I see. And I just wanted to share that with our audience. Kaiser: Underlying a lot of this is a bigger question of China’s overall economic direction and what it is that Xi Jinping actually wants, the shape of the Chinese economy in his longer-term view. This is something that you’ve talked about a lot, and you actually identified back in 2017. I think you and Evan Feigenbaum wrote a paper that pushed your finger on this, I think proved very prescient. And we’ve seen these ideas echoed out of the 20th Party Congress. This move away from GDP uberalist toward a more sort of qualitative growth. Can you talk a little bit about that idea? And I’d love Chang-Tai to weigh in as well about your thoughts on what it is that Xi and the current Chinese leadership want the Chinese economy to be and to do. We’re no longer talking about KPIs for local officials measured in terms of GDP growth, but rather maybe in nanometers as you once kind of half-jokingly said, but accurately said. Damien: Right. We published a piece basically with the title — “Nanometers over GDP.” The idea is to capture, crystallize this sense that for 25 years, people were very much accustomed to Chinese introducing growth to meet a certain target, right? There was even this term in markets called the 问价爆破 [wèn jià bàopò]. Every time the economy would tank, they would do countercyclical stimulus because they want to achieve roughly 7% to 8% growth. Because that fixation was really important. But starting the 14th five-year plan it was very clear that the top leadership, in particular Xi Jinping, decided that was not going to be the case anymore. He said, “We’re not going to really have a… We’ll have a range, we’ll still sort of think about growth,” but basically, that target is now no longer valid. We shouldn’t fixate our entire growth strategy around that. That’s important because the problem is that they didn’t really clarify what the floor is going to be. So, how far can this fall? Are we talking 2%, 3%? What are they satisfied with? This is where I would, I think, agree and also disagree with what Chang-Tai and Lizzi said. I think we can all agree that this is not a 2008 Lehman Brother kind of housing crisis, a problem. And this is not what Lizzi says, sort of a Japanese-style balance sheet recession, which is, I think, Richard Koo branded that. The analogy with the late ’90s holds, it is a sort of debt problem. But last time there was debt on the balance sheet of state-owned enterprises. This time the debt is primarily on local government, right? Kaiser: But that $5 trillion that- Damien: Right. We can get to that number, but the main thing is that if you think about it, the macro conditions, though, are quite different now than it was in the late 1990s. Let’s recount what happened. China was about to enter the World Trade Organization, right? Right at the end in the 1990s. That really gave it a big lift in growth. And then China in ’96, ’97, had just privatized the property sector. That was a big growth driver. Now you have just the opposite. The property sector is declining, and they’re not really trying to save it as much as we think. There is no WTO, there’s nothing coming that way. So, I guess the question is, de-leveraging might be the right call, but to do it in a low-growth environment when it’s not clear what the future growth drivers are going to be, is that too risky of a gamble to execute right now when the entire system is saying, “We don’t care that much about GDP growth anymore,” right? When you grow, even if you take on debt, you can actually inflate away that debt if you have inflation. Actually, debt just becomes a smaller portion of GDP over time. That’s essentially what happened since the late 1990s. Kaiser: But unpack this a little bit. Tell us, what’s the positive vision? What do they hope to achieve? When they talk about qualitative growth, what does he really need? Damien: Well, this is my own interpretation, my view is that China wants to become the Amazon of countries. Amazon is the everything store. China wants to be the make-everything country, essentially. If you think about the 1990s, what was the main moniker attached to China? Factory of the world? Kaiser: Of world. Damien: 2023, what is China set to do? Also, factory of the world. Just those factories have changed from socks and Nike shoes to batteries and low-end chips, and all those technology products. I think China really feels it’s got a strong competitive advantage in all these mid-range tech supply chains, manufacturing. Obviously I’m exaggerating to say make everything, but I think the strategy is can we attract a global supply chain ecosystem to China, make it there, and export it around the world that might offset some of the other growth drivers that are slowing down? Kaiser: Lizzi, you had an interesting way of talking about it. You used a martial arts metaphor. You said it’s 练内功 [liàn nèigōng]. I don’t know how to translate that, sort of like your internal, like cultivating internal… Lizzi: Right. Yeah, I agree with Damien’s framing, but I would use a slightly different word. I think China’s really focusing on the resilience of its system. Here in the United States, we tend to focus on the final product. When we want to develop the EV industry, we focus on consumers, cars, right? We focus on subsidies and policies, policymakers, energy, and so on. In China, they take a much more holistic view on what EV means. They started from rare minerals down to infrastructure, down to batteries, down to the cocktail of government subsidies, tech breaks, and consumer tax credits to the final product itself. That’s a much more vertical way of thinking about what a product actually means. By the way, that ensures that the whole system has enough flexibility. So, if you want to attack a single part of that system, we want to make sure that there’s enough fluidity in the system itself for the system to heal itself. So, a single act of sanction won’t break the entire system. I think that’s what I mean by 内功 [nèigōng]. It’s the chi, the circulation that matters.  Damien: Also because the external environment is just not as conducive to China’s products. Lizzi: Yes, absolutely. One thing that I noticed is that there’s a lot of focus on how to adapt to hostile external environments as they speak of, as we can see from the case on Huawei, right? I think they expect that to happen in the future. They sort of preempt future sanctions and restrictions by making sure there’s enough leeway in the system to have at least three or five years of buffer to sustain that attack. Huawei did not survive by making trailblazing breakthroughs in 5G in chips. Huawei literally found a get-around, Huawei developed a software system to get around hardware restrictions. Huawei developed those chiplets quite literally by stacking inferior chips together to achieve roughly the same thing as those high-speed chips can do. I think that’s what China has gotten really good at. For most of the business and industrial organizations, top technology is actually not necessary. You just need to find something that works and execute that really well. I think that’s what China’s focusing on. Kaiser: Chang-Tai, how would you describe it? You talked about this period of readjustment that we’re in right now. What’s the end goal of that readjustment? What is the imagined end state post-readjustment? Chang-Tai: I’m going to get to your question, but let me just say that I think there’s something else there. And I was asked this question, but I’m going to ask the question to the other people on the panel because I don’t have an answer. There also just seems to be something more than resilience. I don’t know what it is about this view that certain things, that certain products or certain technologies are the ones that are valid, and other things are invalid. Maybe a example is that there is that semiconductor chips are a real thing, and it’s something that China needs to be, and it’d be great if China were good at making semiconductor chips, but coming up with a software, the very best software in the world to design semiconductor chips, that’s not a real thing. Kaiser: I’m not sure that they would classify that as not a real thing. The things that they think are not real things are creating complex financial, derivative-based products, doing social media. They don’t want their best and brightest being steered into, like in the United States, they want their physicists to graduate from Tsinghua and freaking do physics. They don’t want them to go work for a social media company or go work for a bank to design speculative products. Chang-Tai: I mean, for some products, you can say that they’re negative externalities, right? They’re negative. But why is a chip company or the revenues from a chip company more valid than the revenue of Alibaba right? But there’s a very clear sense in which one company is really valuable and the other company is less so. Kaiser: Because they want to be Germany. Chang-Tai: But why? Kaiser: Because they really, honestly believe, and this is something… Chang-Tai: No, no, no, but I- Kaiser: I get into this in this documentary. Damien: Because software platforms, social media has social political ramifications, ultimately. Kaiser: That’s only part- Damien: I mean, that’s one factor. A chip is a chip. It doesn’t have that baggage. Chang-Tai: No, but maybe, but even something like food delivery, software for food delivery, that has no political ramifications. But my sense is that if you ask them, they’re like, “Who cares if you come up with a better food delivery software?” Kaiser: Well, I mean, you’re the one who introduced this phrase earlier in the conversation — grasp the heavy, let go of the light. This is exactly what they believe they’re doing right now. That’s what they believe in themselves. What was the phrase, though? Arthur Kroeber, a great talk, you should check out. He says, “China wants to be a Leninist Germany.” Lizzi: Leninistic Germany. Chang-Tai: I think that’s exactly the right phrase, but let me just ask the question is that… Let me just pull two companies. Nvidia is one, right? That is one. It’s the leading… Kaiser: GPU maker, yeah. Chang-Tai: Chip company in the U.S. For those of you who know Nvidia, Nvidia makes nothing, right? It just designs chips. It’s just incredibly good at chip design. They also are really good at doing the software for AI, but it makes nothing. So, think about Nvidia versus Taiwan semiconductors. Which Taiwan semiconductor, what they know how to do really well is to actually make it, right? I guess for my vantage point, as an economist, I think both of these things are incredibly valuable. How valuable they are, well, it’s what people are willing to pay for these sorts of things. But the leaders of the Party, I think they think about it differently and I don’t fully understand why.  Let me just say that there’s one thing there, right? There’s one thing, or like, so say, software to tutor kids, clearly, that’s of no value, but why not, right? I mean, kids learn and… Kaiser: Well, in this case, they believe clearly that this creates social problems by inequity just by the inequality of opportunity, right? That’s in this case, I don’t think that they would look at one part of the value chain and another part of the value chain in something like semiconductors and say, “This part isn’t important and this part is.” I think that when it comes to semiconductors, though, they do believe that the manufacturing process is absolutely vital and that they should focus on never stopping manufacturing because they really buy into this idea that process knowledge, that the actual innovative advantage conferred by continuing to manufacture is very real. Damien: I think another fact is just China has basically converged with the West on software on the app economy. I mean, China frankly makes some of the best apps in the world already, right? So, the gaps where they feel they’re still deficient are in a lot of these hardware segments. Kaiser: We could go on with this one for a while, but I want to get back into a really cheery topic, which is local debt. Damien, MacroPolo recently put out an estimate that there’s about $5 trillion of local debt that’s at risk in the next three, oh, default in the next three years. Damien: Potentially, yes. Kaiser: Let’s just put that in perspective. What was 2023? The projected GDP is $19.4 trillion. So, we’re talking about north of 20%, of 25%. Damien: Well, but remember, but the debt to GDP ratio, it’s always higher, right? Kaiser: It’s always higher. Right. But I want to ask Chang-Tai, what does an actual debt crisis look like in China? What are the ramifications? What are the spillovers? I mean, if you are a money manager and you’re looking at China, where do you steer away from? Where do you think you want to limit your exposure in China where we start seeing massive default of local government debt? Chang-Tai: Let me just firstly give a direct answer to, it’s clearly the property sector. But in the property sector, there could be some part of the financial institutions. If you think where a lot of the action is taking place, it’s really in the combination of these local financing vehicles and shadow banking. Some of these, we have data, a lot of these we don’t. So, there’s a bunch of it. But let me just push back on that. I don’t think that really is the biggest issue. I think the biggest issue is what Lizzi was talking about, which is this view that things have changed in China. And I want to hone in on one thing, so let me put it this way. One way I have thought about China for a long time is that despite the fact that there are no formal property rights, there was this very clear sense about what the rules of the game were. That is, if I’m an entrepreneur, I don’t engage in politics. If they want to make me a member of the local National Party’s Congress, I will do it, of course. But if I don’t engage in politics, I will be left alone. Although there’s nothing formal about it. My property rights are going to be protected. I can grow, I can make money, I can accumulate my wealth. I think of it almost like this marriage. If I think about what a good marriage is, it’s about, there are clear expectations on both sides about what proper behaviors — Nothing is written down, right? There’s no prenup. After the fact, I think what happened last year may have shattered that contract. Things that I thought only happened to dissidents, things that only happened to somebody like Jack Ma, I didn’t think about it then, but maybe this sense of what happened in 2022 is that, hey, the Party can actually be really crazy, the Party can actually do really crazy stuff. And this crazy stuff can happen to me, even if I’ve done nothing. That may be part of it. I don’t quite know how to quantify it. I’m curious to know your views on how much is going on, but I think of it as the breakdown of a marriage - ‘These were the things that I believed about you, and now I don’t believe in it’.  Kaiser: You and Lizzi are apparently on the same wavelength because recently she was on our sister podcast, The China Global South Podcast, talking about this, the same sort of breakdown of the informal, the contract. Chang-Tai: The contract. Right. Kaiser: Interesting. We only have a few minutes left. I really want to focus on one final big question. I’ll start with Damien. What should U.S. policy do? We seem to be all indulging in a kind of schadenfreude, looking at China’s travails economically and almost gloating over it. But China is deeply interconnected. It could bring our house down as well. It could impact us negatively. What is wise American policy when it comes to China right now in terms of supporting or helping along its economic troubles? What should we be doing? Should we be rooting for China, or should we be rooting for the forces that reset China? Damien: Well, look, the U.S. and China are still 40% of the global economy. You look at what’s going on at a macro level, Europe’s not doing so hot. Germany, France, not doing so hot. It could enter a recession. In The United States, that debate is still outstanding, whether in a few quarters, we might still see some recessionary characteristics.  Kaiser: Please not before November. Damien: And the Chinese, even if they stimulate, they’re probably not going to get too much above 5% this year, which is fine, but not great. So if we’re thinking about global economic stability, there’s no reason why the U.S. and China should think about how to provide the anchor as 40% of the global GDP, which they did try to do back in 2008 and 2009. Kaiser: That’s right. Damien: I think this is a time that’s going to be needed more than ever, the geopolitical volatility aside Kaiser: Can you imagine China having a major financial crisis that threatens to bleed into the global economy and the U.S. stepping up in the way that China did in 2008? Damien: Well, I don’t think the nature of the crisis is going to be that sort of a global contagion like that because it’s not going to come from the formal financial sector. It’s mostly going to be a domestic debt crisis. But a China that grows below its potential is not a good thing when the world needs growth. And I think markets, investors are going to be looking for growth. And if all the big three pillars, the EU, the United States, and China, their trifecta are all kind of anemic, that’s not a good outcome for the global economy. Kaiser: Absolutely. Lizzi, what are your thoughts on this? And then I’ll leave for Chang-Tai at the end. Lizzi: Right. I’m going to answer a slightly different question of what doesn’t work for the United States. I think by making China look bad, by making China do bad, that clearly does nothing for the United States to strengthen itself. And I see a lot of deflections, reflections in the media when it comes to China from policymakers. I do think the United States needs to think harder about what its own strength is and what its own course is. Ultimately, the United States can only become stronger by becoming stronger. It won’t become stronger by making China look like a bully, making China look weak. I don’t want it to go like a full therapist on this, but I think there’s a lot of soul-searching for the United States to do, and it has nothing to do with what China looks like in the future. Kaiser: Run faster, goddammit, and stop trying to trip the other guy. Lizzi: Right. Chang-Tai: I don’t think that’s completely right. Let me try to articulate what I think the U.S. is struggling with for a long time. I think that we have all believed, and it’s true, of course, that everybody gains from trade and investment. If China grows, the U.S. gains. If the U.S. grows, China gains. I don’t think there’s any doubt about that. What the U.S. is struggling with is the question of suppose that, or let me put it this way. I will give an analogy. Suppose that there’s a powerful CEO, right? The owner of a company that you know, or that you believe is a racist. If that person is poor and they’re a racist, it doesn’t matter because they have no money, right? The question is, what if this person is worth a trillion dollars and this person… It’s not a problem if this person just wants to buy a fancy yacht with… Kaiser: And now we’re talking about Elon Musk. Chang-Tai: Yeah. No, that’s a question. Suppose that Elon Musk is going to do stuff that you fundamentally disagree with, and he can do it if he has money, right? The question is, what are you going to do? You are going to lose if you don’t buy that Tesla, right? You love that Tesla, but you buy that Tesla, and that person starts to do stuff that you fundamentally disagree with. I think that is the tension. That is what the U.S. is really struggling with. And it’s a spiral that’s going on, which is this fear in the U.S. on what are you going to do with your economic power, right? Then on the other side, on the Chinese side, there’s this widespread belief that the goal of the U.S. is to destroy China, right? And this speaks to the question about, oh, China faces a hostile environment, so we got to build resilience. You can see how these two views of the world easily reinforce each other. And you could start off with a situation where China has no intention towards the rest of the world. That Elon Musk is really a nice guy, but then you start to do stuff towards him, and Elon Musk feels threatened, then they start to do so. I think that is the spiral that we are on. And that could get both sides to do things that they originally did not want to do. So, what should U.S. policy be? I don’t know. I think that that’s a very dangerous spiral that we are on now. Damien: Convergence on capabilities, divergence on values. Kaiser: Yeah. We should all go home tonight and ponder deeply the question of whether China is Elon Musk or Bill Gates, and that will shape our… Or somebody even who’s not George Soros. Chang-Tai: But it’s endogenous. That’s part of what I’m saying is that whether somebody becomes Elon Musk or Bill Gates is endogenous.  Kaiser: Right. I don’t think it’s entirely. I think that the way that we treat that person also determines how- Chang-Tai: Of course. Kaiser: Not entirely an endogenous question. Alright, folks, thank you so much for coming and for joining us in this great conversation. Damien Ma, Chang-Tai Hsieh, and, of course, Lizzi Lee. All right.  ]]> Transcript Kaiser Kuo: Welcome to this special live recording of the Sinica Podcast here in Chicago, Illinois. Hello, Chicago. I am Kaiser Kuo, and we are here tonight with this terrific and very handsome and well-appointed crowd from Chicago at an event put on by the University of Chicago’s Becker Friedman Institute for Economics, a program that pulls together folks from Chicago’s Booth School of Business with its Kenneth G. Griffin Department of Economics, its Harris School of Public Policy, and its law school. Becker Friedman has partnered with the Paulson Institute, and its in-house think tank MacroPolo — still, the cleverest name ever given to an organization dedicated to research on China, MacroPolo. Let that sink in for a little while. It’s amazing. And with The China Project, of which this podcast is a proud part. We are all joining together to bring you tonight’s program — “Decoding China: China’s economic miracle interrupted?” A huge thank-you to our friends at the Becker Friedman Institute and at the Paulson Institute for making this happen in this magical spot. The sun’s coming down, and you look at the beauty of just the amazing Chicago skyline, what a view. If I am, sort of, not listening and wandering off, distracted, you’ll know exactly why. There’s so much to talk about, so let’s jump in. All summer long, we have heard deep pessimism about the state of the Chinese economy. There is a long litany of woes that have been repeated and amplified to the extent that I’ve gotten, frankly, kind of suspicious. Flagging consumer demand. We all know the stubbornly high savings rate accompanying that, the obvious problems faced now by major residential realty developers like Evergrande and Country Garden, high levels of youth unemployment, and, of course, enormous local government debt. Now, none of my guests today are the economists that American presidents and CEOs have often wished they had at hand. That is, economists with only one hand, and they don’t always say, "On the one hand, and, on the other hand." As for me, I don’t mind hearing or engaging a little, on the one hand, myself. So, on the one hand, ordinarily, when I do hear this level of hyper-pessimism, this sheer volume of doomsaying, much of it built on, frankly, motivated reasoning, my instinct is to be very skeptical. China, after all, has defeated, has defied predictions of doom many a time, including in the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and in the great recession after 2008, the crisis of 2015 when the Chinese stock market plummeted. It seems like it’s always able to muddle through. On the other hand, as a growing number of people whose views I very much trust have come back from trips to China recently, it’s clear to me that the pessimism isn’t by any means limited just to these distant economists or reporters writing about China from the outside. When we hear about the PTSD, the shell shock caused in places like Shanghai by the lockdowns and by the chaotic, confusing end to the COVID restrictions, coupled with this kind of flagging exports, weak signals from the manufacturing sector, unemployment, and, of course, confusion in policy direction overall, I do worry. I take the bears a little more seriously.  Yet, back to that other hand, an economist whom I greatly respect, Arthur Kroeber from Gavekal Dragonomics, gave a very good talk at Harvard recently. He said that this bad news has been enlisted by some in claiming that their grand narratives, going back decades, were correct all along [cough], Gordon Chang. A relatively small amount of data, he notes, is being made to do an awful lot of work. That’s true. Today is really all about right-sizing the problem where the negativity might perhaps be warranted, and where it certainly is not, as well as identifying problems that perhaps aren’t being given sufficient attention in the reportage that we’re all reading. We’ll talk about the nature of the crisis and the nature of the state response, such as it is. Joining me to attack this important question with both hands, as it were, and to try to get this right is Chang-Tai Hsieh, who is the Phyllis and Irwin Winkelried Distinguished Service Professor of Economics at the Booth School, who specializes in development and growth in the developing world. He’s an elected member of the Academia Sinica, I like that name, and a two-time recipient of the Sun Ye-Fang Prize. Chang-Tai, welcome to Sinica, again.  Chang-Tai Hsieh: Thank you. Great to be here. Kaiser: Good up. Also joining is Lizzi Lee, who’s well known to folks who listen to Sinica or who follow The China project. She is the host of our YouTube show, The Signal With Lizzi Lee, where she does interviews with amazing people. She’s just a really expert interviewer. Lizzi also hosts the Chinese language show, Wall Street TV, Wall Street Today rather, 今日華爾街 [Jīnrì huá'ěrjiē], which is something I highly recommend. It’s about the only non-lunatic Chinese-language programming. I mean, everything else is either like hardcore party line or freaking Falun Gong, or what’s that cook’s name? Guo Wengui, right? And then there’s Lizzi, who’s like an island of sanity on YouTube. Lizzi Lee: The bar is pretty low. Kaiser: Anyway, the last time that we were together with Damien was here in Chicago. Our friends at the Chicago Council summoned us to do a sort of roundup of the 20th Party Congress, where some very, very interesting remarks were made. That takes us, of course, to Damien Ma, who is director of MacroPolo, the think tank of the Paulson Institute. Damien is the co-author of a great book, which I’m still constantly recommending to people. It’s really stood the test of time. It’s called In Line Behind a Billion People. It really looks at a lot of issues related to China’s economy and politics through the lens of scarcity. It’s a very, very good book. I highly recommend it. Damien is always one of the people I turn to for the straight dope on what’s happening in the Chinese economy. Damien, great to see you, man. Damien Ma: Very good to see you. Kaiser: Lizzi, Chang-Tai, what a great crowd we’ve had. Damien, let me start with you. You were just in China. You got back just a little over a week ago. You had both high-level meetings and some means or boots on the ground, some shoe leather work. Just talking to people who are either decision makers, economic decision makers at the enterprise level or above, and people who are just directly affected by the economy in China, people who’ve experienced the chaotic end of COVID and everything. What’s the skinny? What’s your overall takeaway from talking to people? Are things as bad as they say? Damien: Well, let me give a sort of two quick, but different observations. I think Kaiser, like you or Lizzi, when we go to China, we tend to not just stay in the hotel. I got there a few days early, so I could, first, walk around, do my own observations. Small things like, are the malls full? Right? Are people buying things? How normal does Beijing look? And caveat that, I mostly interacted with a very small slice of Beijing elites, so they’re not what I would call the true 老百姓 [lǎobǎixìng], right? They are still Beijing elites. So take that with a grain of salt. I talked to Chinese colleagues and talked to the dwindling number of foreign correspondents who are still fighting the good fight in Beijing, just to get a pulse from the people. And had my share of cabby conversations. Kaiser: Oh, those cabby conversations.  Damien: The reason I wanted to have the cabby conversations, this is probably one interesting tangential observation, is that something like 90% of Beijing cabs are now electric vehicles made by a stand-owned enterprise. This really happened over the last several years. So, if you want to see the transformation in electric vehicles, look no further than Beijing City itself. And this is purely a stay-mandated drive. They basically wanted to help the state-owned enterprise. If you went to China prior to the pandemic, you would’ve probably ridden in a South Korean Hyundai. Those basically do not exist anymore. They’re all-electric vehicles now. So, if you want to get a little small slice of that change, Beijing does give you that little insight. But in terms of the economy, I’ll just say a couple things, and I think they’re the things we’re going to get into quite a bit with the other guests as well. Talking to people, talking to friends and colleagues, there does seem to be a sense of just things not going that well. People are not seeing the bright light at the end of the tunnel in terms of the economy. In this sense, the Chinese government is probably correct in diagnosing that there is a lack of confidence among households about where the economy is going. The malls were full, but you do not see a lot of purchasing behavior, which I thought was kind of interesting. There was a lot of more window shopping, so to speak, than people actually pulling out their credit cards. Although, I guess not credit card — paying with Alipay or WeChat. Because that’s all you can do these days in Beijing. I think that struggle is real. At the policy level what’s interesting is I think they understand that this is a problem. But there is, from what I can tell, a very strong debate about really what to do about it because there’s a lot of arguments, and we’re going to get into the different arguments. But I think it’s tough to turn around a consumer and household competence. It takes a while. It takes a combination of policy, it’s a combination of incentives, and also sending very credible consistent signals for a period of time to get people to understand where the economy is going. Part of the problem that the current leadership has is that it’s sending very mixed signals about what’s happening to the economy and what they intend to do about it. I think that’s injecting more confusion to average Chinese households. It’s a very tough conundrum. And if they don’t turn that around, it’s very, very hard to sustain the growth rate that they want, which is why they may want to stimulate, but stimulus will get you a very short-term bump. That might allow them to meet their 5% target for the year. But what happens in 2024? This is something that they’re truly grappling with, and I really got that sense from talking to average Chinese, Beijingers. Kaiser: Excellent. Now, not surprisingly, there are two other historical financial crises that the current situation is often compared to. One of them, of course, is the 2008 financial crisis that started in the U.S. retail housing market, but also the malaise that beset Japan beginning right around 1990. That one is brought up an awful lot. Lizzi, I know you have some thoughts on this. I’m wondering whether you think that China is also about to enter a long period of stagnation and painfully slow growth. Are there meaningful ways in which China right now is comparable to Japan then? Lizzi: In general, I’m always against making those quick and dirty historical analogies because I think they usually are more misleading than educational. In terms of Japan, my argument is that Japan’s problem is not really an asset market problem. It’s a structural problem in the sense that the Japanese economy has its interlinked financial sector and corporate sector, all collateralized by its lent value. If a piece of asset prices goes down, the entire system goes down with it. It reminds me of Charleston, those historical buildings in Charleston. If there were a sparkle fire, the entire city would burn down. The problem is not the fire, the problem is how the city is structured. In China, the system is much more fragmented, actually intentionally so. There’s not much financial linkage between China’s corporate sector and its financial sector. China’s problems are much more fragmented pockets of problems. You have cysts and tumors in local governments, in rural banks, but those problems tend to be separate from each other. The potential of a horizontal, like all-out contagion, I would say is low. People talk about whether China is going to lose in their 20 years and their 30 years like Japan. The fundamental problem is quite different. The similarity is only on the surface. That’s Japan. For the 2008 analogy, I would actually argue that the property market in China now is less like the pre-2008 United States than a few years ago, say 2015. And that’s a deliberate policy choice. China has been aggressively reducing its corporate sector's exposure to property market loans for the past few years. I mean, yes, property market loans are still a substantial part of commercial banks’ assets, but those are individual house mortgages quite unlike the United States. And we know Chinese households pay hefty, hefty down payments, and those loans are recourse loans. So, banks can claim alternate assets if they default. It was said to be like a safe net for banks. Commercial banks, if you look at their balance sheet, they’re actually quite solid. That’s very different from pre-2008 in the United States. So, just make those two.  Kaiser: Yeah. Let me turn to Chang-Tai and ask you about the 2008 comparisons that are so often made. Let’s start by looking at the amount of leverage in the system. That’s one thing. We all probably are aware of the very high percentage of the cost of a home that you have to put down, whether you’re a first timer or a multiple-time home buyer in China, and the amount actually of equity that people have in their homes right now. But the other thing that seems to be missing is we don’t have mortgage-backed securities in China. We don’t have collateralized debt obligations and credit default swaps that we’re betting against those CDOs, right? Is China less vulnerable in that regard? Chang-Tai: Let me just say three things. First, let me just repeat what Lizzi said, that it is always dangerous, but it’s very easy to draw analogies, right? But most of the time, the world is complicated, and they can be very misleading. If I think about two views that I see, it is that China needs a stimulus, and then China has a confidence problem. That is a misleading way to think about what’s going on now. Really, the way I think about what China is going through now, it’s a combination of two things. First, specifically, on Kaiser’s question, I think about the first issue. And I like to think about that as a reallocation problem. I think that there’s no question that there has been over-expansion in the housing sector in China. What does that mean? It means that because of the housing price bubble and because of other factors, too much resources have been dedicated to the real estate sector, say, in the last 15 or so years. Right? What do you do about that? Well, exactly the wrong thing to be doing is to double up. That’s exactly what you don’t want to do because that’s going to make the reallocation problem down the line even worse. Kaiser: What would constitute doubling down on this right now? You mean stimulating? Chang-Tai: Yeah. Either some form of stimulus that supports the real estate sector. Part of the problem is that there’s always going to be short-run pain whenever there is an adjustment process. Let me just say some of that has already taken place. The beginning of this process was really starting in 2018 when you started to see the crackdown of some of the largest Chinese conglomerates, the crackdown on arm bound, the crackdown on the… Kaiser: The gray rhinos. Chang-Tai: Right, the gray rhinos. Actually, since we’re here, for those of you who can look across the street, if you see those three towers right across the street, that was initially a Wanda project. Kaiser: Dalian Wanda. Chang-Tai: The three towers that you see just across the river, 200 yards from where we are. One of the consequences of the crackdown on the Wanda Group starting in 2018, was that they were forced to sell off those three towers. It’s now called Vista Towers, right? Vista Towers, and the new owners got it on the cheap because the Wanda group was forced to sell that, not just that property, but lots of the other stuff. Now, there’s still a lot left to be done. I’m not privy to the internal discussions of the Party on how they’re planning to deal with this. But let me just give you what I think is the right historical analogy to think about this issue, which is that it’s really not 2008, but it’s 1998. If you think about what happened in 1998, China put in place this program. I don’t know whether this was the official name of the program, but this is what people started to call it, which is ‘grasp the large, let go the small.’ It was essentially a program put in place by Premier Zhu Rongji to deal with another big reallocation problem.  Kaiser: Bloated state-owned enterprise. Chang-Tai: It was a bloated state-owned enterprise. It was that you had a very large number. I mean, there’s some dispute about what the precise number is, like a very large share of capital, a very large share of the resources of the economy was going to inefficient state-owned firms. I think it’s the same question, which is, what do you do with that? There is going to be short-run pain, companies need to be closed, people are going to lose their jobs. You can postpone the pain by continuing to subsidize these companies by just renewing the loans and just kicking the can down the road. That’s not what China chose to do in 1998. It put this plan in place, which led to a lot of short-run pain. It led to a tremendous amount of short-run pain, but it was the largest closure and privatization program that I’ve ever seen in the world. A large number of firms were closed down. A large number of firms were privatized. There are interesting details about what privatization meant. We can talk about that next, but lots of people lost their jobs. This was the beginning of the process where it released the resources eventually for the millions of entrepreneurs, private firms to eventually emerge and grow in China. There are lots of details about what happened there. There were these institutions that were built on the financial side. We can talk about the asset management companies that were built in place. There are all kinds of that. It's not just that program, but it was coupled with lots of other things that were put in place at the same time. Now, I want to say I don’t know whether something like this is in the cards. That really is a short-run issue. The question is whether this short-run issue could eventually become a long-run issue if it’s not resolved. Kaiser: Actually, since the scale of it is very different, I mean, we’re talking about breaking and resetting a bone, right? It’s not just pulling off a bandaid. We’re talking about something, a major structural readjustment. Let’s look at what happened in ’99 when China was a much smaller portion of the global economy, and already it was incredibly painful. Domestically, I think you could draw a direct line to the Falun Gong, rise of Falun Gong and the sit-ins, or potentially politically destabilizing events in that time, right? Today, much bigger, much more integrated, much more risk of global contagion. Chang-Tai: In terms of the effect of the world, I think it’s absolutely right. But in terms of the scale of the problem in China, I think it’s much smaller. Kaiser: Okay.  Chang-Tai: In terms of the scale, now, whether there is, I’m going to say the equivalent of Zhu Rongji and the people that were around him at the time, one of the key people at the time was Wang Qishan. Whether there’s that team now, I don’t know, right? I don’t know. But I’ll just say that when I look at other countries of the world, the vast majority of the countries around the world that face this kind of problem, they never solve it, right? Because it’s painful. And if things are painful, you just don’t do it. Kaiser: I want to drill down on this a little bit with Lizzi. You know that there’s nothing that shakes confidence in the economy more than uncertainty. And I think what I hear a lot of complaints about are the lack of clear signals and intention to backstop, coming from the leadership. In 1998, to Chang-Tai’s point, we had Zhu Rongji, a fairly firm hand on the tiller. We had Wang Qishan. Today, we’re just coming out of the transition. We have a relatively new premier, Li Qiang, and He Lifeng, just now appointed. Do we have the same sort of caliber of administrative management to the economy? Lizzi: That’s a really good question. I’ve been pondering this term crisis of confidence, as people talk about it in the media a lot. What do we actually mean by crisis of confidence? Like Damien, I also had the opportunity to interact with a cross-section of Chinese citizens. Some of them are entrepreneurs, some of them are low government officials, some of them are recent college grads. And I do get the sense that there is this general sense of anxiety and unease, which I have not seen before. I mean, we Chinese are a grumpy bunch. We complain about parents, about our kids, about our neighbors, etc. But this time I feel like the grudge is very much pointed toward current policymakers, even to the top leadership. The general sense is that there’s something amiss, and they’re not quite sure the direction this country is heading is what they imagined it to be. So, there’s that real sense of anxiety here. Kaiser: The product of the COVID closure and the lockdowns. Lizzi: Yeah, we can definitely talk about that. But my point is, that is actually not consistent with the raw economic data you see. If you look at the data, in the first half of the year, consumption actually went up by more than 8%. Wage and disposable income went up more than 6%. It’s not breakneck pace by any stretch of imagination, but it’s not that bad. I mean, it’s not great by Chinese standards, but it’s not a picture of doom and gloom. So, where does this sense of anxiety, this sense of we are completely in the wrong direction, there’s no hope, there’s no tomorrow coming from? Again, my thinking on this is still very much fluid, but I think it’s not quite a crisis of confidence. It’s more like what happens when there’s this huge gap between your expectation and reality. If you were born into a middle-class Chinese household, there are certain things that you take to be true, right? Your parents worked really hard, they bought a house, they already paid down the mortgage. You have your family wealth stored in your house, which will appreciate quite a lot, and that’s going to be a decent inheritance to you. And your parents invest really heavily in your education. Most of the college graduates now are from one child household. So, we study really hard. Your parents invest in your education. You go to a really good college, and you expect to be able to get a job in the tech sector, in the financial sector upon graduation, and have a really lucrative career. That’s the expectation that has been building in people’s minds for the past 10 plus years. But now, that equilibrium has been broken, right? First, you have these years of tech crackdowns. All the high-flying tech companies and financial companies are cutting. They’re not recruiting anymore. Those kinds of lucrative jobs are just not there. And then you have three years of lockdowns. And then you have this problem of a market thing where family wealth is now in jeopardy. Basically every single piece of that equation is no longer there. What you take to be 100% certain in the future is just not there. So, I would say it’s not really a crisis of confidence. It’s that gap between reality, between what you currently see and dream. I think that helps explain one puzzling phenomena. If you go to those recruiting fairs in China, they’re all empty, right? If youth unemployment is at 20%, you would imagine that people are eager to find jobs. They will take whatever is available out there, but why aren’t people not showing up at those recruiting fairs? That’s because those jobs that are offered are not the kind of jobs they want. So, when we talk about Chinese youth unemployment at 20%, which is a historical level for China, I think, by some standard, people should be on the street, right? People should be causing all kinds of social unrest. But that’s not what we see in China. I think people are disillusioned, but it’s not like they cannot find jobs and they have to starve on the street. That’s not what’s really going on. But back to Shanghai’s point, I think what’s really different this time is, when the central leadership, when Xi Jinping and Li Qiang announced this piecemeal measures to stimulate, to remedy the economy, the market doesn’t really take that, which is quite interesting. There are multiple hypotheses of what’s actually going on. But one thing that I think is quite different from Zhu Rongji’s time and now is that Zhu Rongji is not one single person. Zhu Rongji has a team of capable economic lieutenants who can actually execute his plans, right? Wang Qishan, people like that. Many of those people have been purged by Xi Jinping during past years of anti-corruption campaigns, especially Guang Da Xi (光大系) and 国开行 [the Guangming banking system and the China Development Bank], all those Zhu Rongji lieutenants. They were hit really hard during the anti-corruption campaign. There’s this general sense that the people who can do this are just not there. And I would say the opposite. There are so many people sitting on their hands basically waiting for directions from the very top leadership because they are afraid of the potential retributions. Like, “What if I do this and something went wrong? I might as well just listen to whatever the top dictates to me.” That kind of inaction, that kind of inertia, is what’s really pragmatic this time. I don’t have a really good solution to that, but this is what I see. And I just wanted to share that with our audience. Kaiser: Underlying a lot of this is a bigger question of China’s overall economic direction and what it is that Xi Jinping actually wants, the shape of the Chinese economy in his longer-term view. This is something that you’ve talked about a lot, and you actually identified back in 2017. I think you and Evan Feigenbaum wrote a paper that pushed your finger on this, I think proved very prescient. And we’ve seen these ideas echoed out of the 20th Party Congress. This move away from GDP uberalist toward a more sort of qualitative growth. Can you talk a little bit about that idea? And I’d love Chang-Tai to weigh in as well about your thoughts on what it is that Xi and the current Chinese leadership want the Chinese economy to be and to do. We’re no longer talking about KPIs for local officials measured in terms of GDP growth, but rather maybe in nanometers as you once kind of half-jokingly said, but accurately said. Damien: Right. We published a piece basically with the title — “Nanometers over GDP.” The idea is to capture, crystallize this sense that for 25 years, people were very much accustomed to Chinese introducing growth to meet a certain target, right? There was even this term in markets called the 问价爆破 [wèn jià bàopò]. Every time the economy would tank, they would do countercyclical stimulus because they want to achieve roughly 7% to 8% growth. Because that fixation was really important. But starting the 14th five-year plan it was very clear that the top leadership, in particular Xi Jinping, decided that was not going to be the case anymore. He said, “We’re not going to really have a… We’ll have a range, we’ll still sort of think about growth,” but basically, that target is now no longer valid. We shouldn’t fixate our entire growth strategy around that. That’s important because the problem is that they didn’t really clarify what the floor is going to be. So, how far can this fall? Are we talking 2%, 3%? What are they satisfied with? This is where I would, I think, agree and also disagree with what Chang-Tai and Lizzi said. I think we can all agree that this is not a 2008 Lehman Brother kind of housing crisis, a problem. And this is not what Lizzi says, sort of a Japanese-style balance sheet recession, which is, I think, Richard Koo branded that. The analogy with the late ’90s holds, it is a sort of debt problem. But last time there was debt on the balance sheet of state-owned enterprises. This time the debt is primarily on local government, right? Kaiser: But that $5 trillion that- Damien: Right. We can get to that number, but the main thing is that if you think about it, the macro conditions, though, are quite different now than it was in the late 1990s. Let’s recount what happened. China was about to enter the World Trade Organization, right? Right at the end in the 1990s. That really gave it a big lift in growth. And then China in ’96, ’97, had just privatized the property sector. That was a big growth driver. Now you have just the opposite. The property sector is declining, and they’re not really trying to save it as much as we think. There is no WTO, there’s nothing coming that way. So, I guess the question is, de-leveraging might be the right call, but to do it in a low-growth environment when it’s not clear what the future growth drivers are going to be, is that too risky of a gamble to execute right now when the entire system is saying, “We don’t care that much about GDP growth anymore,” right? When you grow, even if you take on debt, you can actually inflate away that debt if you have inflation. Actually, debt just becomes a smaller portion of GDP over time. That’s essentially what happened since the late 1990s. Kaiser: But unpack this a little bit. Tell us, what’s the positive vision? What do they hope to achieve? When they talk about qualitative growth, what does he really need? Damien: Well, this is my own interpretation, my view is that China wants to become the Amazon of countries. Amazon is the everything store. China wants to be the make-everything country, essentially. If you think about the 1990s, what was the main moniker attached to China? Factory of the world? Kaiser: Of world. Damien: 2023, what is China set to do? Also, factory of the world. Just those factories have changed from socks and Nike shoes to batteries and low-end chips, and all those technology products. I think China really feels it’s got a strong competitive advantage in all these mid-range tech supply chains, manufacturing. Obviously I’m exaggerating to say make everything, but I think the strategy is can we attract a global supply chain ecosystem to China, make it there, and export it around the world that might offset some of the other growth drivers that are slowing down? Kaiser: Lizzi, you had an interesting way of talking about it. You used a martial arts metaphor. You said it’s 练内功 [liàn nèigōng]. I don’t know how to translate that, sort of like your internal, like cultivating internal… Lizzi: Right. Yeah, I agree with Damien’s framing, but I would use a slightly different word. I think China’s really focusing on the resilience of its system. Here in the United States, we tend to focus on the final product. When we want to develop the EV industry, we focus on consumers, cars, right? We focus on subsidies and policies, policymakers, energy, and so on. In China, they take a much more holistic view on what EV means. They started from rare minerals down to infrastructure, down to batteries, down to the cocktail of government subsidies, tech breaks, and consumer tax credits to the final product itself. That’s a much more vertical way of thinking about what a product actually means. By the way, that ensures that the whole system has enough flexibility. So, if you want to attack a single part of that system, we want to make sure that there’s enough fluidity in the system itself for the system to heal itself. So, a single act of sanction won’t break the entire system. I think that’s what I mean by 内功 [nèigōng]. It’s the chi, the circulation that matters.  Damien: Also because the external environment is just not as conducive to China’s products. Lizzi: Yes, absolutely. One thing that I noticed is that there’s a lot of focus on how to adapt to hostile external environments as they speak of, as we can see from the case on Huawei, right? I think they expect that to happen in the future. They sort of preempt future sanctions and restrictions by making sure there’s enough leeway in the system to have at least three or five years of buffer to sustain that attack. Huawei did not survive by making trailblazing breakthroughs in 5G in chips. Huawei literally found a get-around, Huawei developed a software system to get around hardware restrictions. Huawei developed those chiplets quite literally by stacking inferior chips together to achieve roughly the same thing as those high-speed chips can do. I think that’s what China has gotten really good at. For most of the business and industrial organizations, top technology is actually not necessary. You just need to find something that works and execute that really well. I think that’s what China’s focusing on. Kaiser: Chang-Tai, how would you describe it? You talked about this period of readjustment that we’re in right now. What’s the end goal of that readjustment? What is the imagined end state post-readjustment? Chang-Tai: I’m going to get to your question, but let me just say that I think there’s something else there. And I was asked this question, but I’m going to ask the question to the other people on the panel because I don’t have an answer. There also just seems to be something more than resilience. I don’t know what it is about this view that certain things, that certain products or certain technologies are the ones that are valid, and other things are invalid. Maybe a example is that there is that semiconductor chips are a real thing, and it’s something that China needs to be, and it’d be great if China were good at making semiconductor chips, but coming up with a software, the very best software in the world to design semiconductor chips, that’s not a real thing. Kaiser: I’m not sure that they would classify that as not a real thing. The things that they think are not real things are creating complex financial, derivative-based products, doing social media. They don’t want their best and brightest being steered into, like in the United States, they want their physicists to graduate from Tsinghua and freaking do physics. They don’t want them to go work for a social media company or go work for a bank to design speculative products. Chang-Tai: I mean, for some products, you can say that they’re negative externalities, right? They’re negative. But why is a chip company or the revenues from a chip company more valid than the revenue of Alibaba right? But there’s a very clear sense in which one company is really valuable and the other company is less so. Kaiser: Because they want to be Germany. Chang-Tai: But why? Kaiser: Because they really, honestly believe, and this is something… Chang-Tai: No, no, no, but I- Kaiser: I get into this in this documentary. Damien: Because software platforms, social media has social political ramifications, ultimately. Kaiser: That’s only part- Damien: I mean, that’s one factor. A chip is a chip. It doesn’t have that baggage. Chang-Tai: No, but maybe, but even something like food delivery, software for food delivery, that has no political ramifications. But my sense is that if you ask them, they’re like, “Who cares if you come up with a better food delivery software?” Kaiser: Well, I mean, you’re the one who introduced this phrase earlier in the conversation — grasp the heavy, let go of the light. This is exactly what they believe they’re doing right now. That’s what they believe in themselves. What was the phrase, though? Arthur Kroeber, a great talk, you should check out. He says, “China wants to be a Leninist Germany.” Lizzi: Leninistic Germany. Chang-Tai: I think that’s exactly the right phrase, but let me just ask the question is that… Let me just pull two companies. Nvidia is one, right? That is one. It’s the leading… Kaiser: GPU maker, yeah. Chang-Tai: Chip company in the U.S. For those of you who know Nvidia, Nvidia makes nothing, right? It just designs chips. It’s just incredibly good at chip design. They also are really good at doing the software for AI, but it makes nothing. So, think about Nvidia versus Taiwan semiconductors. Which Taiwan semiconductor, what they know how to do really well is to actually make it, right? I guess for my vantage point, as an economist, I think both of these things are incredibly valuable. How valuable they are, well, it’s what people are willing to pay for these sorts of things. But the leaders of the Party, I think they think about it differently and I don’t fully understand why.  Let me just say that there’s one thing there, right? There’s one thing, or like, so say, software to tutor kids, clearly, that’s of no value, but why not, right? I mean, kids learn and… Kaiser: Well, in this case, they believe clearly that this creates social problems by inequity just by the inequality of opportunity, right? That’s in this case, I don’t think that they would look at one part of the value chain and another part of the value chain in something like semiconductors and say, “This part isn’t important and this part is.” I think that when it comes to semiconductors, though, they do believe that the manufacturing process is absolutely vital and that they should focus on never stopping manufacturing because they really buy into this idea that process knowledge, that the actual innovative advantage conferred by continuing to manufacture is very real. Damien: I think another fact is just China has basically converged with the West on software on the app economy. I mean, China frankly makes some of the best apps in the world already, right? So, the gaps where they feel they’re still deficient are in a lot of these hardware segments. Kaiser: We could go on with this one for a while, but I want to get back into a really cheery topic, which is local debt. Damien, MacroPolo recently put out an estimate that there’s about $5 trillion of local debt that’s at risk in the next three, oh, default in the next three years. Damien: Potentially, yes. Kaiser: Let’s just put that in perspective. What was 2023? The projected GDP is $19.4 trillion. So, we’re talking about north of 20%, of 25%. Damien: Well, but remember, but the debt to GDP ratio, it’s always higher, right? Kaiser: It’s always higher. Right. But I want to ask Chang-Tai, what does an actual debt crisis look like in China? What are the ramifications? What are the spillovers? I mean, if you are a money manager and you’re looking at China, where do you steer away from? Where do you think you want to limit your exposure in China where we start seeing massive default of local government debt? Chang-Tai: Let me just firstly give a direct answer to, it’s clearly the property sector. But in the property sector, there could be some part of the financial institutions. If you think where a lot of the action is taking place, it’s really in the combination of these local financing vehicles and shadow banking. Some of these, we have data, a lot of these we don’t. So, there’s a bunch of it. But let me just push back on that. I don’t think that really is the biggest issue. I think the biggest issue is what Lizzi was talking about, which is this view that things have changed in China. And I want to hone in on one thing, so let me put it this way. One way I have thought about China for a long time is that despite the fact that there are no formal property rights, there was this very clear sense about what the rules of the game were. That is, if I’m an entrepreneur, I don’t engage in politics. If they want to make me a member of the local National Party’s Congress, I will do it, of course. But if I don’t engage in politics, I will be left alone. Although there’s nothing formal about it. My property rights are going to be protected. I can grow, I can make money, I can accumulate my wealth. I think of it almost like this marriage. If I think about what a good marriage is, it’s about, there are clear expectations on both sides about what proper behaviors — Nothing is written down, right? There’s no prenup. After the fact, I think what happened last year may have shattered that contract. Things that I thought only happened to dissidents, things that only happened to somebody like Jack Ma, I didn’t think about it then, but maybe this sense of what happened in 2022 is that, hey, the Party can actually be really crazy, the Party can actually do really crazy stuff. And this crazy stuff can happen to me, even if I’ve done nothing. That may be part of it. I don’t quite know how to quantify it. I’m curious to know your views on how much is going on, but I think of it as the breakdown of a marriage - ‘These were the things that I believed about you, and now I don’t believe in it’.  Kaiser: You and Lizzi are apparently on the same wavelength because recently she was on our sister podcast, The China Global South Podcast, talking about this, the same sort of breakdown of the informal, the contract. Chang-Tai: The contract. Right. Kaiser: Interesting. We only have a few minutes left. I really want to focus on one final big question. I’ll start with Damien. What should U.S. policy do? We seem to be all indulging in a kind of schadenfreude, looking at China’s travails economically and almost gloating over it. But China is deeply interconnected. It could bring our house down as well. It could impact us negatively. What is wise American policy when it comes to China right now in terms of supporting or helping along its economic troubles? What should we be doing? Should we be rooting for China, or should we be rooting for the forces that reset China? Damien: Well, look, the U.S. and China are still 40% of the global economy. You look at what’s going on at a macro level, Europe’s not doing so hot. Germany, France, not doing so hot. It could enter a recession. In The United States, that debate is still outstanding, whether in a few quarters, we might still see some recessionary characteristics.  Kaiser: Please not before November. Damien: And the Chinese, even if they stimulate, they’re probably not going to get too much above 5% this year, which is fine, but not great. So if we’re thinking about global economic stability, there’s no reason why the U.S. and China should think about how to provide the anchor as 40% of the global GDP, which they did try to do back in 2008 and 2009. Kaiser: That’s right. Damien: I think this is a time that’s going to be needed more than ever, the geopolitical volatility aside Kaiser: Can you imagine China having a major financial crisis that threatens to bleed into the global economy and the U.S. stepping up in the way that China did in 2008? Damien: Well, I don’t think the nature of the crisis is going to be that sort of a global contagion like that because it’s not going to come from the formal financial sector. It’s mostly going to be a domestic debt crisis. But a China that grows below its potential is not a good thing when the world needs growth. And I think markets, investors are going to be looking for growth. And if all the big three pillars, the EU, the United States, and China, their trifecta are all kind of anemic, that’s not a good outcome for the global economy. Kaiser: Absolutely. Lizzi, what are your thoughts on this? And then I’ll leave for Chang-Tai at the end. Lizzi: Right. I’m going to answer a slightly different question of what doesn’t work for the United States. I think by making China look bad, by making China do bad, that clearly does nothing for the United States to strengthen itself. And I see a lot of deflections, reflections in the media when it comes to China from policymakers. I do think the United States needs to think harder about what its own strength is and what its own course is. Ultimately, the United States can only become stronger by becoming stronger. It won’t become stronger by making China look like a bully, making China look weak. I don’t want it to go like a full therapist on this, but I think there’s a lot of soul-searching for the United States to do, and it has nothing to do with what China looks like in the future. Kaiser: Run faster, goddammit, and stop trying to trip the other guy. Lizzi: Right. Chang-Tai: I don’t think that’s completely right. Let me try to articulate what I think the U.S. is struggling with for a long time. I think that we have all believed, and it’s true, of course, that everybody gains from trade and investment. If China grows, the U.S. gains. If the U.S. grows, China gains. I don’t think there’s any doubt about that. What the U.S. is struggling with is the question of suppose that, or let me put it this way. I will give an analogy. Suppose that there’s a powerful CEO, right? The owner of a company that you know, or that you believe is a racist. If that person is poor and they’re a racist, it doesn’t matter because they have no money, right? The question is, what if this person is worth a trillion dollars and this person… It’s not a problem if this person just wants to buy a fancy yacht with… Kaiser: And now we’re talking about Elon Musk. Chang-Tai: Yeah. No, that’s a question. Suppose that Elon Musk is going to do stuff that you fundamentally disagree with, and he can do it if he has money, right? The question is, what are you going to do? You are going to lose if you don’t buy that Tesla, right? You love that Tesla, but you buy that Tesla, and that person starts to do stuff that you fundamentally disagree with. I think that is the tension. That is what the U.S. is really struggling with. And it’s a spiral that’s going on, which is this fear in the U.S. on what are you going to do with your economic power, right? Then on the other side, on the Chinese side, there’s this widespread belief that the goal of the U.S. is to destroy China, right? And this speaks to the question about, oh, China faces a hostile environment, so we got to build resilience. You can see how these two views of the world easily reinforce each other. And you could start off with a situation where China has no intention towards the rest of the world. That Elon Musk is really a nice guy, but then you start to do stuff towards him, and Elon Musk feels threatened, then they start to do so. I think that is the spiral that we are on. And that could get both sides to do things that they originally did not want to do. So, what should U.S. policy be? I don’t know. I think that that’s a very dangerous spiral that we are on now. Damien: Convergence on capabilities, divergence on values. Kaiser: Yeah. We should all go home tonight and ponder deeply the question of whether China is Elon Musk or Bill Gates, and that will shape our… Or somebody even who’s not George Soros. Chang-Tai: But it’s endogenous. That’s part of what I’m saying is that whether somebody becomes Elon Musk or Bill Gates is endogenous.  Kaiser: Right. I don’t think it’s entirely. I think that the way that we treat that person also determines how- Chang-Tai: Of course. Kaiser: Not entirely an endogenous question. Alright, folks, thank you so much for coming and for joining us in this great conversation. Damien Ma, Chang-Tai Hsieh, and, of course, Lizzi Lee. All right.  ]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Sinica1019.jpg Live from Chicago: Decoding China — China’s economic miracle interrupted? false no 0:00 No no Robert Daly of the Kissinger Institute on the morality of U.S. China policy https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/robert-daly-of-the-kissinger-institute-on-the-morality-of-u-s-china-policy/ Thu, 12 Oct 2023 18:00:56 +0000 http://thechinaproject.com/?post_type=podcast&p=287028 whataboutism 1:27:08 – Comparing American intentions with Chinese realities and the issue of moral absolutism 1:44:50 – What a “Just Cold War” would involve? 1:51:34 – Can the U.S. imagine a world in which it is not a hegemonic power? A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations:  Robert: The House of Sixty Fathers (a Newbury Award-winning book) by Meindert DeJong with illustrations by the late Maurice Sendak Kaiser: Wolf Hall: A Novel by Hilary Mantel Anda Union (Inner Mongolian band)]]> whataboutism 1:27:08 – Comparing American intentions with Chinese realities and the issue of moral absolutism 1:44:50 – What a “Just Cold War” would involve? 1:51:34 – Can the U.S. imagine a world in which it is not a hegemonic power? A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations:  Robert: The House of Sixty Fathers (a Newbury Award-winning book) by Meindert DeJong with illustrations by the late Maurice Sendak Kaiser: Wolf Hall: A Novel by Hilary Mantel Anda Union (Inner Mongolian band)]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/RobertDaly.jpg Robert Daly of the Kissinger Institute on the morality of U.S. China policy false no 0:00 No no China Tobacco: How China’s tobacco monopoly also has ensured that China keeps smoking https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/china-tobacco-how-chinas-tobacco-monopoly-also-has-ensured-that-china-keeps-smoking/ Thu, 05 Oct 2023 18:00:14 +0000 http://thechinaproject.com/?post_type=podcast&p=286506 The Examination, and reporter Jude Chan, who writes for Initium Media. The two worked with two other reporters on a fascinating expose, funded by the Pulitzer Center, of China's tobacco monopoly, the State Tobacco Monopoly Administration (or China Tobacco), and how it has managed to be both the biggest seller of tobacco in the world — and also the effective regulator of tobacco laws in China. 06:41 – The origins and mission of The Examination 09:24 – An overview of the tobacco industry in China 12:17 – What is the true power China Tobacco holds in the Chinese tobacco industry? 14:34 – The history and inner workings of China Tobacco 20:30 – China Tobacco - a manufacturer or a regulator? 28:42 – The current situation of anti-smoking advocacy in China 31:47 – The role of smoking in the Chinese culture and the gender discrepancy within the custom of smoking 39:09 – How does China Tobacco manage to prevent the implementation of smoking bans in Chinese cities? 48:07 – What was the reason behind the faltering of promising initiatives regarding smoking control? 55:33 – The approach of Chinese youth towards the unequal fight with China Tobacco? A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Jude: Zhang Chunqiao: 1949 and Beyond by Zheng Zhong Jason: Top Boy (British crime drama on Netflix) Kaiser: The music of Florence Price, and especially Symphony No. 1 and Symphony No. 3 recorded by the Philadelphia Orchestra]]> The Examination, and reporter Jude Chan, who writes for Initium Media. The two worked with two other reporters on a fascinating expose, funded by the Pulitzer Center, of China's tobacco monopoly, the State Tobacco Monopoly Administration (or China Tobacco), and how it has managed to be both the biggest seller of tobacco in the world — and also the effective regulator of tobacco laws in China. 06:41 – The origins and mission of The Examination 09:24 – An overview of the tobacco industry in China 12:17 – What is the true power China Tobacco holds in the Chinese tobacco industry? 14:34 – The history and inner workings of China Tobacco 20:30 – China Tobacco - a manufacturer or a regulator? 28:42 – The current situation of anti-smoking advocacy in China 31:47 – The role of smoking in the Chinese culture and the gender discrepancy within the custom of smoking 39:09 – How does China Tobacco manage to prevent the implementation of smoking bans in Chinese cities? 48:07 – What was the reason behind the faltering of promising initiatives regarding smoking control? 55:33 – The approach of Chinese youth towards the unequal fight with China Tobacco? A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Jude: Zhang Chunqiao: 1949 and Beyond by Zheng Zhong Jason: Top Boy (British crime drama on Netflix) Kaiser: The music of Florence Price, and especially Symphony No. 1 and Symphony No. 3 recorded by the Philadelphia Orchestra]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/McLure.jpg China Tobacco: How China’s tobacco monopoly also has ensured that China keeps smoking false no 0:00 No no The Philadelphia Orchestra commemorates the 50th anniversary of its groundbreaking China tour https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/the-philadelphia-orchestra-commemorates-the-50th-anniversary-of-its-groundbreaking-china-tour/ Thu, 28 Sep 2023 18:00:26 +0000 http://thechinaproject.com/?post_type=podcast&p=285989 guzheng player and composer Wu Fei about the legacy of the Philadelphia Orchestra’s China tour, their continuing connection with China, and their concert performances in Chapel Hill, performed to the day on the two closing nights of that historic tour 50 years ago. 07:00 – The China connection in the overall identity of the Philadelphia Orchestra 11:32 – 缘分 [yuánfèn] and the serendipity of the commemorative concert in Chapel Hill 14:19 – What can we learn from the original Philadelphia Orchestra members? 19:49 – Has the interest in the China-U.S. culture exchange started to fall off in recent years? 25:04 – Music as the common ground in the light of worsening relations with China 28:02 – “What’s the orchestra of today?” as the leading theme for the commemorative concert 31:10 – The significance of Beethoven’s Symphony No. 6 to the orchestra’s history in China 33:41 – The inspiration for Hello Gold Mountain and its connection to Jewish history in China A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Matias: Soave sia il vento (the trio from Mozart’s opera Così fan tutte) Alison: Natalie Haynes Stands Up for the Classics (podcast) Shanir Blumenkranz’s music Fei: Sleepytime Gorilla Museum (avant-garde metal band) Kaiser: Good Harvest 大丰收 (restaurant) Matteo Mancuso (Sicilian guitar virtuoso)]]> guzheng player and composer Wu Fei about the legacy of the Philadelphia Orchestra’s China tour, their continuing connection with China, and their concert performances in Chapel Hill, performed to the day on the two closing nights of that historic tour 50 years ago. 07:00 – The China connection in the overall identity of the Philadelphia Orchestra 11:32 – 缘分 [yuánfèn] and the serendipity of the commemorative concert in Chapel Hill 14:19 – What can we learn from the original Philadelphia Orchestra members? 19:49 – Has the interest in the China-U.S. culture exchange started to fall off in recent years? 25:04 – Music as the common ground in the light of worsening relations with China 28:02 – “What’s the orchestra of today?” as the leading theme for the commemorative concert 31:10 – The significance of Beethoven’s Symphony No. 6 to the orchestra’s history in China 33:41 – The inspiration for Hello Gold Mountain and its connection to Jewish history in China A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Matias: Soave sia il vento (the trio from Mozart’s opera Così fan tutte) Alison: Natalie Haynes Stands Up for the Classics (podcast) Shanir Blumenkranz’s music Fei: Sleepytime Gorilla Museum (avant-garde metal band) Kaiser: Good Harvest 大丰收 (restaurant) Matteo Mancuso (Sicilian guitar virtuoso)]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Sinica9.28.jpg The Philadelphia Orchestra commemorates the 50th anniversary of its groundbreaking China tour false no 0:00 No no Ian Johnson on “Sparks,” his new book on China’s underground historians https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/ian-johnson-on-sparks-his-new-book-on-chinas-underground-historians/ Thu, 21 Sep 2023 16:45:24 +0000 http://thechinaproject.com/?post_type=podcast&p=285412 Sparks China's Underground Historians and their Battle for the Future." Profiling both prominent and lesser-known individuals working to expose dark truths about some of the grimmest periods of the PRC's history, including the Great Leap Forward famine and the violence of the Cultural Revolution, Johnson argues that the efforts of China's "counter-historians" have managed to survive the stepped-up efforts of Xi Jinping to control the historical narrative completely. 03:27 – Is the obsessive control of historical narratives a particularly Chinese phenomenon? 07:19 – The life of Ai Xiaoming and the creation of a collective memory as one of the main themes in the book 21:46 – The story of Jiang Xue, citizen journalist 25:22 – Journalistic stubbornness of Tan Hecheng 28:39 – Cheng Hongguo and the Zhiwuzhi salon 30:26 – Common traits shared by many Chinese regime critics 37:17 – Is there a link between dissent in China and Christianity? 39:53 – Historical nihilism and sensitive topics for the Chinese Communist Party 47:08 – Are counter-historians especially noteworthy because they’re exceptional, or representative? 57:36 – The most important insight the book adds to our understanding of regime critics in China A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Ian: The Quiet Before: On the Unexpected Origins of Radical Ideas by Gal Beckerman Unofficial Chinese Archives Kaiser: Death in Venice and Other Tales by Thomas Mann, translated by Joachim Neugroschel]]> Sparks China's Underground Historians and their Battle for the Future." Profiling both prominent and lesser-known individuals working to expose dark truths about some of the grimmest periods of the PRC's history, including the Great Leap Forward famine and the violence of the Cultural Revolution, Johnson argues that the efforts of China's "counter-historians" have managed to survive the stepped-up efforts of Xi Jinping to control the historical narrative completely. 03:27 – Is the obsessive control of historical narratives a particularly Chinese phenomenon? 07:19 – The life of Ai Xiaoming and the creation of a collective memory as one of the main themes in the book 21:46 – The story of Jiang Xue, citizen journalist 25:22 – Journalistic stubbornness of Tan Hecheng 28:39 – Cheng Hongguo and the Zhiwuzhi salon 30:26 – Common traits shared by many Chinese regime critics 37:17 – Is there a link between dissent in China and Christianity? 39:53 – Historical nihilism and sensitive topics for the Chinese Communist Party 47:08 – Are counter-historians especially noteworthy because they’re exceptional, or representative? 57:36 – The most important insight the book adds to our understanding of regime critics in China A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Ian: The Quiet Before: On the Unexpected Origins of Radical Ideas by Gal Beckerman Unofficial Chinese Archives Kaiser: Death in Venice and Other Tales by Thomas Mann, translated by Joachim Neugroschel]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/IanJohnson2-1.jpg Ian Johnson on “Sparks,” his new book on China’s underground historians false no 0:00 No no U.S. Congressman Rick Larsen (D-WA) on his new U.S.-China policy white paper https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/u-s-congressman-rick-larsen-d-wa-on-his-new-u-s-china-policy-white-paper/ Thu, 14 Sep 2023 15:29:10 +0000 http://thechinaproject.com/?post_type=podcast&p=284725 A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Rep. Larsen: Path Lit by Lightning: The Life of Jim Thorpe by David Maraniss Kaiser: The Driftless Area (a topographical and cultural region in the Midwestern United States)]]> A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Rep. Larsen: Path Lit by Lightning: The Life of Jim Thorpe by David Maraniss Kaiser: The Driftless Area (a topographical and cultural region in the Midwestern United States)]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/RickLarsen.jpg U.S. Congressman Rick Larsen (D-WA) on his new U.S.-China policy white paper false no 0:00 No no The case for the U.S.-China Science and Technology Agreement https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/the-case-for-the-u-s-china-science-and-technology-agreement/ Thu, 07 Sep 2023 16:00:43 +0000 http://thechinaproject.com/?post_type=podcast&p=284098 A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com Recommendations: Debbi: Abortion Opponents Are Targeting a Signature G.O.P. Public-Health Initiative by Peter Slevin (in The New Yorker) Karen: Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity by Daren Acemoglu and Simon Johnson Kaiser: King’s War (Chinese TV series 《楚汉传奇》Chǔhàn chuánqí on Netflix Mentioned: The Case for Renewing the U.S.-China S&T Cooperation Agreement by Deborah Seligsohn (article in CSIS)]]> A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com Recommendations: Debbi: Abortion Opponents Are Targeting a Signature G.O.P. Public-Health Initiative by Peter Slevin (in The New Yorker) Karen: Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity by Daren Acemoglu and Simon Johnson Kaiser: King’s War (Chinese TV series 《楚汉传奇》Chǔhàn chuánqí on Netflix Mentioned: The Case for Renewing the U.S.-China S&T Cooperation Agreement by Deborah Seligsohn (article in CSIS)]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/HaoSeligsohn.jpg The case for the U.S.-China Science and Technology Agreement false no 0:00 No no The Rise and Fall of the EAST: MIT’s Yasheng Huang on his new book https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/the-rise-and-fall-of-the-east-mits-yasheng-huang-on-his-new-book/ Thu, 31 Aug 2023 18:00:43 +0000 http://thechinaproject.com/?post_type=podcast&p=283489 The Rise and Fall of the EAST: How Exams, Autocracy, Stability, and Technology Brought China Success, and Why they Might Lead to its Decline. This ambitious and thought-provoking book is bound to stir up quite a bit of controversy. It’s a long conversation — but worth the listen! 04:11 - The impact of the Keju system on China today - an overview of the big questions in Yasheng Huang’s newest book 07:31 - How does the framework of scale and scope correlate with homogeneity and heterogeneity? 12:33 - M-form and U-form economies - which one describes contemporary China best? 23:43 - How did the Keju system develop into a perfect scaling tool? 36:22 - Did Imperial China have a weak civil society? 44:05 - The GDP metric as a modern equivalent of the Keju system 50:00 - The design behind a political ladder to the highest positions in the central government 1:06:26 - The question of literacy and its possible neurobiological impact on people in the West and East 1:24:05 - Gordon Tullock and the succession problem in China 1:30:36 - T in the WEST: Technology 1:37:57 - The correlation between technological inventiveness and the prevalence of warfare 1:53:58 - Can Xi Jinping step down? Xi’s anti-corruption campaign - its consequences, and other possible scenarios A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Yasheng: American Prometheus: The Inspiration for the Major Motion Picture OPPENHEIMER by Kai Bird and Martin J. Sherwin Kaiser: @DrewDurnil (YouTube channel)]]> The Rise and Fall of the EAST: How Exams, Autocracy, Stability, and Technology Brought China Success, and Why they Might Lead to its Decline. This ambitious and thought-provoking book is bound to stir up quite a bit of controversy. It’s a long conversation — but worth the listen! 04:11 - The impact of the Keju system on China today - an overview of the big questions in Yasheng Huang’s newest book 07:31 - How does the framework of scale and scope correlate with homogeneity and heterogeneity? 12:33 - M-form and U-form economies - which one describes contemporary China best? 23:43 - How did the Keju system develop into a perfect scaling tool? 36:22 - Did Imperial China have a weak civil society? 44:05 - The GDP metric as a modern equivalent of the Keju system 50:00 - The design behind a political ladder to the highest positions in the central government 1:06:26 - The question of literacy and its possible neurobiological impact on people in the West and East 1:24:05 - Gordon Tullock and the succession problem in China 1:30:36 - T in the WEST: Technology 1:37:57 - The correlation between technological inventiveness and the prevalence of warfare 1:53:58 - Can Xi Jinping step down? Xi’s anti-corruption campaign - its consequences, and other possible scenarios A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Yasheng: American Prometheus: The Inspiration for the Major Motion Picture OPPENHEIMER by Kai Bird and Martin J. Sherwin Kaiser: @DrewDurnil (YouTube channel)]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/YashengHuang.jpg The Rise and Fall of the EAST: MIT’s Yasheng Huang on his new book false no 0:00 No no China Stories summer special: The best of This Week in China’s History https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/282997/ Thu, 24 Aug 2023 18:00:19 +0000 http://thechinaproject.com/?post_type=podcast&p=282997
  • Not just a metaphor: Dragons of imperial China show us how people lived (1517)
  • The ‘Empress of China’ and the beginning of U.S.-China trade (1784)
  • The rise of Empress Dowager Cixi (1861)
  • In the 7th century, a Chinese coup of Shakespearean proportions (626)
  • Titanic’s six Chinese survivors tell a story that goes far beyond a shipwreck (1912)
  • The problem with Mao’s ‘continuous’ revolution (1967)
  • The Battle of Red Cliffs and the blurring of fact and fiction (208–209)
  • The music — snippets from:
    • The Huntsman
    • The Last Page (intro)
    • The Subcelestial
    • A Call from Afar
    • Between the Mountains and the Sea
    • Born of the Storm
    • Born of the Storm (again)
    • A New Day
    • The Last Page (outro)
    All these tracks and more are available on Spotify here or on YouTube here.]]>
  • Not just a metaphor: Dragons of imperial China show us how people lived (1517)
  • The ‘Empress of China’ and the beginning of U.S.-China trade (1784)
  • The rise of Empress Dowager Cixi (1861)
  • In the 7th century, a Chinese coup of Shakespearean proportions (626)
  • Titanic’s six Chinese survivors tell a story that goes far beyond a shipwreck (1912)
  • The problem with Mao’s ‘continuous’ revolution (1967)
  • The Battle of Red Cliffs and the blurring of fact and fiction (208–209)
  • The music — snippets from:
    • The Huntsman
    • The Last Page (intro)
    • The Subcelestial
    • A Call from Afar
    • Between the Mountains and the Sea
    • Born of the Storm
    • Born of the Storm (again)
    • A New Day
    • The Last Page (outro)
    All these tracks and more are available on Spotify here or on YouTube here.]]>
    https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/twich.jpg China Stories summer special: The best of This Week in China’s History false no 0:00 No no
    Wargaming a Taiwan invasion scenario: Lyle Goldstein on the CSIS wargame “The First Battle of the Next War” https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/wargaming-a-taiwan-invasion-scenario-lyle-goldstein-on-the-csis-wargame-the-first-battle-of-the-next-war/ Thu, 17 Aug 2023 18:00:25 +0000 http://thechinaproject.com/?post_type=podcast&p=282401 The First Battle of the Next War: Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan – the first large-scale publicly available wargame conducted by CSIS 04:05 – The history of wargaming and its significance 09:09 – What is the value of wargaming? 13:12 – The physical setup of the wargames and the role of dice and  technology in contingency 17:49 – The assumptions that go into the game 22:05 – How much agency do the players have? 24:16 – How are the decisions of other countries factored in the wargame? 26:11 – Pros and cons of the CSIS wargame 31:57 – Thoughts on the possibility of nuclear escalation 38:43 – A take on the report’s assumptions and conclusions 47:37 – Will we get a warning? A complete transcript of this episode is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: CSIS Report: The First Battle of the Next War: Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan Lyle: Yin Yu Tang in Peabody Essex Museum, Salem, Massachusetts Kaiser: The Story of Civilization [Volumes 1 to 11] by Will & Ariel Durant Our Oriental Heritage: The Story of Civilization, Volume 1 by Will Durant Mentioned: Meeting China Halfway: How to Defuse the Emerging US-China Rivalry by Lyle J. Goldstein]]> The First Battle of the Next War: Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan – the first large-scale publicly available wargame conducted by CSIS 04:05 – The history of wargaming and its significance 09:09 – What is the value of wargaming? 13:12 – The physical setup of the wargames and the role of dice and  technology in contingency 17:49 – The assumptions that go into the game 22:05 – How much agency do the players have? 24:16 – How are the decisions of other countries factored in the wargame? 26:11 – Pros and cons of the CSIS wargame 31:57 – Thoughts on the possibility of nuclear escalation 38:43 – A take on the report’s assumptions and conclusions 47:37 – Will we get a warning? A complete transcript of this episode is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: CSIS Report: The First Battle of the Next War: Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan Lyle: Yin Yu Tang in Peabody Essex Museum, Salem, Massachusetts Kaiser: The Story of Civilization [Volumes 1 to 11] by Will & Ariel Durant Our Oriental Heritage: The Story of Civilization, Volume 1 by Will Durant Mentioned: Meeting China Halfway: How to Defuse the Emerging US-China Rivalry by Lyle J. Goldstein]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/LyleGoldstein.jpg Wargaming a Taiwan invasion scenario: Lyle Goldstein on the CSIS wargame “The First Battle of the Next War” false no 0:00 No no The state of play of generative AI in China, with Paul Triolo https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/the-state-of-play-of-generative-ai-in-china-with-paul-triolo/ Thu, 10 Aug 2023 17:56:45 +0000 http://thechinaproject.com/?post_type=podcast&p=281848 A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Paul: The Alignment Problem by Brian Christian A Lonesome Dove trilogy by Larry McMurtry Blood Meridian by Cormac McCarthy Kaiser: The Righteous Gemstones on HBO Justified: City Prime Evil on Hulu ]]> A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Paul: The Alignment Problem by Brian Christian A Lonesome Dove trilogy by Larry McMurtry Blood Meridian by Cormac McCarthy Kaiser: The Righteous Gemstones on HBO Justified: City Prime Evil on Hulu ]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/Untitled-design-4.png The state of play of generative AI in China, with Paul Triolo false no 0:00 No no Is the Biden administration resetting U.S.-China relations? https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/is-the-biden-administration-resetting-u-s-china-relations/ Thu, 03 Aug 2023 18:00:29 +0000 http://thechinaproject.com/?post_type=podcast&p=281115 https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/Untitled-design-3.png Is the Biden administration resetting U.S.-China relations? false no 0:00 No no The CFR Taiwan task force report: advice and dissent, with Maggie Lewis and Paul Heer https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/the-cfr-taiwan-task-force-report-advice-and-dissent-with-maggie-lewis-and-paul-heer/ Thu, 27 Jul 2023 18:00:24 +0000 http://thechinaproject.com/?post_type=podcast&p=280411 U.S.-Taiwan Relations in a New Era: Responding to a More Assertive China 05:09 – The mechanics of producing the report 06:46 – Areas of common consensus among participants 08:48 – What is the significance of the PLA’s centennial in 2027 in view of the CFR task force? 10:54 – Is the report too focused on the military at the expense of political, diplomatic, and economic considerations? 14:22 – Taiwanese perspectives in the report 16:36 – Strategic ambiguity and President Biden’s “gaffes” as a new baseline for U.S. declaratory policy 20:48 – The issue of deterrence: American and Chinese approaches 25:48 – What has the United States done to move the status quo in terms of the Taiwan issue? 41:06 – Is there evidence yet of Chinese preparation for a military action against Taiwan? A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Maggie: Fever: The Hunt for Covid’s Origin by John Sudworth (podcast) Paul: Oppenheimer by Christopher Nolan Kennan: A life between Worlds by Frank Costigliola Kaiser: The Rise and Fall of the EAST: How Exams, Autocracy, Stability, and Technology Brought China Success, and Why They Might Lead to Its Decline by Yasheng Huang]]> U.S.-Taiwan Relations in a New Era: Responding to a More Assertive China 05:09 – The mechanics of producing the report 06:46 – Areas of common consensus among participants 08:48 – What is the significance of the PLA’s centennial in 2027 in view of the CFR task force? 10:54 – Is the report too focused on the military at the expense of political, diplomatic, and economic considerations? 14:22 – Taiwanese perspectives in the report 16:36 – Strategic ambiguity and President Biden’s “gaffes” as a new baseline for U.S. declaratory policy 20:48 – The issue of deterrence: American and Chinese approaches 25:48 – What has the United States done to move the status quo in terms of the Taiwan issue? 41:06 – Is there evidence yet of Chinese preparation for a military action against Taiwan? A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Maggie: Fever: The Hunt for Covid’s Origin by John Sudworth (podcast) Paul: Oppenheimer by Christopher Nolan Kennan: A life between Worlds by Frank Costigliola Kaiser: The Rise and Fall of the EAST: How Exams, Autocracy, Stability, and Technology Brought China Success, and Why They Might Lead to Its Decline by Yasheng Huang]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/HeerLewis.jpg The CFR Taiwan task force report: advice and dissent, with Maggie Lewis and Paul Heer false no 0:00 No no Transnational repression and China’s “overseas police stations,” with Jeremy Daum of Yale’s Paul Tsai China Law Center https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/transnational-repression-and-chinas-overseas-police-stations-with-jeremy-daum-of-yales-paul-tsai-china-law-center/ Thu, 20 Jul 2023 18:00:28 +0000 http://thechinaproject.com/?post_type=podcast&p=279674 A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Jeremy: I’m a Virgo, a television show on Amazon Prime. Kaiser: A perfect family dinner for the summer: An easy recipe for spicy salmon/tuna]]> A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Jeremy: I’m a Virgo, a television show on Amazon Prime. Kaiser: A perfect family dinner for the summer: An easy recipe for spicy salmon/tuna]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/JeremyDaum.jpg Transnational repression and China’s “overseas police stations,” with Jeremy Daum of Yale’s Paul Tsai China Law Center false no 0:00 No no China after COVID: UPenn’s Neysun Mahboubi reports on scholarly exchange in a tightening political space https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/china-after-covid-upenns-neysun-mahboubi-reports-on-scholarly-exchange-in-a-tightening-political-space/ Thu, 13 Jul 2023 18:00:02 +0000 http://thechinaproject.com/?post_type=podcast&p=279022 A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: NeysunTo Live, directed by Zhang Yimou KaiserThe Status Kuo, an American politics substack by Jay Kuo Mentioned:  To Live: A Novel by Yu Hua (translated by Michael Berry)]]> A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: NeysunTo Live, directed by Zhang Yimou KaiserThe Status Kuo, an American politics substack by Jay Kuo Mentioned:  To Live: A Novel by Yu Hua (translated by Michael Berry)]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/NeysunMahboubi.jpg China after COVID: UPenn’s Neysun Mahboubi reports on scholarly exchange in a tightening political space false no 0:00 No no China’s Military-Civil Fusion program: CNAS fellow Elsa Kania on the myths and realities https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/chinas-military-civil-fusion-program-cnas-fellow-elsa-kania-on-the-myths-and-realities/ Thu, 06 Jul 2023 18:00:01 +0000 http://thechinaproject.com/?post_type=podcast&p=278413 A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Elsa: Translation State by Ann Leckie Kaiser: A recipe for making homemade nuomi cha / genmai cha — green tea with roasted glutinous rice]]> A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Elsa: Translation State by Ann Leckie Kaiser: A recipe for making homemade nuomi cha / genmai cha — green tea with roasted glutinous rice]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/IMG_0039.jpeg China’s Military-Civil Fusion program: CNAS fellow Elsa Kania on the myths and realities false no 0:00 No no Mr. Blinken goes to Beijing, with former NSC China Director Dennis Wilder https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/mr-blinken-goes-to-beijing-with-former-nsc-china-director-dennis-wilder/ Tue, 20 Jun 2023 16:30:42 +0000 http://thechinaproject.com/?post_type=podcast&p=276921 TheChinaProject.com website. Recommendations: Dennis: Hand-Off: The Foreign Policy George W. Bush Passed to Barack Obama by Stephen J. Hadley Kaiser: The Cosmic Library by Literary Hub (podcast)  ]]> TheChinaProject.com website. Recommendations: Dennis: Hand-Off: The Foreign Policy George W. Bush Passed to Barack Obama by Stephen J. Hadley Kaiser: The Cosmic Library by Literary Hub (podcast)  ]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/DennisWilder.jpg Mr. Blinken goes to Beijing, with former NSC China Director Dennis Wilder false no 0:00 No no Economist Keyu Jin on her new book, ‘The New China Playbook’ https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/economist-keyu-jin-on-her-new-book-the-new-china-playbook/ Thu, 15 Jun 2023 18:00:36 +0000 http://thechinaproject.com/?post_type=podcast&p=276574 The New China Playbook: Beyond Socialism and Capitalism, a wide-ranging, ambitious, and accessible book that explains the unique Chinese political economy, emphasizing both its successes to date and how it must change to meet the challenges to come. 01:01 – An overview of the book The New China Playbook: Beyond Socialism and Capitalism by Keyu Jin 09:22 – Is the criticism about being pro-China justified? 14:25 – The element of culture in the Chinese economy 27:56 – What is the mayor economy and what are its pros and cons? 38:00 – The power of the Chinese state to affect changes in the macroeconomy 42:52 – The modern state-owned enterprise and its purpose 47:39 – China’s financial system – the disparity between China’s GDP growth and its abyssmal stock market 52:07 – The current situation with the real estate market: Is the bubble going to pop? 1:02:03 – Pros and cons of the growth of the shadow banking sector in China 1:06:32 – The position of China in the global trading system 1:13:52 – How does China respond to technology restrictions in key areas such as semiconductor manufacturing? A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Keyu: When the Facts Change: Essays, 1995-2010 by Tony Judt Kaiser: 1776 (Musical) Mentioned: The New China Playbook: Beyond Socialism and Capitalism by Keyu Jin]]> The New China Playbook: Beyond Socialism and Capitalism, a wide-ranging, ambitious, and accessible book that explains the unique Chinese political economy, emphasizing both its successes to date and how it must change to meet the challenges to come. 01:01 – An overview of the book The New China Playbook: Beyond Socialism and Capitalism by Keyu Jin 09:22 – Is the criticism about being pro-China justified? 14:25 – The element of culture in the Chinese economy 27:56 – What is the mayor economy and what are its pros and cons? 38:00 – The power of the Chinese state to affect changes in the macroeconomy 42:52 – The modern state-owned enterprise and its purpose 47:39 – China’s financial system – the disparity between China’s GDP growth and its abyssmal stock market 52:07 – The current situation with the real estate market: Is the bubble going to pop? 1:02:03 – Pros and cons of the growth of the shadow banking sector in China 1:06:32 – The position of China in the global trading system 1:13:52 – How does China respond to technology restrictions in key areas such as semiconductor manufacturing? A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Keyu: When the Facts Change: Essays, 1995-2010 by Tony Judt Kaiser: 1776 (Musical) Mentioned: The New China Playbook: Beyond Socialism and Capitalism by Keyu Jin]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/sinica6.15.jpg Economist Keyu Jin on her new book, ‘The New China Playbook’ false no 0:00 No no David Ownby of ReadingtheChinaDream.com on the intellectual mood in China https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/david-ownby-of-readingthechinadream-com-on-the-intellectual-mood-in-china/ Thu, 08 Jun 2023 18:00:27 +0000 http://thechinaproject.com/?post_type=podcast&p=276032 ReadingTheChinaDream.com website — a trove of translations of writings by mainstream Chinese intellectuals. David talks about the website’s mission and tells about his recent three-week trip to Beijing and Shanghai, in which he met with many of the people he translates on his site. Many of them are profoundly disillusioned with the leadership’s handling of the end of COVID-zero, he found. 03:38 – Genesis of the project Reading the Chinese Dream 09:32 – The choice of intellectuals being translated 14:11 – An overview of common ideological denominators for the New Confucians, the Liberals, and the New Left. 24:19 – The emerging groups as a direct response to certain phenomena happening in the West 25:58 – How did we fail to understand the intellectual life in China? 30:30 – An overview of David’s recent trip to China 35:12 – How does the post-COVID reality in China affect Chinese intellectuals? 45:34 – Are we observing a turning point in the intellectual community and its relationship with the Chinese government? 47:41 – The attitudes of Chinese intellectuals towards the U.S. 56:04 – Will the negativity currently observed among Chinese intellectuals a temporary or enduring issue? A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: David: Ties by Domenico Starnone, translated by Jhumpa Lahiri Kaiser: The Thirty Years War: Europe's Tragedy by Peter H. Wilson Mentioned: Translating Myself and Others by Jhumpa Lahiri Simplicissimus by Johann Grimmelshausen]]> ReadingTheChinaDream.com website — a trove of translations of writings by mainstream Chinese intellectuals. David talks about the website’s mission and tells about his recent three-week trip to Beijing and Shanghai, in which he met with many of the people he translates on his site. Many of them are profoundly disillusioned with the leadership’s handling of the end of COVID-zero, he found. 03:38 – Genesis of the project Reading the Chinese Dream 09:32 – The choice of intellectuals being translated 14:11 – An overview of common ideological denominators for the New Confucians, the Liberals, and the New Left. 24:19 – The emerging groups as a direct response to certain phenomena happening in the West 25:58 – How did we fail to understand the intellectual life in China? 30:30 – An overview of David’s recent trip to China 35:12 – How does the post-COVID reality in China affect Chinese intellectuals? 45:34 – Are we observing a turning point in the intellectual community and its relationship with the Chinese government? 47:41 – The attitudes of Chinese intellectuals towards the U.S. 56:04 – Will the negativity currently observed among Chinese intellectuals a temporary or enduring issue? A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: David: Ties by Domenico Starnone, translated by Jhumpa Lahiri Kaiser: The Thirty Years War: Europe's Tragedy by Peter H. Wilson Mentioned: Translating Myself and Others by Jhumpa Lahiri Simplicissimus by Johann Grimmelshausen]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/DavidOwnby.jpg David Ownby of ReadingtheChinaDream.com on the intellectual mood in China false no 0:00 No no Curtain-raiser on the Shangri-La Dialogue, with the man who runs the show: James Crabtree of IISS https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/curtain-raiser-on-the-shangri-la-dialogue-with-the-man-who-runs-the-show-james-crabtree-of-iiss/ Thu, 01 Jun 2023 18:00:45 +0000 http://thechinaproject.com/?post_type=podcast&p=275668 A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: James: The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914 by Christopher Clark; and The Pigeon Tunnel: Stories from My Life by John le Carré Kaiser:  A Perfect Spy: A Novel by John le Carré  Mentioned: The Billionaire Raj: A Journey Through India’s New Gilded Age by James Crabtree]]> A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: James: The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914 by Christopher Clark; and The Pigeon Tunnel: Stories from My Life by John le Carré Kaiser:  A Perfect Spy: A Novel by John le Carré  Mentioned: The Billionaire Raj: A Journey Through India’s New Gilded Age by James Crabtree]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/JamesCrabtree.jpg Curtain-raiser on the Shangri-La Dialogue, with the man who runs the show: James Crabtree of IISS false no 0:00 No no Harvard’s William Kirby on China’s higher education system and his book “Empires of Ideas” https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/harvards-william-kirby-on-chinas-higher-education-system-and-his-book-empires-of-ideas/ Thu, 25 May 2023 18:00:47 +0000 http://thechinaproject.com/?post_type=podcast&p=275365 Empires of Ideas: Creating the Modern University from Germany to America to China, and to share his views on the state of higher education in China and the U.S, 03:12 – Wissenschaft and the German contribution to the creation of the modern research university 06:30 – The decreasing number of Chinese students willing to study in the U.S. and the defunding of American public universities 12:17 – What is the current state of higher education in China? 18:19 – Continuities between the old imperial civil service examination system and the current higher education system in China 23:08 – The state of Chinese universities before the Cultural Revolution 29:23 – How China revived higher education on the model of American universities in the early years of Reform and Opening 33:00 – Why does China maintain the gaokao examination despite its great unpopularity? 41:38 – Differences between the two leading universities in China: Peking University and Tsinghua University 44:00 – Institutional entrepreneurship at Tsinghua University 50:01 – The origins of Nanjing University and how it evolved over the years 57:21 – The importance of governance and management in the example of the University of Hong Kong 1:05:23 – What is the future of the joint programs between American and Chinese universities? A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Bill: Made in Hong Kong: Transpacific Networks and a New History of Globalization by  Peter E. Hamilton The Dean of Shandong: The Confessions of a Minor Bureaucrat at a Chinese University by Daniel A. Bell The Real World of College: What Higher Education Is and What It Can Be by Wendy Fischman and Howard Gardner 9,000 Years of Wine: A World History by Rod Phillips Red Mandarin Dress: An Inspector Chen Novel by Qiu Xiaolong Kaiser: Adventures of Horatio Hornblower by Entertainment Radio Mentioned: Empires of Ideas: Creating the Modern University from Germany to America to China by William C. Kirby]]> Empires of Ideas: Creating the Modern University from Germany to America to China, and to share his views on the state of higher education in China and the U.S, 03:12 – Wissenschaft and the German contribution to the creation of the modern research university 06:30 – The decreasing number of Chinese students willing to study in the U.S. and the defunding of American public universities 12:17 – What is the current state of higher education in China? 18:19 – Continuities between the old imperial civil service examination system and the current higher education system in China 23:08 – The state of Chinese universities before the Cultural Revolution 29:23 – How China revived higher education on the model of American universities in the early years of Reform and Opening 33:00 – Why does China maintain the gaokao examination despite its great unpopularity? 41:38 – Differences between the two leading universities in China: Peking University and Tsinghua University 44:00 – Institutional entrepreneurship at Tsinghua University 50:01 – The origins of Nanjing University and how it evolved over the years 57:21 – The importance of governance and management in the example of the University of Hong Kong 1:05:23 – What is the future of the joint programs between American and Chinese universities? A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Bill: Made in Hong Kong: Transpacific Networks and a New History of Globalization by  Peter E. Hamilton The Dean of Shandong: The Confessions of a Minor Bureaucrat at a Chinese University by Daniel A. Bell The Real World of College: What Higher Education Is and What It Can Be by Wendy Fischman and Howard Gardner 9,000 Years of Wine: A World History by Rod Phillips Red Mandarin Dress: An Inspector Chen Novel by Qiu Xiaolong Kaiser: Adventures of Horatio Hornblower by Entertainment Radio Mentioned: Empires of Ideas: Creating the Modern University from Germany to America to China by William C. Kirby]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/WilliamKirby.jpg Harvard’s William Kirby on China’s higher education system and his book “Empires of Ideas” false no 0:00 No no Does the Capvision raid signal a crackdown on consultancies in China? The China Project’s CEO Bob Guterma, formerly of Capvision, weighs in https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/does-the-capvision-raid-signal-a-crackdown-on-consultancies-in-china-the-china-projects-ceo-bob-guterma-formerly-of-capvision-weighs-in/ Thu, 18 May 2023 18:00:23 +0000 http://thechinaproject.com/?post_type=podcast&p=274956 A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Bob:  Energy and Civilization: A History by Vaclav Smil Kaiser:  Mr. Bungle’s debut album Mr. Bungle]]> A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Bob:  Energy and Civilization: A History by Vaclav Smil Kaiser:  Mr. Bungle’s debut album Mr. Bungle]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/BobG.jpg Does the Capvision raid signal a crackdown on consultancies in China? The China Project’s CEO Bob Guterma, formerly of Capvision, weighs in false no 0:00 No no Xiong’an: Techno-natural utopia or authoritarian folly? https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/xiongan-techno-natural-utopia-or-authoritarian-folly/ Thu, 04 May 2023 18:00:11 +0000 http://thechinaproject.com/?post_type=podcast&p=274244 A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com Recommendations: Andrew:  The Institutional Foundation of Economic Development by Shiping Tang Kaiser:  Five Families by Selwyn Raab Mentioned: Andrew’s article on Xiong’an:   Chinas techno-natural utopia: A deep dive into Xiong’an Shanghai Future: Modernity Remade by Anna Greenspan]]> A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com Recommendations: Andrew:  The Institutional Foundation of Economic Development by Shiping Tang Kaiser:  Five Families by Selwyn Raab Mentioned: Andrew’s article on Xiong’an:   Chinas techno-natural utopia: A deep dive into Xiong’an Shanghai Future: Modernity Remade by Anna Greenspan]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/AndrewStokols2.jpg Xiong’an: Techno-natural utopia or authoritarian folly? false no 0:00 No no Earth Day episode: How can the U.S. and China cooperate on climate in this era of competition? https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/earth-day-episode-how-can-the-u-s-and-china-cooperate-on-climate-in-this-era-of-competition/ Thu, 27 Apr 2023 18:02:17 +0000 http://thechinaproject.com/?post_type=podcast&p=273876 A complete transcript of this episode is available at TheChinaProject.com.]]> A complete transcript of this episode is available at TheChinaProject.com.]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Sinica4.26.jpg Earth Day episode: How can the U.S. and China cooperate on climate in this era of competition? false no 0:00 No no Legendary CNN reporter Mike Chinoy on his book and documentary series “Assignment China” https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/legendary-cnn-reporter-mike-chinoy-on-his-book-and-documentary-series-assignment-china/ Thu, 20 Apr 2023 18:00:59 +0000 http://thechinaproject.com/?post_type=podcast&p=273572 Assignment China: An Oral History of American Journalists in the People’s Republic, for which he interviewed about 130 journalists whose careers spanned an 80-year period, from the 1940s to the present. 04:08 – The genesis of the Assignment China project 11:15 – Editorial decisions: What was included, and what wasn’t 16:13 – The big takeaways for Mike on finishing this project 25:13 – The role of contingency and the observer effect 32:52 – How Tiananmen really made CNN and changed the future of cable news 36:30 – Tough ethical calls in the reporting of China 42:42 – Structural biases in American reporting on China… 50:50 – …and what news consumers can do to adjust for those baked-in biases 52:54 – Does where the reporters are actually determine what the story is? 1:02:17 – What went wrong with TV news? A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Mike:  Who by Fire: Leonard Cohen in the Sinai by Matti Friedman Jeremy: From the Jewish Provinces: Selected Stories by Fradl Shtok, translated by Jordan Finkin and Allison Schachter Kaiser: Father's Laszlo Ladany's "Ten Commandments" on China-watching, and playing around with ChatGPT 4]]> Assignment China: An Oral History of American Journalists in the People’s Republic, for which he interviewed about 130 journalists whose careers spanned an 80-year period, from the 1940s to the present. 04:08 – The genesis of the Assignment China project 11:15 – Editorial decisions: What was included, and what wasn’t 16:13 – The big takeaways for Mike on finishing this project 25:13 – The role of contingency and the observer effect 32:52 – How Tiananmen really made CNN and changed the future of cable news 36:30 – Tough ethical calls in the reporting of China 42:42 – Structural biases in American reporting on China… 50:50 – …and what news consumers can do to adjust for those baked-in biases 52:54 – Does where the reporters are actually determine what the story is? 1:02:17 – What went wrong with TV news? A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Mike:  Who by Fire: Leonard Cohen in the Sinai by Matti Friedman Jeremy: From the Jewish Provinces: Selected Stories by Fradl Shtok, translated by Jordan Finkin and Allison Schachter Kaiser: Father's Laszlo Ladany's "Ten Commandments" on China-watching, and playing around with ChatGPT 4]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/MikeChinoy.jpg Legendary CNN reporter Mike Chinoy on his book and documentary series “Assignment China” false no 0:00 No no As the U.S. and China part ways, the Global South finds its own path, with Kishore Mahbubani https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/as-the-u-s-and-china-part-ways-the-global-south-finds-its-own-path-with-kishore-mahbubani/ Thu, 13 Apr 2023 18:00:24 +0000 http://thechinaproject.com/?post_type=podcast&p=273342 Foreign Affairs, and to advocate for the pragmatic approach that's held ASEAN together for over five decades of continuous peace and growing prosperity. 4:36 – Kishore talks about Macron’s state visit to China and the controversy around his comments in media interviews 8:53 – How the Ukraine War has highlighted divisions between the West and the Global South 11:45 – Pragmatism: is this a euphemism for amorality? 15:26 – ASEAN as a template for multipolarity 19:38 – Cultural relativism, moral absolutism, and the shift in the American intelligentsia 24:56 – How does ASEAN handle specific issues of U.S.-China tension? 29:12 – Investment and trade: China and ASEAN vs. U.S and ASEAN — guns and butter 40:04 – The Belt and Road Initiative and American attitudes toward it 44:10 – Kishore’s “three rules” for U.S. engagement with ASEAN 49:49 – China’s recent diplomatic efforts: Saudi-Iran, and the Ukraine War 52:34 – How receptive has the American strategic class been to Kishore’s ideas? A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Kishore: John Rawls, A Theory of Justice Kaiser: The Silk Roads: A New History of the World by Peter Frankopan]]> Foreign Affairs, and to advocate for the pragmatic approach that's held ASEAN together for over five decades of continuous peace and growing prosperity. 4:36 – Kishore talks about Macron’s state visit to China and the controversy around his comments in media interviews 8:53 – How the Ukraine War has highlighted divisions between the West and the Global South 11:45 – Pragmatism: is this a euphemism for amorality? 15:26 – ASEAN as a template for multipolarity 19:38 – Cultural relativism, moral absolutism, and the shift in the American intelligentsia 24:56 – How does ASEAN handle specific issues of U.S.-China tension? 29:12 – Investment and trade: China and ASEAN vs. U.S and ASEAN — guns and butter 40:04 – The Belt and Road Initiative and American attitudes toward it 44:10 – Kishore’s “three rules” for U.S. engagement with ASEAN 49:49 – China’s recent diplomatic efforts: Saudi-Iran, and the Ukraine War 52:34 – How receptive has the American strategic class been to Kishore’s ideas? A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Kishore: John Rawls, A Theory of Justice Kaiser: The Silk Roads: A New History of the World by Peter Frankopan]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/image413.jpg As the U.S. and China part ways, the Global South finds its own path, with Kishore Mahbubani false no 0:00 No no Sinica at the Association for Asian Studies Conference, Boston 2023: Capsule interviews https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/sinica-at-the-association-for-asian-studies-conference-boston-2023-capsule-interviews/ Thu, 06 Apr 2023 17:00:09 +0000 http://thechinaproject.com/?post_type=podcast&p=272962 Kristin Shi-Kupfer — recommendations: this essay (in Chinese) by Teng Biao on Chinese Trump supporters; Han Rongbin's work on digital society; and Yang Guobin's work on digital expression on the internet in China. 7:48 – Lev Nachman — recommendation: Ian Rowen, One China, Many Taiwans: The Geopolitics of Cross-Strait Tourism; and the city of Taichung, and especially its night market food on Yizhong Street and the Fang Chia Night market. 9:27 – Lin Zhang — recommendation: Victor Seow, Carbon Technocracy: Energy Regimes in Modern East Asia; and Gary Gertle, American Crucible: Race and Nation in the 20th Century 15:32 – Maura Dykstra — recommendation: Richard von Glahn's contribution to the Oxford History of Modern China about registration in imperial China 19:00 – Jonathan Elkobi — a Rand Corporation study on economic cooperation between Israel and China; the fusion band Snarky Puppy 22:22 – Seiji Shirane — Seediq Bale (Warriors of the Rainbow) and Lust, Caution 25:18 – Zhu Qian — Rebecca Karl, Staging the World: Chinese Nationalism at the Turn of the 20th Century, and two films: Hou Hsiao-hsien's A City of Sadness and Jia Zhangke's A Touch of Sin 31:23– Fabio Lanza — Sarah Mellors Rodriguez, Reproductive Realities in Modern China: Birth Control and Abortion, 1911–2021; and Leopoldina Fortunati, The Arcane of Reproduction: Housework, Prostitution, Labor and Capital by Leopoldina Fortunati  33:04 – Catherine Tsai —:Hiroko Matsuda’s The Liminality of the Japanese Empire 34:46– Lena Kaufmann — Technology and Gender: Fabrics of Power in Late Imperial China and other works by Francesca Bray 39:05 – Josh Freeman — Works of Uyghur poetry by Ghojimuhemmed Muhemmed, Ekhmetjan Osman, Tahir Hamut Izgil, Perhat Tursun, Dilkhumar Imin, Abide Abbas Nesrin, Erkan Qadir, and Muyesser Abdul'ehed Hendan. 41:32 – Susan McCarthy — Joanna Handlin Smith, The Art of Doing Good: Charity in Late Ming China 49:18 – Brian DeMare — William Hinton, Fanshen 50:47 – Juliet Lu — Maria Repnikova, Chinese Soft Power, and Samuel L. Jackson reading Adam Mansbach's Go the F--k to Sleep 58:29 – Sabina Knight — Wu Ming-Yi, The Man with the Compound Eyes, translated by Darryl Sterk A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com  ]]> Kristin Shi-Kupfer — recommendations: this essay (in Chinese) by Teng Biao on Chinese Trump supporters; Han Rongbin's work on digital society; and Yang Guobin's work on digital expression on the internet in China. 7:48 – Lev Nachman — recommendation: Ian Rowen, One China, Many Taiwans: The Geopolitics of Cross-Strait Tourism; and the city of Taichung, and especially its night market food on Yizhong Street and the Fang Chia Night market. 9:27 – Lin Zhang — recommendation: Victor Seow, Carbon Technocracy: Energy Regimes in Modern East Asia; and Gary Gertle, American Crucible: Race and Nation in the 20th Century 15:32 – Maura Dykstra — recommendation: Richard von Glahn's contribution to the Oxford History of Modern China about registration in imperial China 19:00 – Jonathan Elkobi — a Rand Corporation study on economic cooperation between Israel and China; the fusion band Snarky Puppy 22:22 – Seiji Shirane — Seediq Bale (Warriors of the Rainbow) and Lust, Caution 25:18 – Zhu Qian — Rebecca Karl, Staging the World: Chinese Nationalism at the Turn of the 20th Century, and two films: Hou Hsiao-hsien's A City of Sadness and Jia Zhangke's A Touch of Sin 31:23– Fabio Lanza — Sarah Mellors Rodriguez, Reproductive Realities in Modern China: Birth Control and Abortion, 1911–2021; and Leopoldina Fortunati, The Arcane of Reproduction: Housework, Prostitution, Labor and Capital by Leopoldina Fortunati  33:04 – Catherine Tsai —:Hiroko Matsuda’s The Liminality of the Japanese Empire 34:46– Lena Kaufmann — Technology and Gender: Fabrics of Power in Late Imperial China and other works by Francesca Bray 39:05 – Josh Freeman — Works of Uyghur poetry by Ghojimuhemmed Muhemmed, Ekhmetjan Osman, Tahir Hamut Izgil, Perhat Tursun, Dilkhumar Imin, Abide Abbas Nesrin, Erkan Qadir, and Muyesser Abdul'ehed Hendan. 41:32 – Susan McCarthy — Joanna Handlin Smith, The Art of Doing Good: Charity in Late Ming China 49:18 – Brian DeMare — William Hinton, Fanshen 50:47 – Juliet Lu — Maria Repnikova, Chinese Soft Power, and Samuel L. Jackson reading Adam Mansbach's Go the F--k to Sleep 58:29 – Sabina Knight — Wu Ming-Yi, The Man with the Compound Eyes, translated by Darryl Sterk A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com  ]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/AAS-Boston-2.jpg Sinica at the Association for Asian Studies Conference, Boston 2023: Capsule interviews false no 0:00 No no The Maoist legacy in Chinese private enterprise, with Chris Marquis https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/the-maoist-legacy-in-chinese-private-enterprise-with-chris-marquis/ Thu, 30 Mar 2023 18:02:01 +0000 http://thechinaproject.com/?post_type=podcast&p=272703 Mao and Markets: The Communist Roots of Chinese Enterprise. In it, they examine how even in China's private sector, socialization into the ideology of the Chinese Communist Party among some entrepreneurs has left an enduring legacy that is visible in some of the ways Chinese private enterprises conduct business. 3:35 – Motivation for Mao and Markets 5:34 – Enduring elements of Maoism in contemporary Chinese enterprise 12:35 – Variation among “Maoist” entrepreneurs 20:40 – Differentiating superficial and authentic Maoist entrepreneurship 35:04 – Is today’s China ideological or simply nationalistic? 39:17 – Xi’s Maoist revival: real or imagined? 44:30 – Chris’s transition from business and sociology to Chinese politics 47:09 – Chris’s experience as a Thousand Talents recipient A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Chris: The Entrepreneurial State and The Big Con by Mariana Mazzucato Kaiser: This calendar of lunar phases from theoriginallunarphase.com, and Mongolian salty milk tea, or sūūtei tsai which is easy to make at home]]> Mao and Markets: The Communist Roots of Chinese Enterprise. In it, they examine how even in China's private sector, socialization into the ideology of the Chinese Communist Party among some entrepreneurs has left an enduring legacy that is visible in some of the ways Chinese private enterprises conduct business. 3:35 – Motivation for Mao and Markets 5:34 – Enduring elements of Maoism in contemporary Chinese enterprise 12:35 – Variation among “Maoist” entrepreneurs 20:40 – Differentiating superficial and authentic Maoist entrepreneurship 35:04 – Is today’s China ideological or simply nationalistic? 39:17 – Xi’s Maoist revival: real or imagined? 44:30 – Chris’s transition from business and sociology to Chinese politics 47:09 – Chris’s experience as a Thousand Talents recipient A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Chris: The Entrepreneurial State and The Big Con by Mariana Mazzucato Kaiser: This calendar of lunar phases from theoriginallunarphase.com, and Mongolian salty milk tea, or sūūtei tsai which is easy to make at home]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Untitled-design.png The Maoist legacy in Chinese private enterprise, with Chris Marquis false no 0:00 No no The Xi-Putin meetings, with Maria Repnikova https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/the-xi-putin-meetings-with-maria-repnikova/ Thu, 23 Mar 2023 18:00:44 +0000 http://thechinaproject.com/?post_type=podcast&p=272367 A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Maria: Solomon Elusoji, Travelling with Big Brother: A Reporter’s Junket in China  Kaiser: The Polish progressive rock band Riverside, and its latest album ID.Entity  ]]> A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Maria: Solomon Elusoji, Travelling with Big Brother: A Reporter’s Junket in China  Kaiser: The Polish progressive rock band Riverside, and its latest album ID.Entity  ]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/mariarep.jpg The Xi-Putin meetings, with Maria Repnikova false no 0:00 No no Beijing brokers a Saudi-Iranian rapprochement, with Tuvia Gering https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/beijing-brokers-a-saudi-iranian-rapprochement-with-tuvia-gering/ Thu, 23 Mar 2023 18:00:32 +0000 http://thechinaproject.com/?post_type=podcast&p=272369 A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Tuvia:  King Gizzard and the Lizard Wizard on YouTube Kaiser: The Venture of Islam by Marshall G. S. Hodgson Mentioned: Tuvia's Discourse Power Substack The China-Global South Podcast Tuvia’s interview with retired PLA Colonel Zhou Bo  ]]> A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Tuvia:  King Gizzard and the Lizard Wizard on YouTube Kaiser: The Venture of Islam by Marshall G. S. Hodgson Mentioned: Tuvia's Discourse Power Substack The China-Global South Podcast Tuvia’s interview with retired PLA Colonel Zhou Bo  ]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/tuvia.jpg Beijing brokers a Saudi-Iranian rapprochement, with Tuvia Gering false no 0:00 No no The expansion of China’s administrative state during COVID, with Yale Law’s Taisu Zhang https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/the-expansion-of-chinas-administrative-state-during-covid-with-yale-laws-taisu-zhang/ Thu, 16 Mar 2023 18:00:53 +0000 http://thechinaproject.com/?post_type=podcast&p=271922 his recent work on the expansion of the administrative state down to the subdistrict and neighborhood level — changes that are far-reaching, and likely permanent. They also discuss a recent essay in Foreign Affairsi n which Taisu argued that Beijing is shifting away from "performance legitimacy" as the foundation of political rule, and more toward legality — not to be confused with the rule of law. 3:29 – Nationalism as legitimacy, and its grounding in economic performance 7:45 – The CCP’s unique approach to “legal legitimacy” 21:28 – Evidence from the Two Meetings, or 兩會 liǎnghuì 35:56 – Chinese Administrative Expansion in the Xi Jinping Era 49:40 – The role of the anti-corruption campaign in expanding local government authority 56:18 – Changes in local governance after COVID 1:01:27 – Who were the dàbái? 1:04:10 – Technology in China’s post-pandemic power structure A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Taisu: The Utopia of Rules: On Technology, Stupidity and the Secret Joys of Bureaucracy by David Graeber; The Rise and Fall of Imperial China: The Social Origins of State Development by Yuhua Wang; Uncertainty in the Empire of Routine: The Administrative Revolution of the Eighteenth-Century Qing State by Maura Dykstra; The Three-Body Problem by Cixin Liu; and The Lower Yangzi Trilogy by Ge Fei Kaiser: Kaiser: Assignment China: An Oral History of American Journalists in the People's Republic by Mike Chinoy; and the many uses of beeswax]]> his recent work on the expansion of the administrative state down to the subdistrict and neighborhood level — changes that are far-reaching, and likely permanent. They also discuss a recent essay in Foreign Affairsi n which Taisu argued that Beijing is shifting away from "performance legitimacy" as the foundation of political rule, and more toward legality — not to be confused with the rule of law. 3:29 – Nationalism as legitimacy, and its grounding in economic performance 7:45 – The CCP’s unique approach to “legal legitimacy” 21:28 – Evidence from the Two Meetings, or 兩會 liǎnghuì 35:56 – Chinese Administrative Expansion in the Xi Jinping Era 49:40 – The role of the anti-corruption campaign in expanding local government authority 56:18 – Changes in local governance after COVID 1:01:27 – Who were the dàbái? 1:04:10 – Technology in China’s post-pandemic power structure A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Taisu: The Utopia of Rules: On Technology, Stupidity and the Secret Joys of Bureaucracy by David Graeber; The Rise and Fall of Imperial China: The Social Origins of State Development by Yuhua Wang; Uncertainty in the Empire of Routine: The Administrative Revolution of the Eighteenth-Century Qing State by Maura Dykstra; The Three-Body Problem by Cixin Liu; and The Lower Yangzi Trilogy by Ge Fei Kaiser: Kaiser: Assignment China: An Oral History of American Journalists in the People's Republic by Mike Chinoy; and the many uses of beeswax]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/taisuzhang.jpg The expansion of China’s administrative state during COVID, with Yale Law’s Taisu Zhang false no 0:00 No no Jude Blanchette on the Select Committee and the American moral panic over China https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/jude-blanchette-on-the-select-committee-and-the-american-moral-panic-over-china/ Thu, 09 Mar 2023 19:01:42 +0000 http://thechinaproject.com/?post_type=podcast&p=271627 A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com Recommendations: Jude: Miracle and Wonder: Conversations with Paul Simon by Malcolm Gladwell and Bruce Headlam, from Audible Kaiser: This podcast interview with Angela Rasmussen, the virologist who has been in the front lines fighting back against the resurgent lab leak theory, from the Slate What Next: TBD podcast]]> A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com Recommendations: Jude: Miracle and Wonder: Conversations with Paul Simon by Malcolm Gladwell and Bruce Headlam, from Audible Kaiser: This podcast interview with Angela Rasmussen, the virologist who has been in the front lines fighting back against the resurgent lab leak theory, from the Slate What Next: TBD podcast]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Jude.jpg Jude Blanchette on the Select Committee and the American moral panic over China false no 0:00 No no Inside Tencent’s “Influence Empire,” with Bloomberg’s Lulu Chen https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/inside-tencents-influence-empire-with-bloombergs-lulu-chen/ Thu, 09 Mar 2023 19:00:30 +0000 http://thechinaproject.com/?post_type=podcast&p=271630 Influence Empire: The Inside Story of Tencent and China's Tech AmbitionIt's a fascinating look at not only Tencent but at the overall internet sector in China, focusing on the travails and the triumphs of some of the most consequential Chinese internet entrepreneurs. 5:31 – Motivation for and background of Influence Empire 10:15 – Ma Huateng and Martin Lau at Tencent 19:56 – How the Chinese internet sector went from copying to innovating 30:59 – Cutthroat company cultures 33:20 – What made Allen Zhang successful? 37:25 – The Tencent-Meituan food delivery coup 45:21 – Tencent’s position in the online game industry 51:58 – Understanding China’s 2020-2022 tech crackdown A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Lulu: The Gay Talese Reader: Portraits and Encounters by Gay Talese Kaiser: Cunk on Earth on Netflix]]> Influence Empire: The Inside Story of Tencent and China's Tech AmbitionIt's a fascinating look at not only Tencent but at the overall internet sector in China, focusing on the travails and the triumphs of some of the most consequential Chinese internet entrepreneurs. 5:31 – Motivation for and background of Influence Empire 10:15 – Ma Huateng and Martin Lau at Tencent 19:56 – How the Chinese internet sector went from copying to innovating 30:59 – Cutthroat company cultures 33:20 – What made Allen Zhang successful? 37:25 – The Tencent-Meituan food delivery coup 45:21 – Tencent’s position in the online game industry 51:58 – Understanding China’s 2020-2022 tech crackdown A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Lulu: The Gay Talese Reader: Portraits and Encounters by Gay Talese Kaiser: Cunk on Earth on Netflix]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/LuLu.jpg Inside Tencent’s “Influence Empire,” with Bloomberg’s Lulu Chen false no 0:00 No no China and the electric vehicle battery supply chain, with Henry Sanderson https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/china-and-the-electric-vehicle-battery-supply-chain-with-henry-sanderson/ Thu, 02 Mar 2023 19:00:48 +0000 http://thechinaproject.com/?post_type=podcast&p=271248 Volt Rush: The Winners and Losers in the Race to Go Green — a book that reminds us of the very ugly fact that the metals that are needed to make electric vehicle batteries need to be dug out of the earth, and processed in ways that are anything but environmentally friendly. Henry talks about China's outsize role in lithium, cobalt, and nickel processing, as well as some promising chemistries that allow for EV batteries without some of the problematic metals. 2:49 – China’s role in the EV battery supply chain 9:36 – Global Chinese investments in lithium mines 14:04 – Is cobalt a necessary evil? 18:56 – Can NGO pressure induce better corporate behavior in EV battery supply chains? 21:28 – How Indonesia used its nickel resources to attract Chinese FDI 26:17 – China’s efforts to innovate around scarce metals 32:08 – China’s metal processing industry: State- or market-driven? 36:06 – Lessons from Europe’s battery industry 40:42 – Electrification of two-wheeled vehicles A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Jeremy: London Review of Books HenryThe Impossible City: A Hong Kong Memoir by Karen Cheung Kaiser: Tracking the People’s Daily newsletter by Manoj Kewalramani]]> Volt Rush: The Winners and Losers in the Race to Go Green — a book that reminds us of the very ugly fact that the metals that are needed to make electric vehicle batteries need to be dug out of the earth, and processed in ways that are anything but environmentally friendly. Henry talks about China's outsize role in lithium, cobalt, and nickel processing, as well as some promising chemistries that allow for EV batteries without some of the problematic metals. 2:49 – China’s role in the EV battery supply chain 9:36 – Global Chinese investments in lithium mines 14:04 – Is cobalt a necessary evil? 18:56 – Can NGO pressure induce better corporate behavior in EV battery supply chains? 21:28 – How Indonesia used its nickel resources to attract Chinese FDI 26:17 – China’s efforts to innovate around scarce metals 32:08 – China’s metal processing industry: State- or market-driven? 36:06 – Lessons from Europe’s battery industry 40:42 – Electrification of two-wheeled vehicles A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Jeremy: London Review of Books HenryThe Impossible City: A Hong Kong Memoir by Karen Cheung Kaiser: Tracking the People’s Daily newsletter by Manoj Kewalramani]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/HenryS.jpg China and the electric vehicle battery supply chain, with Henry Sanderson false no 0:00 No no China and the Ukraine War one year after the invasion, with Evan Feigenbaum and Alexander Gabuev https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/china-and-the-ukraine-war-one-year-after-the-invasion-with-evan-feigenbaum-and-alexander-gabuev/ Thu, 23 Feb 2023 19:00:27 +0000 http://thechinaproject.com/?post_type=podcast&p=269714 A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Sasha:  Writing From Ukraine: Fiction, Poetry and Essays since 1965 by Mark Andryczyk Evan: The Road Less Traveled: The Secret Battle to End the Great War,1916-1917 by Philip Zelikow Kaiser: Jessica Chen Weiss on The Ezra Klein Show and The Problem With Jon Stewart; "Avoiding Catastrophe Will Be the True Test of Fractious U.S.-China Relations," an op-ed in the Financial Times by Jude Blanchette]]> A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Sasha:  Writing From Ukraine: Fiction, Poetry and Essays since 1965 by Mark Andryczyk Evan: The Road Less Traveled: The Secret Battle to End the Great War,1916-1917 by Philip Zelikow Kaiser: Jessica Chen Weiss on The Ezra Klein Show and The Problem With Jon Stewart; "Avoiding Catastrophe Will Be the True Test of Fractious U.S.-China Relations," an op-ed in the Financial Times by Jude Blanchette]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/Gabuev_Feigenbaum.jpg China and the Ukraine War one year after the invasion, with Evan Feigenbaum and Alexander Gabuev false no 0:00 No no Sinostan: Raffaello Pantucci on China’s inadvertent empire in Central Asia https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/sinostan-raffaello-pantucci-on-chinas-inadvertent-empire-in-central-asia/ Thu, 16 Feb 2023 19:00:57 +0000 http://thechinaproject.com/?post_type=podcast&p=269073 Sinostan: China's Inadvertent Empire, which examines China's presence in Central Asia. Based on extensive travel and interviews undertaken both before and after the tragic murder of his co-author, Alexandros Petersen, in 2014, the book is a highly readable if difficult to categorize melange of analysis and anecdote, history and travelogue, and it paints a complex portrait of China's extensive efforts to build out a network of commercial and cultural ties throughout the pivotal region. 3:48 – Remembering the late Alexandros Petersen 9:35 – Xinjiang’s importance in Beijing’s Central Asia policy 13:36 – Central Asian states’ reactions to Xinjiang internment camps 24:39 – Assessing China’s soft power in Central Asia 37:10 – BRI: strategic calculus or ad-hoc scramble? 43:32 – Evolution of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 49:45 – China’s characterization of terrorism 54:45 – The SCO today and China’s growing security footprint 1:03:03 – China in Afghanistan 1:10:36 – Current status of the BRI A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Raffaello: The Silk Roads: A New History of the World by Peter Frankopan; The Geographical Pivot of History by Halford Mackinder Kaiser: Volt Rush by Henry Sanderson]]> Sinostan: China's Inadvertent Empire, which examines China's presence in Central Asia. Based on extensive travel and interviews undertaken both before and after the tragic murder of his co-author, Alexandros Petersen, in 2014, the book is a highly readable if difficult to categorize melange of analysis and anecdote, history and travelogue, and it paints a complex portrait of China's extensive efforts to build out a network of commercial and cultural ties throughout the pivotal region. 3:48 – Remembering the late Alexandros Petersen 9:35 – Xinjiang’s importance in Beijing’s Central Asia policy 13:36 – Central Asian states’ reactions to Xinjiang internment camps 24:39 – Assessing China’s soft power in Central Asia 37:10 – BRI: strategic calculus or ad-hoc scramble? 43:32 – Evolution of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 49:45 – China’s characterization of terrorism 54:45 – The SCO today and China’s growing security footprint 1:03:03 – China in Afghanistan 1:10:36 – Current status of the BRI A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Raffaello: The Silk Roads: A New History of the World by Peter Frankopan; The Geographical Pivot of History by Halford Mackinder Kaiser: Volt Rush by Henry Sanderson]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/pantucci.jpg Sinostan: Raffaello Pantucci on China’s inadvertent empire in Central Asia false no 0:00 No no CSIS analyst Gerard DiPippo deflates the balloon hype and brings the discussion back to earth https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/csis-analyst-gerard-dipippo-deflates-the-balloon-hype-and-brings-the-discussion-back-to-earth/ Mon, 06 Feb 2023 17:02:39 +0000 http://thechinaproject.com/?post_type=podcast&p=263373 A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Gerard: The Beautiful Country and the Middle Kingdom: America and China, 1776 to the Presentby John Pomfret Kaiser: Improbable Diplomats: How Ping-Pong Players, Musicians, and Scientists Remade US-China Relations by Pete Millwood]]> A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Gerard: The Beautiful Country and the Middle Kingdom: America and China, 1776 to the Presentby John Pomfret Kaiser: Improbable Diplomats: How Ping-Pong Players, Musicians, and Scientists Remade US-China Relations by Pete Millwood]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/sinica2.6.23.jpg CSIS analyst Gerard DiPippo deflates the balloon hype and brings the discussion back to earth false no 0:00 No no Live in New York City with veteran China journalist Ian Johnson https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/live-in-new-york-city-with-veteran-china-journalist-ian-johnson/ Thu, 02 Feb 2023 19:02:11 +0000 http://thechinaproject.com/?post_type=podcast&p=262910 A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Jeremy: Paul French's Ultimate China Bookshelf, a new feature at The China Project Ian: Golden Age by Wáng Xiaǒbō 王小波, translated by Yan Yan; Blue Note jazz LP re-issues Kaiser: The audiobook of Stella Maris by Cormac McCarthy, narrated by Julia Whelan and Edoardo Ballerini]]> A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Jeremy: Paul French's Ultimate China Bookshelf, a new feature at The China Project Ian: Golden Age by Wáng Xiaǒbō 王小波, translated by Yan Yan; Blue Note jazz LP re-issues Kaiser: The audiobook of Stella Maris by Cormac McCarthy, narrated by Julia Whelan and Edoardo Ballerini]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/IanJohnson.jpg Live in New York City with veteran China journalist Ian Johnson false no 0:00 No no Is China’s demography China’s destiny? A chat with former World Bank economist Bert Hofman https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/is-chinas-demography-chinas-destiny-a-chat-with-former-world-bank-economist-bert-hofman/ Wed, 25 Jan 2023 20:27:30 +0000 http://thechinaproject.com/?post_type=podcast&p=258744 A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com Recommendations: Bert: China Reconnects by Wang Gungwu; The Last of Us on HBO Max Kaiser: Great Circle by Maggie Shipstead]]> A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com Recommendations: Bert: China Reconnects by Wang Gungwu; The Last of Us on HBO Max Kaiser: Great Circle by Maggie Shipstead]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/bertH.jpg Is China’s demography China’s destiny? A chat with former World Bank economist Bert Hofman false no 0:00 No no A firsthand view of China’s chaotic COVID re-opening, with Deborah Seligsohn https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/a-firsthand-view-of-chinas-chaotic-covid-re-opening-with-deborah-seligsohn/ Thu, 19 Jan 2023 20:17:44 +0000 http://thechinaproject.com/?post_type=podcast&p=256557 A transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Debbi: two-part interview with Jesse Jenkins from the Volts Podcast, detailing the Inflation Reduction Act, the CHIPS act, and the Infrastructure Bill Kaiser: Demon Copperhead, the latest novel by Barbara Kingsolver. A coming of age story set in Southern Appalachia.]]> A transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Debbi: two-part interview with Jesse Jenkins from the Volts Podcast, detailing the Inflation Reduction Act, the CHIPS act, and the Infrastructure Bill Kaiser: Demon Copperhead, the latest novel by Barbara Kingsolver. A coming of age story set in Southern Appalachia.]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/debsinica-1.jpg A firsthand view of China’s chaotic COVID re-opening, with Deborah Seligsohn false no 0:00 No no Talking China on TikTok with The China Project’s Susan St. Denis https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/talking-china-on-tiktok-with-the-china-projects-susan-st-denis/ Thu, 12 Jan 2023 19:00:49 +0000 http://thechinaproject.com/?post_type=podcast&p=253543 A transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations – SusanEldest Son: Zhou Enlai and the Making of Modern China by Han Suyin; The China America Student Conference (www.iscdc.org) KaiserGenghis Khan and the Making of the Modern World by Jack Weatherford; and an ambivalent endorsement of the Conqueror series by Conn Iggulden.]]> A transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations – SusanEldest Son: Zhou Enlai and the Making of Modern China by Han Suyin; The China America Student Conference (www.iscdc.org) KaiserGenghis Khan and the Making of the Modern World by Jack Weatherford; and an ambivalent endorsement of the Conqueror series by Conn Iggulden.]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/susan.jpg Talking China on TikTok with The China Project’s Susan St. Denis false no 0:00 No no The Sinica Network presents Season 3 Episode 1 of “Strangers in China” https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/the-sinica-network-presents-resenting-season-3-episode-1-of-strangers-in-china/ Fri, 06 Jan 2023 17:22:53 +0000 http://thechinaproject.com/?post_type=podcast&p=253087 Music credits: Csus - https://soundcloud.com/csus Moss Heim- https://soundcloud.com/mossheim-experimental/cutup-test-cycle-7000 Trey - https://soundcloud.com/tristan-phipps-1/trance Jaies - https://soundcloud.com/jaiess Bary - https://soundcloud.com/bary_is_cool Ginger pitcher - https://soundcloud.com/gingerpitcherfredfroh TDP-Experimental - https://soundcloud.com/user-99078702 Xxiuk - https://soundcloud.com/xxiuk Lakey Inspired - https://soundcloud.com/lakeyinspired TazLazuli - https://soundcloud.com/tazlazuli Terri skills -  https://soundcloud.com/beatz-by-terri-skillz Lofee - https://soundcloud.com/lofeetunes Dr3am - https://soundcloud.com/dr3am-official Purrple Cat - https://soundcloud.com/purrplecat Ye Old Experimental Junk - https://soundcloud.com/ye-old-experimental-junk Le gang - https://soundcloud.com/thisislegang Obani - https://soundcloud.com/obani Jozwyn - https://soundcloud.com/jozwyn MCV - https://soundcloud.com/just-chillin-654995634 Works consulted https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-60893070 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-04-12/shanghai-residents-remain-largely-under-lockdown-despite-easing https://isdp.eu/publication/xi-jinping-and-the-administrative-hierarchy-and-subdivisions-in-china/ https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/elizabethperry/files/managed_campaigns_-_proofs.pdf https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1178528.shtml https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1184356.shtml https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdf/10.1086/694299 https://elibrary.law.psu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1209&context=psilr https://www.smh.com.au/world/pocket-of-poverty-the-new-shanghai-has-left-behind-20121109-293dl.html https://www.scmp.com/video/china/3187061/shanghais-old-west-gate-neighbourhood-emptied-demolition-and-redevelopment https://academic.oup.com/columbia-scholarship-online/book/20259/chapter-abstract/179324873?redirectedFrom=fulltext&login=false The work of Michel Foucault]]> Music credits: Csus - https://soundcloud.com/csus Moss Heim- https://soundcloud.com/mossheim-experimental/cutup-test-cycle-7000 Trey - https://soundcloud.com/tristan-phipps-1/trance Jaies - https://soundcloud.com/jaiess Bary - https://soundcloud.com/bary_is_cool Ginger pitcher - https://soundcloud.com/gingerpitcherfredfroh TDP-Experimental - https://soundcloud.com/user-99078702 Xxiuk - https://soundcloud.com/xxiuk Lakey Inspired - https://soundcloud.com/lakeyinspired TazLazuli - https://soundcloud.com/tazlazuli Terri skills -  https://soundcloud.com/beatz-by-terri-skillz Lofee - https://soundcloud.com/lofeetunes Dr3am - https://soundcloud.com/dr3am-official Purrple Cat - https://soundcloud.com/purrplecat Ye Old Experimental Junk - https://soundcloud.com/ye-old-experimental-junk Le gang - https://soundcloud.com/thisislegang Obani - https://soundcloud.com/obani Jozwyn - https://soundcloud.com/jozwyn MCV - https://soundcloud.com/just-chillin-654995634 Works consulted https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-60893070 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-04-12/shanghai-residents-remain-largely-under-lockdown-despite-easing https://isdp.eu/publication/xi-jinping-and-the-administrative-hierarchy-and-subdivisions-in-china/ https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/elizabethperry/files/managed_campaigns_-_proofs.pdf https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1178528.shtml https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1184356.shtml https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdf/10.1086/694299 https://elibrary.law.psu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1209&context=psilr https://www.smh.com.au/world/pocket-of-poverty-the-new-shanghai-has-left-behind-20121109-293dl.html https://www.scmp.com/video/china/3187061/shanghais-old-west-gate-neighbourhood-emptied-demolition-and-redevelopment https://academic.oup.com/columbia-scholarship-online/book/20259/chapter-abstract/179324873?redirectedFrom=fulltext&login=false The work of Michel Foucault]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Hesuan-Ziyou.jpg The Sinica Network presents Season 3 Episode 1 of “Strangers in China” false no 0:00 No no No Stranger to China: A conversation with Strangers in China creator Clay Baldo about Season 3 https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/strangers-in-china-season-3-ep-1-the-lockdown-part-1-a-day-in-the-life/ Thu, 05 Jan 2023 18:15:28 +0000 http://thechinaproject.com/?post_type=podcast&p=253080 Strangers in China, part of the Sinica Network from The China Project. In this season, host Clay Baldo provides an intimate look at the lockdown in Shanghai, from the foreboding that preceded it through the harrowing days of the lockdown itself. Be sure to subscribe to the show, too! Just look up Strangers in China in your podcast app of choice and hit subscribe. 2:21 – A preview of this season of Strangers in China 8:23 – The Shanghai fāngcāng方舱 and emergence of spontaneous mass gatherings 13:28 – Explaining the role of neighborhood committees/ jūwěihuì 居委会 in China 18:39 – The exploration of mental health throughout this podcast 24:21 – Clay’s process in producing the podcast 28:06 – The editorial choice to not dub over Chinese speakers 31:29 – Can the protests like the one that broke out on Urumqi Lu emerge again? 37:15 – Examples of strong group solidarity during the lockdown 43:35 – Clay’s thoughts on the recent loosening of restrictions A transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Clay: 3 Shanghai fashion Instagram accounts to follow – Windowsen (@windowsen), Susu, (@_su.su.su.su). Lexi (@jing_sen_); and the book Seeing Like a State by James C. Scott. KaiserThe Long Ships by Frans Bengtsson]]> Strangers in China, part of the Sinica Network from The China Project. In this season, host Clay Baldo provides an intimate look at the lockdown in Shanghai, from the foreboding that preceded it through the harrowing days of the lockdown itself. Be sure to subscribe to the show, too! Just look up Strangers in China in your podcast app of choice and hit subscribe. 2:21 – A preview of this season of Strangers in China 8:23 – The Shanghai fāngcāng方舱 and emergence of spontaneous mass gatherings 13:28 – Explaining the role of neighborhood committees/ jūwěihuì 居委会 in China 18:39 – The exploration of mental health throughout this podcast 24:21 – Clay’s process in producing the podcast 28:06 – The editorial choice to not dub over Chinese speakers 31:29 – Can the protests like the one that broke out on Urumqi Lu emerge again? 37:15 – Examples of strong group solidarity during the lockdown 43:35 – Clay’s thoughts on the recent loosening of restrictions A transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Clay: 3 Shanghai fashion Instagram accounts to follow – Windowsen (@windowsen), Susu, (@_su.su.su.su). Lexi (@jing_sen_); and the book Seeing Like a State by James C. Scott. KaiserThe Long Ships by Frans Bengtsson]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Sinica-Clay-Baldo.jpg No Stranger to China: A conversation with Strangers in China creator Clay Baldo about Season 3 false no 0:00 No no Author Rebecca Kuang on her novel Babel, or on the Necessity of Violence: An Arcane History of the Oxford Translators Revolution https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/252876/ Thu, 29 Dec 2022 19:00:42 +0000 http://thechinaproject.com/?post_type=podcast&p=252876 Babel. Set in the 1830s in England, the novel’s Chinese-born protagonist sets out to prevent a war with China over the opium trade. It’s a novel about the industrial revolution, labor activism, revolution, and — surprisingly — language, etymology, and translation. 2:28 – On Rebecca's own connections to China and her anxieties about losing the Chinese language 8:27 – What historical insights Rebecca hoped her readers would take away from Babel 14:37 – Parallels between the U.K. of the early 19th century and the U.S. of the early 21st 20:26 – Refections on revolution and revolutionaries 25:48 – Silver working: the magic system in Babel and its relation to language 30:37 – Issues with translation theory presented in the book 38:04 – How Rebecca’s background in debate influenced her writing style 45:03 – Rebecca's forthcoming novel Yellowface A transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Rebecca: The film Banshees of Inisherin and other works by its director, Martin McDonagh, including the dark comedy In Bruges (2008). Kaiser: The new novel by Cormac McCarthy The Passenger, and a review of it by James Wood in The New Yorker.]]> Babel. Set in the 1830s in England, the novel’s Chinese-born protagonist sets out to prevent a war with China over the opium trade. It’s a novel about the industrial revolution, labor activism, revolution, and — surprisingly — language, etymology, and translation. 2:28 – On Rebecca's own connections to China and her anxieties about losing the Chinese language 8:27 – What historical insights Rebecca hoped her readers would take away from Babel 14:37 – Parallels between the U.K. of the early 19th century and the U.S. of the early 21st 20:26 – Refections on revolution and revolutionaries 25:48 – Silver working: the magic system in Babel and its relation to language 30:37 – Issues with translation theory presented in the book 38:04 – How Rebecca’s background in debate influenced her writing style 45:03 – Rebecca's forthcoming novel Yellowface A transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Rebecca: The film Banshees of Inisherin and other works by its director, Martin McDonagh, including the dark comedy In Bruges (2008). Kaiser: The new novel by Cormac McCarthy The Passenger, and a review of it by James Wood in The New Yorker.]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/rebecca.jpg Author Rebecca Kuang on her novel Babel, or on the Necessity of Violence: An Arcane History of the Oxford Translators Revolution false no 0:00 No no The best solution for Taiwan is no solution: Jude Blanchette and Ryan Hass on why we must kick the can https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/the-best-solution-for-taiwan-is-no-solution-jude-blanchette-and-ryan-hass-on-why-we-must-kick-the-can/ Wed, 21 Dec 2022 19:00:52 +0000 http://thechinaproject.com/?post_type=podcast&p=251387 Foreign Affairs, "The Taiwan Long Game: Why the Best Solution Is No Solution.” 3:05 –  Reconceptualizing Taiwan as “a strategic problem with a defense component” 6:00 – Why expanding the scope of the Taiwan issue beyond the military dimension should not be conflated with capitulation 13:34 – Has current U.S. policy abandoned preserving status quo cross-strait relations? 17:27 – Why has China refrained from the use of force thus far? 27:05 – China, U.S., and Taiwan’s heightened sense of urgency 31:22 – How Ukraine alters China’s decision calculus on Taiwan 36:44 – What pertinent challenges should the US be planning for rather than exclusively focusing on the threat of invasion? 43:58 – The issue with democracy vs authoritarianism framing 46:01 – The importance of considering Taiwanese agency when crafting US policy 48:40 – How the U.S. should define its one-China policy 53:19 – Opportunities for a detente between Washington and Beijing A transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Ryan: "How We Would Know When China Is Preparing to Invade Taiwan," by John Culver; the film White Christmas Jude: The podcast In the Dark from American Public Media Kaiser: "A Professor Who Challenges the Washington Consensus on China," Ian Johnson’s piece in The New Yorker about Jessica Chen Weiss]]> Foreign Affairs, "The Taiwan Long Game: Why the Best Solution Is No Solution.” 3:05 –  Reconceptualizing Taiwan as “a strategic problem with a defense component” 6:00 – Why expanding the scope of the Taiwan issue beyond the military dimension should not be conflated with capitulation 13:34 – Has current U.S. policy abandoned preserving status quo cross-strait relations? 17:27 – Why has China refrained from the use of force thus far? 27:05 – China, U.S., and Taiwan’s heightened sense of urgency 31:22 – How Ukraine alters China’s decision calculus on Taiwan 36:44 – What pertinent challenges should the US be planning for rather than exclusively focusing on the threat of invasion? 43:58 – The issue with democracy vs authoritarianism framing 46:01 – The importance of considering Taiwanese agency when crafting US policy 48:40 – How the U.S. should define its one-China policy 53:19 – Opportunities for a detente between Washington and Beijing A transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Ryan: "How We Would Know When China Is Preparing to Invade Taiwan," by John Culver; the film White Christmas Jude: The podcast In the Dark from American Public Media Kaiser: "A Professor Who Challenges the Washington Consensus on China," Ian Johnson’s piece in The New Yorker about Jessica Chen Weiss]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/sinicaDec22-2.jpg The best solution for Taiwan is no solution: Jude Blanchette and Ryan Hass on why we must kick the can false no 0:00 No no China’s push for RMB internationalization https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/chinas-push-for-rmb-internationalization/ Thu, 08 Dec 2022 19:00:26 +0000 http://thechinaproject.com/?post_type=podcast&p=249988 Wall Street Journal reporter and author of the book China's Great Wall of Debt. Their report is called “China’s Quest for Financial Self-Reliance: How Beijing Plans to Decouple from the Dollar-Based Global Trading and Financial System.” 2:38 – The advantages the U.S. enjoys through the dollar’s global primacy 4:40 –  How Beijing sees the dollar’s dominance as a strategic vulnerability 7:11 – Other countries who actively pursued internationalization of their currency 10:07 – International trust deficit regarding China’s currency 13:37 – Right-sizing China’s currency ambitions 15:13 – How China incentives increased demand for the RMB 24:19 – Are we currently at a critical turning point of currency displacement? 36:42 – The role of digital currency in China’s monetary strategy 43:42 – The BRI as a mechanism for expanding the circulation of the RMB A transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Jeremy: This is Going to Hurt: Secret Diaries of a Junior Doctor by Adam Kay; Kay's Anatomy by Adam Kay Diana: Picking up dancing as a pastime; China: The Gathering Threat by Constantine Menges Dinny: Lombard Street by Walter Bagehot Kaiser: The Amazon miniseries The English]]> Wall Street Journal reporter and author of the book China's Great Wall of Debt. Their report is called “China’s Quest for Financial Self-Reliance: How Beijing Plans to Decouple from the Dollar-Based Global Trading and Financial System.” 2:38 – The advantages the U.S. enjoys through the dollar’s global primacy 4:40 –  How Beijing sees the dollar’s dominance as a strategic vulnerability 7:11 – Other countries who actively pursued internationalization of their currency 10:07 – International trust deficit regarding China’s currency 13:37 – Right-sizing China’s currency ambitions 15:13 – How China incentives increased demand for the RMB 24:19 – Are we currently at a critical turning point of currency displacement? 36:42 – The role of digital currency in China’s monetary strategy 43:42 – The BRI as a mechanism for expanding the circulation of the RMB A transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Jeremy: This is Going to Hurt: Secret Diaries of a Junior Doctor by Adam Kay; Kay's Anatomy by Adam Kay Diana: Picking up dancing as a pastime; China: The Gathering Threat by Constantine Menges Dinny: Lombard Street by Walter Bagehot Kaiser: The Amazon miniseries The English]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Sinica1208.jpg China’s push for RMB internationalization false no 0:00 No no A familiar drumbeat: Michael Mazarr on the run-up to the Iraq invasion and parallels with China https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/a-familiar-drumbeat-michael-mazarr-on-the-run-up-to-the-iraq-invasion-and-parallels-with-china/ Thu, 01 Dec 2022 19:00:34 +0000 http://thechinaproject.com/?post_type=podcast&p=249400 Leap of Faith: Hubris, Negligence, and America's Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy, which examines the decision to invade Iraq in March 2003. Mike is a senior political scientist at the Rand Corporation and a former professor at the National War College, and he warns of certain parallels between what happened 20 years ago and the growing sense of urgency and moral imperative to confront China that he now senses in Washington. 3:40 – Patterns that lead to poor decision-making in the realm of foreign policy and warfare 8:30 – Parallels between American discourse on Iraq and China 13:54 – American exceptionalism and the missionary mindset 15:51 – Much like the US experience after 9/11, could an equivalent “deeply felt imperative” trigger catastrophic conflict with China? 21:15 – The danger of moralistic thinking overriding rational cost-benefit analysis 27:37 – What does Washington hope to gain from the imputation of CCP illegitimacy? 31:47 – Debunking the claim that Washington exaggerates threats for the sake of increasing the defense budget 35:49 – The role of media and Congress in the lead-up to the Iraq war 40:49 – The difference between effective policymaking and policy negligence: assessing the Bush and Biden administrations 47:29 – Adapting the liberal “rules-based international order” to reflect contemporary realities 52:27 – The shortcomings of a reductionist “democracy vs. authoritarianism” foreign policy A full transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Mike: Mr. X and the Pacific by Paul HeerThe Guardians: Kingman Brewster, His Circle, and the Rise of the Liberal Establishment by Geoffrey Kabaservice Kaiser: Babel: Or the Necessity of Violence: An Arcane History of the Oxford Translators' Revolution by R.F. Kuang]]> Leap of Faith: Hubris, Negligence, and America's Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy, which examines the decision to invade Iraq in March 2003. Mike is a senior political scientist at the Rand Corporation and a former professor at the National War College, and he warns of certain parallels between what happened 20 years ago and the growing sense of urgency and moral imperative to confront China that he now senses in Washington. 3:40 – Patterns that lead to poor decision-making in the realm of foreign policy and warfare 8:30 – Parallels between American discourse on Iraq and China 13:54 – American exceptionalism and the missionary mindset 15:51 – Much like the US experience after 9/11, could an equivalent “deeply felt imperative” trigger catastrophic conflict with China? 21:15 – The danger of moralistic thinking overriding rational cost-benefit analysis 27:37 – What does Washington hope to gain from the imputation of CCP illegitimacy? 31:47 – Debunking the claim that Washington exaggerates threats for the sake of increasing the defense budget 35:49 – The role of media and Congress in the lead-up to the Iraq war 40:49 – The difference between effective policymaking and policy negligence: assessing the Bush and Biden administrations 47:29 – Adapting the liberal “rules-based international order” to reflect contemporary realities 52:27 – The shortcomings of a reductionist “democracy vs. authoritarianism” foreign policy A full transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Mike: Mr. X and the Pacific by Paul HeerThe Guardians: Kingman Brewster, His Circle, and the Rise of the Liberal Establishment by Geoffrey Kabaservice Kaiser: Babel: Or the Necessity of Violence: An Arcane History of the Oxford Translators' Revolution by R.F. Kuang]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Michael-Mazarr.jpg A familiar drumbeat: Michael Mazarr on the run-up to the Iraq invasion and parallels with China false no 0:00 No no Special episode: The COVID lockdown protests, with David Moser and Jeremiah Jenne https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/special-episode-the-covid-lockdown-protests-with-david-moser-and-jeremiah-jenne/ Tue, 29 Nov 2022 18:21:20 +0000 http://thechinaproject.com/?post_type=podcast&p=249223 A transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com.

    Recommendations –

    Jeremy: The Twitter account 李老师不是你老师 (Lǐ lǎoshī bùshì nǐ lǎoshī), with the handle @whyyoutouzhele; Cindy Yu’s Twitter account @CindyXiaodanYu

    Jeremiah: Hygienic Modernity: Meanings of Health and Disease in Treaty-Port China by Ruth Rogaski

    David: The Globe and Mail article “In rare show of weakness, China's censors struggle to keep up with zero COVID protests” by James Griffith; Speak Not: Empire, Identity and the Politics of Language by James Griffith

    Kaiser: Happiness is 4 Million Pounds, a New York Times documentary by Hao Wu

    ]]>
    A transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com.

    Recommendations –

    Jeremy: The Twitter account 李老师不是你老师 (Lǐ lǎoshī bùshì nǐ lǎoshī), with the handle @whyyoutouzhele; Cindy Yu’s Twitter account @CindyXiaodanYu

    Jeremiah: Hygienic Modernity: Meanings of Health and Disease in Treaty-Port China by Ruth Rogaski

    David: The Globe and Mail article “In rare show of weakness, China's censors struggle to keep up with zero COVID protests” by James Griffith; Speak Not: Empire, Identity and the Politics of Language by James Griffith

    Kaiser: Happiness is 4 Million Pounds, a New York Times documentary by Hao Wu

    ]]>
    https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/image1-8.jpg Special episode: The COVID lockdown protests, with David Moser and Jeremiah Jenne false no 0:00 No no
    Financial Times reporter Yuan Yang on China-Europe relations https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/financial-times-reporter-yuan-yang-on-china-europe-relations/ Wed, 23 Nov 2022 19:00:26 +0000 http://thechinaproject.com/?post_type=podcast&p=248933 Financial Times who was until recently covering technology in Beijing. Now based in London, her beat is China-Europe relations, and on this episode she discusses German Chancellor Olaf Scholz's recent trip to China, and how Europe and European countries are navigating the fraught U.S.-China relationship. 6:09 – Providing a balanced account of China’s tech ecosystem     9:38 – German Chancellor Olaf Scholz's recent trip to Beijing 16:00 –  The strategic autonomy of European foreign policy 18:41 – European countries’ fractured response to US tech restrictions on China 21:58 – EU policies towards Xinjiang  24:31 – The impact of tech restrictions on European supply chains 27:39 –  The efficacy of sanctions 30:12 – How China’s position on Russia damaged its reputation in Europe 33:48 – European reaction to Biden-Xi meeting 35:57 – How a change in the American presidency could disrupt the Transatlantic alliance system 40:55 – The formulation of Sunak’s China policy   43:50 – Yuan’s new forthcoming book Private Revolutions   A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com Jeremy: Jewish comedian Ari Shaffir Yuan: The Emily Wells album Regards to the End; The Dispossessed by Ursula Le Guin Kaiser: mongulai.com, an e-commerce website specializing in Mongolian artisanal crafts; the Netflix show Barbarians]]> Financial Times who was until recently covering technology in Beijing. Now based in London, her beat is China-Europe relations, and on this episode she discusses German Chancellor Olaf Scholz's recent trip to China, and how Europe and European countries are navigating the fraught U.S.-China relationship. 6:09 – Providing a balanced account of China’s tech ecosystem     9:38 – German Chancellor Olaf Scholz's recent trip to Beijing 16:00 –  The strategic autonomy of European foreign policy 18:41 – European countries’ fractured response to US tech restrictions on China 21:58 – EU policies towards Xinjiang  24:31 – The impact of tech restrictions on European supply chains 27:39 –  The efficacy of sanctions 30:12 – How China’s position on Russia damaged its reputation in Europe 33:48 – European reaction to Biden-Xi meeting 35:57 – How a change in the American presidency could disrupt the Transatlantic alliance system 40:55 – The formulation of Sunak’s China policy   43:50 – Yuan’s new forthcoming book Private Revolutions   A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com Jeremy: Jewish comedian Ari Shaffir Yuan: The Emily Wells album Regards to the End; The Dispossessed by Ursula Le Guin Kaiser: mongulai.com, an e-commerce website specializing in Mongolian artisanal crafts; the Netflix show Barbarians]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Sinica-Yuan.jpg Financial Times reporter Yuan Yang on China-Europe relations false no 0:00 No no Evan Feigenbaum on the U.S. in the Indo-Pacific region https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/evan-feigenbaum-on-the-u-s-in-the-indo-pacific-region/ Thu, 17 Nov 2022 17:00:45 +0000 http://thechinaproject.com/?post_type=podcast&p=248654 A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com.]]> A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com.]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/EvanF_Sinica.jpeg Evan Feigenbaum on the U.S. in the Indo-Pacific region false no 0:00 No no New America President Anne-Marie Slaughter on balancing China competition and global imperatives https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/new-america-president-anne-marie-slaughter-on-balancing-china-competition-and-global-imperatives/ Thu, 10 Nov 2022 21:00:27 +0000 http://thechinaproject.com/?post_type=podcast&p=248325 A transcript of this interview is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Anne-MarieTo Paradise by Hanya YanagiharaA Little Life by Hanya YanagiharaThe Ministry for the Future by Kim Stanley Robinson; What It Feels Like to Be a Bird by David Sibley KaiserSpin Dictators: The Changing Face of Tyranny in the 21st Century by Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman]]> A transcript of this interview is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Anne-MarieTo Paradise by Hanya YanagiharaA Little Life by Hanya YanagiharaThe Ministry for the Future by Kim Stanley Robinson; What It Feels Like to Be a Bird by David Sibley KaiserSpin Dictators: The Changing Face of Tyranny in the 21st Century by Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/annemarie_slaughter.jpeg New America President Anne-Marie Slaughter on balancing China competition and global imperatives false no 0:00 No no The 20th Party Congress postgame show with Damien Ma and Lizzi Lee https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/the-20th-party-congress-postgame-show-with-damien-ma-and-lizzi-lee/ Wed, 02 Nov 2022 20:10:35 +0000 http://thechinaproject.com/?post_type=podcast&p=247461 A transcript of this interview is available at TheChinaProject.com.

    Recommendations:

    Lizzi: Prestige, Manipulation, and Coercion: Elite Power Struggles in the Soviet Union and China after Stalin and Mao by Joseph Torigian

    Damien: Slouching Towards Utopia by Brad DeLong

    Kaiser: "Taiwan, the World-Class Puzzle," a Radio Open Source podcast hosted by Christopher Lydon

    ]]>
    A transcript of this interview is available at TheChinaProject.com.

    Recommendations:

    Lizzi: Prestige, Manipulation, and Coercion: Elite Power Struggles in the Soviet Union and China after Stalin and Mao by Joseph Torigian

    Damien: Slouching Towards Utopia by Brad DeLong

    Kaiser: "Taiwan, the World-Class Puzzle," a Radio Open Source podcast hosted by Christopher Lydon

    ]]>
    https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/damien-lizzi.jpg The 20th Party Congress postgame show with Damien Ma and Lizzi Lee false no 0:00 No no
    Grifter, chaos agent, or CCP spy? The New Yorker’s Evan Osnos on Guo Wengui https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/grifter-chaos-agent-or-ccp-spy-the-new-yorkers-evan-osnos-on-guo-wengui/ Thu, 27 Oct 2022 19:28:45 +0000 http://thechinaproject.com/?post_type=podcast&p=247040 The New Yorker, joins hosts Kaiser Kuo and Jeremy Goldkorn to talk about his new piece on one of the most puzzling figures to come out of China: Guo Wengui, a.k.a. Miles Kwok, who took what he learned about dealing with power and money in China and applied those lessons to the U.S., insinuating himself with leading figures of the American right. Who is this mysterious man, and what is he really after? In an unscripted episode that will bring some listeners back to the grotty apartment in Beijing where Sinica recorded in its very early days, Evan, Kaiser, and Jeremy parse the mysteries of the strange phenomenon of Guo Wengui. 03:37 – Who is Guo Wengui? 10:07 – Orville Schell’s experience with Guo Wengui 14:48 – Steve Bannon’s comparison between Guo and Trump 17:40 – The process of fact-checking this piece 23:03 – Guo’s potential ties to the pro-Xi Jinping clique 26:02 – VOA’s interview with Guo 30:06 – Guo’s campaign against Teng Biao and other Chinese dissidents 33:57 – Guo’s role as an interlocutor on behalf of the MSS 39:00 – Steve Wynn’s efforts to extradite Guo 42:10 – Guo’s impact on the Chinese diaspora community 45:11 – Guo’s influence on U.S.-China relations A transcript of this interview is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Jeremy: "President Trump's First Term," by Evan Osnos, a New Yorker article written in 2016 predicting what would happen to the U.S. if Donald Trump won in 2016. (Spoiler: he did. And Evan was right). Evan: An audio tribute to legendary New Yorker editor John Bennet. Kaiser: The Pillars of the Earth by Ken Follet, a forgivably melodramatic historical fiction novel with an emphasis on architecture]]> The New Yorker, joins hosts Kaiser Kuo and Jeremy Goldkorn to talk about his new piece on one of the most puzzling figures to come out of China: Guo Wengui, a.k.a. Miles Kwok, who took what he learned about dealing with power and money in China and applied those lessons to the U.S., insinuating himself with leading figures of the American right. Who is this mysterious man, and what is he really after? In an unscripted episode that will bring some listeners back to the grotty apartment in Beijing where Sinica recorded in its very early days, Evan, Kaiser, and Jeremy parse the mysteries of the strange phenomenon of Guo Wengui. 03:37 – Who is Guo Wengui? 10:07 – Orville Schell’s experience with Guo Wengui 14:48 – Steve Bannon’s comparison between Guo and Trump 17:40 – The process of fact-checking this piece 23:03 – Guo’s potential ties to the pro-Xi Jinping clique 26:02 – VOA’s interview with Guo 30:06 – Guo’s campaign against Teng Biao and other Chinese dissidents 33:57 – Guo’s role as an interlocutor on behalf of the MSS 39:00 – Steve Wynn’s efforts to extradite Guo 42:10 – Guo’s impact on the Chinese diaspora community 45:11 – Guo’s influence on U.S.-China relations A transcript of this interview is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Jeremy: "President Trump's First Term," by Evan Osnos, a New Yorker article written in 2016 predicting what would happen to the U.S. if Donald Trump won in 2016. (Spoiler: he did. And Evan was right). Evan: An audio tribute to legendary New Yorker editor John Bennet. Kaiser: The Pillars of the Earth by Ken Follet, a forgivably melodramatic historical fiction novel with an emphasis on architecture]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/EvanOsnos.jpg Grifter, chaos agent, or CCP spy? The New Yorker’s Evan Osnos on Guo Wengui false no 0:00 No no Overreach and overreaction, with Susan Shirk https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/susan-shirk-on-her-new-book-overreach-how-china-derailed-its-peaceful-rise/ Thu, 20 Oct 2022 13:00:10 +0000 http://thechinaproject.com/?post_type=podcast&p=245140 21st Century China Center at the School of Global Policy and Strategy at UCSD, about how the deliberately collective leadership of the Hu Jintao years set the stage for the over-concentration of power under Xi Jinping and created conditions for overreach. She argues that Chinese overreach was met with American overreaction — not just in the Trump years, but continuing into the Biden administration. 11:35 – The thesis of Overreach and misconceptions based on the title 15:50 – The decline of collective leadership 19:57 – Selection process of politburo members 27:48 – The advantages of China’s former collective leadership system 31:40 – How collective leadership often lead to overreach 39:40 – How personalistic, overly centralized rule can also result in overreach 43:02 – Increased paranoia, insecurity, and “permanent purge” culture under Xi 49:59 – American overreaction to China’s ambitions A transcript of this episode is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: SusanBorn in Blackness: Africa, Africans, and the Making of the Modern World by Howard French Kaiser – His hobby of Asian archery and finding a community/activity you’re passionate about outside your professional line of work]]> 21st Century China Center at the School of Global Policy and Strategy at UCSD, about how the deliberately collective leadership of the Hu Jintao years set the stage for the over-concentration of power under Xi Jinping and created conditions for overreach. She argues that Chinese overreach was met with American overreaction — not just in the Trump years, but continuing into the Biden administration. 11:35 – The thesis of Overreach and misconceptions based on the title 15:50 – The decline of collective leadership 19:57 – Selection process of politburo members 27:48 – The advantages of China’s former collective leadership system 31:40 – How collective leadership often lead to overreach 39:40 – How personalistic, overly centralized rule can also result in overreach 43:02 – Increased paranoia, insecurity, and “permanent purge” culture under Xi 49:59 – American overreaction to China’s ambitions A transcript of this episode is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: SusanBorn in Blackness: Africa, Africans, and the Making of the Modern World by Howard French Kaiser – His hobby of Asian archery and finding a community/activity you’re passionate about outside your professional line of work]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/shirk.jpg Overreach and overreaction, with Susan Shirk false no 0:00 No no Podcasting the Prince: Sue-Lin Wong of the Economist on her Xi Jinping podcast https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/podcasting-the-prince-sue-lin-wong-of-the-economist-on-her-xi-jinping-podcast/ Thu, 13 Oct 2022 15:11:38 +0000 http://thechinaproject.com/?post_type=podcast&p=244818 This week on Sinica, Kaiser and Jeremy are joined by Sue-Lin Wong, who until recently covered China for the Economist and hosted an eight-part podcast series all about Xi Jinping called The Prince. The podcast features interviews with a wide range of China-watchers, peers of Xi, dissidents, and many others who offer insights into what makes Xi tick.

    3:38 – Reason behind naming the podcast “the Prince”

    5:53 – Differences between traditional journalism and podcasting

    9:52 – The role of Sue-Lin’s mother in the podcast

    13:37 – How corruption influenced Xi’s leadership style

    19:29 – Identifying Xi’s greatest anxieties: party in-fighting, the collapse of the USSR

    22:48 – Early signs of Xi’s ideological underpinnings most China watchers missed

    29:33 – Did the CCP’s internal crisis make Xi’s rise inevitable?

    32:57 – Is Xi Jinping the most powerful man in the world?

    37:12 – Reframing the engagement debate after Xi’s administration

    41:51 – David Rennie’s view on China: “a giant utilitarian experiment”

    46:45 – Key insights on Xi that listeners of the Prince should walk away with

    52:16 – How Sue-Lin would brief an American policymaker on Xi Jinping’s main motivations

    A transcript of this episode is available at TheChinaProject.com.

    Recommendations:

    Jeremy A Matter of Perspective: Parsing Insider Accounts of Xi Jinping Ahead of the 20th Party Congress, an article on The China Story written by Neil Thomas

    Sue-Lin – Race to the Galaxy, a two-player board game

    Kaiser Interview with the Vampire, a new AMC TV series

    ]]>
    This week on Sinica, Kaiser and Jeremy are joined by Sue-Lin Wong, who until recently covered China for the Economist and hosted an eight-part podcast series all about Xi Jinping called The Prince. The podcast features interviews with a wide range of China-watchers, peers of Xi, dissidents, and many others who offer insights into what makes Xi tick.

    3:38 – Reason behind naming the podcast “the Prince”

    5:53 – Differences between traditional journalism and podcasting

    9:52 – The role of Sue-Lin’s mother in the podcast

    13:37 – How corruption influenced Xi’s leadership style

    19:29 – Identifying Xi’s greatest anxieties: party in-fighting, the collapse of the USSR

    22:48 – Early signs of Xi’s ideological underpinnings most China watchers missed

    29:33 – Did the CCP’s internal crisis make Xi’s rise inevitable?

    32:57 – Is Xi Jinping the most powerful man in the world?

    37:12 – Reframing the engagement debate after Xi’s administration

    41:51 – David Rennie’s view on China: “a giant utilitarian experiment”

    46:45 – Key insights on Xi that listeners of the Prince should walk away with

    52:16 – How Sue-Lin would brief an American policymaker on Xi Jinping’s main motivations

    A transcript of this episode is available at TheChinaProject.com.

    Recommendations:

    Jeremy A Matter of Perspective: Parsing Insider Accounts of Xi Jinping Ahead of the 20th Party Congress, an article on The China Story written by Neil Thomas

    Sue-Lin – Race to the Galaxy, a two-player board game

    Kaiser Interview with the Vampire, a new AMC TV series

    ]]>
    https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/suelinwong-scaled.jpg Podcasting the Prince: Sue-Lin Wong of the Economist on her Xi Jinping podcast false no 0:00 No no
    Legendary BBC presenter and China editor Carrie Gracie, live in London https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/legendary-bbc-presenter-and-china-editor-carrie-gracie-live-in-london/ Thu, 06 Oct 2022 17:00:16 +0000 http://thechinaproject.com/?post_type=podcast&p=242097 Murder in the Lucky Holiday Hotel and Carrie’s coverage of the Bo Xilai scandal and Chinese elite politics in 2012 11:38 – Overview of the main characters: Bo Xilai, Gu Kuilai, Neil Heywood, and Wang Lijun 35:18 – How the 2012 power struggle shaped Xi Jinping’s leadership style 41:42 – Carrie’s key takeaways from following the Bo Xilai case 44:33 – White Horse Village: documenting life of farmers across a decade in rural China 50:56 – Changing conditions for foreign journalists in China 56:52 – Advice to reporters starting in China 1:01:05 – Assessing media organizations’ progress on dismantling the gender pay gap A transcript of this episode is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: JeremyYellowstone, a drama series about a family-owned ranch in Montana CarrieEverything Everywhere All at Once; the Disney animated film Mulan Kaiser: the UK progressive rock band Porcupine Tree's current Continuation/Closure tour — Europe dates]]> Murder in the Lucky Holiday Hotel and Carrie’s coverage of the Bo Xilai scandal and Chinese elite politics in 2012 11:38 – Overview of the main characters: Bo Xilai, Gu Kuilai, Neil Heywood, and Wang Lijun 35:18 – How the 2012 power struggle shaped Xi Jinping’s leadership style 41:42 – Carrie’s key takeaways from following the Bo Xilai case 44:33 – White Horse Village: documenting life of farmers across a decade in rural China 50:56 – Changing conditions for foreign journalists in China 56:52 – Advice to reporters starting in China 1:01:05 – Assessing media organizations’ progress on dismantling the gender pay gap A transcript of this episode is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: JeremyYellowstone, a drama series about a family-owned ranch in Montana CarrieEverything Everywhere All at Once; the Disney animated film Mulan Kaiser: the UK progressive rock band Porcupine Tree's current Continuation/Closure tour — Europe dates]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/carriegracie.jpg Legendary BBC presenter and China editor Carrie Gracie, live in London false no 0:00 No no A conversation with Minister Xu Xueyuan, Deputy Chief of Mission of the embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Washington, D.C. https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/a-conversation-with-minister-xu-xueyuan-deputy-chief-of-mission-of-the-embassy-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china-in-washington/ Thu, 29 Sep 2022 16:54:24 +0000 http://thechinaproject.com/?post_type=podcast&p=240778 A few words about the process, in the interest of transparency: Minister Xu’s team did request questions in advance, and they were all accepted without alteration except to suggest that two questions, both related to public diplomacy efforts, be combined. Questions on subjects like Taiwan, Xinjiang, and China’s Zero-COVID policy were all accepted without even any suggestions on changes of wording. Kaiser was also able to follow up on questions without any objection at all. Where Minister Xu cited numbers and made factual claims, we made a good faith effort to check them — for example, on the number of acres in the recent offshore oil lease approvals made by the Biden administration. Doubtless, there will be listeners who will wish that Kaiser had been more forceful, and there may be some who believe he was perhaps too forceful. Sinica is not a “gotcha” show and never has been, and we believe there is value in hearing the perspectives of a ranking Chinese diplomat, and we hope you agree that the interview is very much worth listening to. The interview has only been edited only for clarity and concision — taking out filler or hesitation words and pick-ups. 2:56 – Does the Biden administration’s China policy diverge from Trump's? 8:29 – China’s role in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 15:09 – China’s position on the Ukraine war 19:21 – How the Ukraine conflict factors into Beijing’s decision-making on Taiwan 23:11 – The diminishing appeal of “one country, two systems” 29:56 – Beijing’s suspension of climate talks after the Pelosi visit 38:20 – U.S.-China coordination on alleviating global economic issues 46:37 – The possibility of diplomatic concessions to improve relations 52:29 –The decline in people-to-people exchange between China and the U.S. 1:00:27 – China’s "dynamic zero-COVID" policy 1:08:16 – The 20th Party Congress’ impact on U.S.-China relations 1:10:51 – Considering the Xinjiang issue from the American perspective 1:20:10 – The unintended consequences of wolf-warrior diplomacy 1:24:45 – Differing views on China in the Global South vs. Global North A full transcript of this interview is available at thechinaproject.com.]]> A few words about the process, in the interest of transparency: Minister Xu’s team did request questions in advance, and they were all accepted without alteration except to suggest that two questions, both related to public diplomacy efforts, be combined. Questions on subjects like Taiwan, Xinjiang, and China’s Zero-COVID policy were all accepted without even any suggestions on changes of wording. Kaiser was also able to follow up on questions without any objection at all. Where Minister Xu cited numbers and made factual claims, we made a good faith effort to check them — for example, on the number of acres in the recent offshore oil lease approvals made by the Biden administration. Doubtless, there will be listeners who will wish that Kaiser had been more forceful, and there may be some who believe he was perhaps too forceful. Sinica is not a “gotcha” show and never has been, and we believe there is value in hearing the perspectives of a ranking Chinese diplomat, and we hope you agree that the interview is very much worth listening to. The interview has only been edited only for clarity and concision — taking out filler or hesitation words and pick-ups. 2:56 – Does the Biden administration’s China policy diverge from Trump's? 8:29 – China’s role in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 15:09 – China’s position on the Ukraine war 19:21 – How the Ukraine conflict factors into Beijing’s decision-making on Taiwan 23:11 – The diminishing appeal of “one country, two systems” 29:56 – Beijing’s suspension of climate talks after the Pelosi visit 38:20 – U.S.-China coordination on alleviating global economic issues 46:37 – The possibility of diplomatic concessions to improve relations 52:29 –The decline in people-to-people exchange between China and the U.S. 1:00:27 – China’s "dynamic zero-COVID" policy 1:08:16 – The 20th Party Congress’ impact on U.S.-China relations 1:10:51 – Considering the Xinjiang issue from the American perspective 1:20:10 – The unintended consequences of wolf-warrior diplomacy 1:24:45 – Differing views on China in the Global South vs. Global North A full transcript of this interview is available at thechinaproject.com.]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Xu-Xueyuan.jpg A conversation with Minister Xu Xueyuan, Deputy Chief of Mission of the embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Washington, D.C. false no 0:00 No no China in the Global South, with Eric Olander and Cobus van Staden https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/china-in-the-global-south-with-eric-olander-and-cobus-van-staden/ Thu, 22 Sep 2022 21:18:16 +0000 http://thechinaproject.com/?post_type=podcast&p=239159 A transcript of the podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Eric: Following Gyude Moore, Senior Policy Fellow at the Center for Global Development: @gyude_moore; Hannah Ryder; CEO of Development Reimagined: @hmryder; Ovigue Eguegu; Policy Analyst at Development Reimagined: @ovigweeguegu; and Christian-Geraud Neema; and Francophone Editor at the China-Global South Project: @christiangeraud Cobus: The Specter of Global China: Politics, Labor, and Foreign Investment in Africa by Ching Kwan Lee Kaiser: Chinese traditional bow maker AF Archery; The Way of Archery by Gao Ying, translated by Jie Tian and Justin Ma]]> A transcript of the podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Eric: Following Gyude Moore, Senior Policy Fellow at the Center for Global Development: @gyude_moore; Hannah Ryder; CEO of Development Reimagined: @hmryder; Ovigue Eguegu; Policy Analyst at Development Reimagined: @ovigweeguegu; and Christian-Geraud Neema; and Francophone Editor at the China-Global South Project: @christiangeraud Cobus: The Specter of Global China: Politics, Labor, and Foreign Investment in Africa by Ching Kwan Lee Kaiser: Chinese traditional bow maker AF Archery; The Way of Archery by Gao Ying, translated by Jie Tian and Justin Ma]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/CGS-3.jpg China in the Global South, with Eric Olander and Cobus van Staden false no 0:00 No no Surveillance State: Authors Josh Chin and Liza Lin on their new book on China’s tech-enhanced social controls https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/surveillance-state-authors-josh-chin-and-liza-lin-on-their-new-book-on-chinas-tech-enhanced-social-controls/ Thu, 15 Sep 2022 16:31:39 +0000 http://thechinaproject.com/?post_type=podcast&p=238802 Wall Street Journal reporters Josh Chin and Liza Lin join the program to discuss their new book Surveillance State: Inside China's Quest to Launch a New Era of Social Control. From Urumqi to Uganda and from Hangzhou to the Bronx, the book explores every facet of technological surveillance, from the technocratic mindset that birthed it to its spread, with Beijing's help, to many countries of the developing world. But it also examines the role that U.S. tech companies played in giving rise to it. 6:05 – The story of Tahir Hamut: a Uyghur poet living under Xinjiang’s surveillance state 12:50 – Will the Xinjiang model for surveillance be expanded to other parts of China? 16:37 – Is China actively pushing other countries to adopt its surveillance state practices? 23:26 – The case of Hangzhou: the benefits of the “smart city” model 27:17 – Is there a fundamental difference between the concept of “privacy” in China and the West? 30:55 – How Xu Bing’s film uses surveillance footage 35:39 – What accounts for Chinese society’s changing views on privacy? 40:12 – China’s tendency to apply an “engineering” mindset to fixing social problems 47:57 – Assessing US companies’ role in enabling Chinese surveillance 52:27 – Devising a policy that effectively bans hardware used for Xinjiang surveillance 1:01:03 – China’s new laws on digital data protection 1:05:05 – What the social credit system’s popular narrative gets wrong 1:10:40 – An example of Chinese propaganda fabricating the surveillance system’s success 1:14:29 – The future of privacy protection in China and the West A full transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Liza: The Mayo Clinic Guide to a Healthy Pregnancy Josh: The Backstreets: A Novel from Xinjiang by Perhat Tursun (translated by Darren Byler), a short novel about life for Uyghurs in modern China; The Wok: Recipes and Techniques: by Kenji Lopez Kaiser: After the Ivory Tower Falls: How College Broke the American Dream and Blew Up Our Politics and How to Fix It by Will Bunch]]> Wall Street Journal reporters Josh Chin and Liza Lin join the program to discuss their new book Surveillance State: Inside China's Quest to Launch a New Era of Social Control. From Urumqi to Uganda and from Hangzhou to the Bronx, the book explores every facet of technological surveillance, from the technocratic mindset that birthed it to its spread, with Beijing's help, to many countries of the developing world. But it also examines the role that U.S. tech companies played in giving rise to it. 6:05 – The story of Tahir Hamut: a Uyghur poet living under Xinjiang’s surveillance state 12:50 – Will the Xinjiang model for surveillance be expanded to other parts of China? 16:37 – Is China actively pushing other countries to adopt its surveillance state practices? 23:26 – The case of Hangzhou: the benefits of the “smart city” model 27:17 – Is there a fundamental difference between the concept of “privacy” in China and the West? 30:55 – How Xu Bing’s film uses surveillance footage 35:39 – What accounts for Chinese society’s changing views on privacy? 40:12 – China’s tendency to apply an “engineering” mindset to fixing social problems 47:57 – Assessing US companies’ role in enabling Chinese surveillance 52:27 – Devising a policy that effectively bans hardware used for Xinjiang surveillance 1:01:03 – China’s new laws on digital data protection 1:05:05 – What the social credit system’s popular narrative gets wrong 1:10:40 – An example of Chinese propaganda fabricating the surveillance system’s success 1:14:29 – The future of privacy protection in China and the West A full transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Liza: The Mayo Clinic Guide to a Healthy Pregnancy Josh: The Backstreets: A Novel from Xinjiang by Perhat Tursun (translated by Darren Byler), a short novel about life for Uyghurs in modern China; The Wok: Recipes and Techniques: by Kenji Lopez Kaiser: After the Ivory Tower Falls: How College Broke the American Dream and Blew Up Our Politics and How to Fix It by Will Bunch]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/sinica9.15.jpg Surveillance State: Authors Josh Chin and Liza Lin on their new book on China’s tech-enhanced social controls false no 0:00 No no Yuen Yuen Ang on Xi Jinping, the Party bureaucracy, and authoritarian resilience https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/yuen-yuen-ang-on-xi-jinping-the-party-bureaucracy-and-authoritarian-resilience/ Thu, 08 Sep 2022 20:54:12 +0000 http://thechinaproject.com/?post_type=podcast&p=238073 Journal of Democracy titled "How Resilient is the CCP?" The essay examines why Xi Jinping surprisingly seeks to retain a competent and selectively adaptive bureaucracy, despite his personalist style of rule 3:51 – Summarizing debates on Chinese governance in the current China watcher field 8:43 – Defining the concept of institutionalization and contextualizing it to China 13:39 – Explaining Xi’s bureaucratic objectives: maintaining competence but limiting autonomy 18:57 – Remaining areas of autonomy for China’s state bureaucracy 22:11 – Key areas where Xi weakened bureaucracy 26:08 – Institutionalization prior to the Xi era 29:00 – Main sources of resilience and threat under Xi’s new model for authoritarianism 31:45 – Fundamental difference between Mao and Xi 34:52 – The revival of state bureaucracy and technocrats after Mao’s death 40:13 – How do we understand the tension between expertise and ideology in Xi’s governance agenda? 46:15 – Historical roots of technocracy in the Chinese government 49:09 – The CCP’s technocratic bureaucracy as an integral source of resiliency A complete transcript of this podcast is available on TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations:  Yuen Yuen: Chinese drama series Zǒuxiàng gònghé 走向共和 (Towards the Republic); and  Lenin's Tomb: The Last Days of the Soviet Empire by David Remnick Kaiser: Children of Earth and Sky; A Brightness Long Ago and All the Seas of the World a historical fantasy novel trilogy by Guy Gavriel Kay]]> Journal of Democracy titled "How Resilient is the CCP?" The essay examines why Xi Jinping surprisingly seeks to retain a competent and selectively adaptive bureaucracy, despite his personalist style of rule 3:51 – Summarizing debates on Chinese governance in the current China watcher field 8:43 – Defining the concept of institutionalization and contextualizing it to China 13:39 – Explaining Xi’s bureaucratic objectives: maintaining competence but limiting autonomy 18:57 – Remaining areas of autonomy for China’s state bureaucracy 22:11 – Key areas where Xi weakened bureaucracy 26:08 – Institutionalization prior to the Xi era 29:00 – Main sources of resilience and threat under Xi’s new model for authoritarianism 31:45 – Fundamental difference between Mao and Xi 34:52 – The revival of state bureaucracy and technocrats after Mao’s death 40:13 – How do we understand the tension between expertise and ideology in Xi’s governance agenda? 46:15 – Historical roots of technocracy in the Chinese government 49:09 – The CCP’s technocratic bureaucracy as an integral source of resiliency A complete transcript of this podcast is available on TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations:  Yuen Yuen: Chinese drama series Zǒuxiàng gònghé 走向共和 (Towards the Republic); and  Lenin's Tomb: The Last Days of the Soviet Empire by David Remnick Kaiser: Children of Earth and Sky; A Brightness Long Ago and All the Seas of the World a historical fantasy novel trilogy by Guy Gavriel Kay]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/ang.jpg Yuen Yuen Ang on Xi Jinping, the Party bureaucracy, and authoritarian resilience false no 0:00 No no Avoiding the China Trap, with Jessica Chen Weiss https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/avoiding-the-china-trap-with-jessica-chen-weiss/ Thu, 01 Sep 2022 21:00:04 +0000 http://thechinaproject.com/?post_type=podcast&p=231782 Foreign Affairs, titled "The China Trap: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Perilous Logic of Zero-Sum Competition,” which calls on the U.S. to formulate an affirmative vision for the relationship with China instead of pursuing an ad-hoc policy predicated simply on countering what China does. 7:17 – Moving away from the current zero-sum framing of U.S.-China competition and adopting an “affirmative vision” 12:29 – Shortcomings of the U.S. response to China’s strategy in the developing world 15:11 – How competition with China framing has adverse consequences for domestic American politics 18:37 – Can the U.S. benefit from adopting certain aspects of the Chinese approach? 20:49 – The steps needed to return to normalized U.S.-China diplomacy 25:00 – How can the US properly calibrate its China threat assessment? 34:05 – The relationship between China’s domestic challenges and its foreign policy A transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Jessica: Stephen Walt and Dani Rodrik’s essay on a establishing a new global order in Foreign Affairs [forthcoming]; and After Engagement: Dilemmas in U.S.-China Security Relations by Jacques deLisle and Avery Goldstein Kaiser: The Lord of the Rings trilogy audiobooks narrated by Andy Serkis]]> Foreign Affairs, titled "The China Trap: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Perilous Logic of Zero-Sum Competition,” which calls on the U.S. to formulate an affirmative vision for the relationship with China instead of pursuing an ad-hoc policy predicated simply on countering what China does. 7:17 – Moving away from the current zero-sum framing of U.S.-China competition and adopting an “affirmative vision” 12:29 – Shortcomings of the U.S. response to China’s strategy in the developing world 15:11 – How competition with China framing has adverse consequences for domestic American politics 18:37 – Can the U.S. benefit from adopting certain aspects of the Chinese approach? 20:49 – The steps needed to return to normalized U.S.-China diplomacy 25:00 – How can the US properly calibrate its China threat assessment? 34:05 – The relationship between China’s domestic challenges and its foreign policy A transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Jessica: Stephen Walt and Dani Rodrik’s essay on a establishing a new global order in Foreign Affairs [forthcoming]; and After Engagement: Dilemmas in U.S.-China Security Relations by Jacques deLisle and Avery Goldstein Kaiser: The Lord of the Rings trilogy audiobooks narrated by Andy Serkis]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/weiss_mh1661976268380-1.jpg Avoiding the China Trap, with Jessica Chen Weiss false no 0:00 No no Is China’s bubble finally about to pop? A conversation with Bloomberg Chief Economist Tom Orlik https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/is-chinas-bubble-finally-about-to-pop-a-conversation-with-bloomberg-chief-economist-tom-orlik/ Thu, 25 Aug 2022 20:00:21 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=231424 China: The Bubble that Never Pops. Ahead of the release of the new, updated edition of his book, we ask him about all that has changed in the two-and-a-half years since the publication of the first edition — and whether the real estate crisis, the Common Prosperity agenda, China's fraying foreign relations, or the COVID lockdowns are finally going to bring about the crash long predicted by the "China bears." 4:40 – Tom offers a succinct summary of the chief arguments in the first edition of China: The Bubble that Never Pops 8:05 – Is China looking quite as clever as it was four months ago? 11:08 – The Chinese economy’s great COVID shutdown stress test 13:53 – China’s stimulus response 20:22 – The future of the Common Prosperity agenda 25:49 – China’s push for tech self-sufficiency 33:00 – China’s present real estate crisis 38:15 – Xi Jinping’s priorities: triage for the ailing Chinese economy 44:00 – How bad will the damage be from China’s 2022 lockdowns? A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Jeremy: The Parker series,: crime fiction by Richard Stark, pen name of Donald E. Westlake Tom: Surveillance State by Josh Chin and Liza Lin; and Coalitions of the Weak by Victor Shih Kaiser: The TV drama from Hulu, The Bear]]> China: The Bubble that Never Pops. Ahead of the release of the new, updated edition of his book, we ask him about all that has changed in the two-and-a-half years since the publication of the first edition — and whether the real estate crisis, the Common Prosperity agenda, China's fraying foreign relations, or the COVID lockdowns are finally going to bring about the crash long predicted by the "China bears." 4:40 – Tom offers a succinct summary of the chief arguments in the first edition of China: The Bubble that Never Pops 8:05 – Is China looking quite as clever as it was four months ago? 11:08 – The Chinese economy’s great COVID shutdown stress test 13:53 – China’s stimulus response 20:22 – The future of the Common Prosperity agenda 25:49 – China’s push for tech self-sufficiency 33:00 – China’s present real estate crisis 38:15 – Xi Jinping’s priorities: triage for the ailing Chinese economy 44:00 – How bad will the damage be from China’s 2022 lockdowns? A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Jeremy: The Parker series,: crime fiction by Richard Stark, pen name of Donald E. Westlake Tom: Surveillance State by Josh Chin and Liza Lin; and Coalitions of the Weak by Victor Shih Kaiser: The TV drama from Hulu, The Bear]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/tomorlikBW.jpg Is China’s bubble finally about to pop? A conversation with Bloomberg Chief Economist Tom Orlik false no 0:00 No no China’s space program, with NASA astronaut Leroy Chiao https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/chinas-space-program-with-nasa-astronaut-leroy-chiao/ Thu, 18 Aug 2022 21:00:04 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=231067 A complete transcript of this podcast is available on TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Jeremy:  Nuremberg Diary by G.M. Gilbert. Leroy: Old Henry, a micro-Western film Kaiser: Putin by Philip Short; and a preview of a forthcoming paper about the Cyberspace Administration of China, CAC, written by Jamie Horsley]]> A complete transcript of this podcast is available on TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Jeremy:  Nuremberg Diary by G.M. Gilbert. Leroy: Old Henry, a micro-Western film Kaiser: Putin by Philip Short; and a preview of a forthcoming paper about the Cyberspace Administration of China, CAC, written by Jamie Horsley]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/chiao.jpg China’s space program, with NASA astronaut Leroy Chiao false no 0:00 No no China and America’s “great power opportunity,” with Ali Wyne https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/china-and-americas-great-power-opportunity-with-ali-wyne/ Thu, 11 Aug 2022 21:00:15 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=230761 America's Great Power Opportunity: Revitalizing U.S. Foreign Policy to Meet the Challenges of Strategic Competition. Ali's book calls on American policymakers to craft a strategy that is guided by confidence and a clear vision of American renewal and emphasizes America's competitive advantages, rather than being determined by the behavior of our notional competitors, especially China. 2:09 – The framework of great power competition and building a foreign policy that is not dictated by the actions of other great powers 16:13 – The competitive challenges from China and Russia 25:38 – America's psychological anxiety over China's rise 39:30 – Eight principles for building a new foreign policy: Principle one – renew America's competitive advantages 51:35 – Principle two: regard the power of America's domestic example, not as a supplement to external competitiveness, but as a precondition for it. 56:22 – Principle three: do not use competitive anxiety as a crutch and principle four: frame internal renewal as an explicit objective of U.S. foreign policy, not as a desired byproduct 1:01:19 – Principle five: enlisting allies and partners in affirmative undertakings 1:08:26 – Principle six: appreciate the limits to American unilateral influence 1:13:38 – Principle seven: pursue cooperative opportunities that can temper the destabilizing effects of great power competition 1:17:29 – Principle eight: rebalance toward the Asia Pacific within economic focus 1:20:12 – How Russia's invasion of Ukraine has affected the framework laid out in Ali's book A complete transcript of this interview is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Ali: The Foreign Affairs essay "Beijing Is Still Playing the Long Game on Taiwan: Why China Isn’t Poised to Invade" by Andrew Nathan Kaiser: The Swedish TV show Clark on Netflix]]> America's Great Power Opportunity: Revitalizing U.S. Foreign Policy to Meet the Challenges of Strategic Competition. Ali's book calls on American policymakers to craft a strategy that is guided by confidence and a clear vision of American renewal and emphasizes America's competitive advantages, rather than being determined by the behavior of our notional competitors, especially China. 2:09 – The framework of great power competition and building a foreign policy that is not dictated by the actions of other great powers 16:13 – The competitive challenges from China and Russia 25:38 – America's psychological anxiety over China's rise 39:30 – Eight principles for building a new foreign policy: Principle one – renew America's competitive advantages 51:35 – Principle two: regard the power of America's domestic example, not as a supplement to external competitiveness, but as a precondition for it. 56:22 – Principle three: do not use competitive anxiety as a crutch and principle four: frame internal renewal as an explicit objective of U.S. foreign policy, not as a desired byproduct 1:01:19 – Principle five: enlisting allies and partners in affirmative undertakings 1:08:26 – Principle six: appreciate the limits to American unilateral influence 1:13:38 – Principle seven: pursue cooperative opportunities that can temper the destabilizing effects of great power competition 1:17:29 – Principle eight: rebalance toward the Asia Pacific within economic focus 1:20:12 – How Russia's invasion of Ukraine has affected the framework laid out in Ali's book A complete transcript of this interview is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Ali: The Foreign Affairs essay "Beijing Is Still Playing the Long Game on Taiwan: Why China Isn’t Poised to Invade" by Andrew Nathan Kaiser: The Swedish TV show Clark on Netflix]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/sinica-aug-2-1-scaled.jpg China and America’s “great power opportunity,” with Ali Wyne false no 0:00 No no Another Taiwan Straits Crisis? CIA veteran John Culver weighs in https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/another-taiwan-straits-crisis-cia-veteran-john-culver-weighs-in/ Thu, 04 Aug 2022 21:02:50 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=230302 A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: John: The late Alan Romberg's exegesis of the US-China negotiating record, "Rein In at the Brink of the Precipice" and Ryan Hass's book Stronger: Adapting America’s China Strategy in an Age of Competitive Interdependence Kaiser: Banff National Park in Alberta, Canada — and the town of Canmore as a great place to stay nearby.]]> A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: John: The late Alan Romberg's exegesis of the US-China negotiating record, "Rein In at the Brink of the Precipice" and Ryan Hass's book Stronger: Adapting America’s China Strategy in an Age of Competitive Interdependence Kaiser: Banff National Park in Alberta, Canada — and the town of Canmore as a great place to stay nearby.]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/johnculver.jpg Another Taiwan Straits Crisis? CIA veteran John Culver weighs in false no 0:00 No no The Sinica Network presents the Café & Seda (Coffee & Silk) Podcast https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/the-sinica-network-presents-the-cafe-seda-coffee-silk-podcast/ Thu, 28 Jul 2022 21:15:31 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=229931 A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com Recommendations: China Engages Latin America: Distorting Development and Democracy? By Evan Ellis Links of interest: Articles from Evan Ellis at Global Americans Andrés Bello Foundation - China Latin America Research Center Twitter: @FABChinaLatam | @REvanEllis]]> A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com Recommendations: China Engages Latin America: Distorting Development and Democracy? By Evan Ellis Links of interest: Articles from Evan Ellis at Global Americans Andrés Bello Foundation - China Latin America Research Center Twitter: @FABChinaLatam | @REvanEllis]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Cafe-y-Seda-Logo-Rectangle2-pdf.jpg The Sinica Network presents the Café & Seda (Coffee & Silk) Podcast false no 0:00 No no Prototype Nation: Silvia Lindtner on what drives Chinese tech innovation, and how tech drives Chinese statecraft https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/prototype-nation-silvia-lindtner-on-what-drives-chinese-tech-innovation-and-how-tech-drives-chinese-statecraft/ Thu, 21 Jul 2022 21:00:51 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=229560 A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Silvia: In This Moment, We Are Happy by Chen Qiufan and Surrogate Humanity: Race, Robots, and the Politics of Technological Futures by Kalindi Vora and Neda Atanasoski Kaiser: Sarmat Archery based in Kiev, Ukraine]]> A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Silvia: In This Moment, We Are Happy by Chen Qiufan and Surrogate Humanity: Race, Robots, and the Politics of Technological Futures by Kalindi Vora and Neda Atanasoski Kaiser: Sarmat Archery based in Kiev, Ukraine]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/silvia-sinica-scaled-e1658406447234.jpg Prototype Nation: Silvia Lindtner on what drives Chinese tech innovation, and how tech drives Chinese statecraft false no 0:00 No no Semiconductors and the unspoken U.S. tech policy on China, with Paul Triolo https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/semiconductors-and-the-unspoken-u-s-tech-policy-on-china-with-paul-triolo/ Fri, 15 Jul 2022 00:23:12 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=229298 A transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Paul: Rob Dunn, A Natural History of the Future; and Ryan Hass, Stronger: Adapting America's China Strategy in an Age of Competitive Interdependence Kaiser: The Boys on Amazon Prime]]> A transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Paul: Rob Dunn, A Natural History of the Future; and Ryan Hass, Stronger: Adapting America's China Strategy in an Age of Competitive Interdependence Kaiser: The Boys on Amazon Prime]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/paul-t-scaled.jpg Semiconductors and the unspoken U.S. tech policy on China, with Paul Triolo false no 0:00 No no Historian Andrew Liu on COVID origins: Orientalism and the “Asiatic racial form” https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/historian-andrew-liu-on-covid-origins-orientalism-and-the-asiatic-racial-form/ Thu, 07 Jul 2022 21:04:35 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=228895 Orientalism and why it's a poor fit for Asia today 10:41 – The "Asiatic racial form" and the notionally "positive" Asian stereotypes 13:58 – How Orientalism and the Asiatic racial form interact today and historically 23:50 – Conspiracies on China, and what's wrong with the Asiatic form 27:51 – Japan's rise as a parallel 30:57 – How to talk about Chinese attitudes toward tech without invoking Asiatic stereotypes 37:27 – Race, culture, and global capitalism A full transcript of this podcast is available on TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Andy: Stay True: a memoir by the New Yorker writer Hua Hsu and donating to abortion providers in states affected by the end of Roe v. Wade:, like Abortion Care for Tennessee, abortioncaretn.org Kaiser: The Danish political drama  Borgen on Netflix]]> Orientalism and why it's a poor fit for Asia today 10:41 – The "Asiatic racial form" and the notionally "positive" Asian stereotypes 13:58 – How Orientalism and the Asiatic racial form interact today and historically 23:50 – Conspiracies on China, and what's wrong with the Asiatic form 27:51 – Japan's rise as a parallel 30:57 – How to talk about Chinese attitudes toward tech without invoking Asiatic stereotypes 37:27 – Race, culture, and global capitalism A full transcript of this podcast is available on TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Andy: Stay True: a memoir by the New Yorker writer Hua Hsu and donating to abortion providers in states affected by the end of Roe v. Wade:, like Abortion Care for Tennessee, abortioncaretn.org Kaiser: The Danish political drama  Borgen on Netflix]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/sinica-scaled.jpg Historian Andrew Liu on COVID origins: Orientalism and the “Asiatic racial form” false no 0:00 No no Yale’s Jing Tsu on the characters who modernized Chinese characters https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/yales-jing-tsu-on-the-characters-who-modernized-chinese-characters/ Thu, 30 Jun 2022 21:35:16 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=228622 Kingdom of Characters: The Language Revolution that Made China Modern. Jing talks about her role as culture commentator for NBC during the 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing, about how the written Chinese language has helped shape China, and about the fascinating individuals who worked to bring a writing system so deeply rooted in history and tradition into the modern world. Link to Jing and Kaiser interviewed for the Radio Opensource Podcast here. 4:59 – Jing's role as cultural commentator for NBC during the Winter Games 10:43 – The impetus for writing Kingdom of Characters 16:09 – Why the critics of the Chinese writing system called for its destruction 18:57 – What the defenders of the Chinese writing system love so much about it 25:51 – The challenge of writing about the technology of Chinese writing 29:05 – The Chinese writing system as a metaphor for China 32:46 – The next technological frontiers for Chinese 35:48 – Language and how it shapes thinking in China A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Jing: Everything Everywhere All at Once Kaiser: The Pattern of the Chinese Past by Mark Elvin; and Closure/Continuation, a new album by the British progressive rock band Porcupine Tree.]]> Kingdom of Characters: The Language Revolution that Made China Modern. Jing talks about her role as culture commentator for NBC during the 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing, about how the written Chinese language has helped shape China, and about the fascinating individuals who worked to bring a writing system so deeply rooted in history and tradition into the modern world. Link to Jing and Kaiser interviewed for the Radio Opensource Podcast here. 4:59 – Jing's role as cultural commentator for NBC during the Winter Games 10:43 – The impetus for writing Kingdom of Characters 16:09 – Why the critics of the Chinese writing system called for its destruction 18:57 – What the defenders of the Chinese writing system love so much about it 25:51 – The challenge of writing about the technology of Chinese writing 29:05 – The Chinese writing system as a metaphor for China 32:46 – The next technological frontiers for Chinese 35:48 – Language and how it shapes thinking in China A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Jing: Everything Everywhere All at Once Kaiser: The Pattern of the Chinese Past by Mark Elvin; and Closure/Continuation, a new album by the British progressive rock band Porcupine Tree.]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/jingtsu-scaled.jpg Yale’s Jing Tsu on the characters who modernized Chinese characters false no 0:00 No no Taiwan: Saber rattling, salami slicing, and strategic ambiguity, with Shelley Rigger and Simona Grano https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/taiwan-saber-rattling-salami-slicing-and-strategic-ambiguity-with-shelley-rigger-and-simona-grano/ Thu, 16 Jun 2022 21:19:35 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=227398 A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Simona: Orphan of Asia, a novel by Wu Zhuoliu; and the show Orange is the New Black Shelley: Occupied, a Norwegian thriller series on Netflix Kaiser: Meizhong.report, a Chinese-language resource from the Carter Center's U.S.-China Perception Monitor, covering official, media, and social media commentary on U.S.-China relations]]> A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Simona: Orphan of Asia, a novel by Wu Zhuoliu; and the show Orange is the New Black Shelley: Occupied, a Norwegian thriller series on Netflix Kaiser: Meizhong.report, a Chinese-language resource from the Carter Center's U.S.-China Perception Monitor, covering official, media, and social media commentary on U.S.-China relations]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/sinica-6.16-scaled.jpg Taiwan: Saber rattling, salami slicing, and strategic ambiguity, with Shelley Rigger and Simona Grano false no 0:00 No no A Comprehensive Mirror: James Carter’s “This Week in China’s History” column marks two years https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/a-comprehensive-mirror-james-carters-this-week-in-chinas-history-column-marks-two-years/ Thu, 09 Jun 2022 21:01:36 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=227006 Champion's Day, is the author of one of the most widely-read columns that The China Project runs: This Week in China's History. In honor of two full years of contributions, with over 100 columns, Kaiser asked Jay to talk about his process, his purpose, and the challenges and the rewards of writing this excellent column. 6:34 – The origin story of the column, and its original intention 11:34 – How the hell does Jay do it week in and week out? 23:84 – Jay talks about Jonathan Spence and what it was like to study under him at Yale 31:32 – On the diversity of perspectives in the column 40:53 – How the column keeps Jay connected to academic work and intellectual life 43:35 – Threading the needle in deploying historical analogy, and right-sizing historical "rhymes" and patterns A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com Recommendations: Jay: The Broadway musical Hadestown; and the New York City Ballet Kaiser: The inaugural Sinologia Conference on June 10]]> Champion's Day, is the author of one of the most widely-read columns that The China Project runs: This Week in China's History. In honor of two full years of contributions, with over 100 columns, Kaiser asked Jay to talk about his process, his purpose, and the challenges and the rewards of writing this excellent column. 6:34 – The origin story of the column, and its original intention 11:34 – How the hell does Jay do it week in and week out? 23:84 – Jay talks about Jonathan Spence and what it was like to study under him at Yale 31:32 – On the diversity of perspectives in the column 40:53 – How the column keeps Jay connected to academic work and intellectual life 43:35 – Threading the needle in deploying historical analogy, and right-sizing historical "rhymes" and patterns A complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com Recommendations: Jay: The Broadway musical Hadestown; and the New York City Ballet Kaiser: The inaugural Sinologia Conference on June 10]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/jay-scaled.jpg A Comprehensive Mirror: James Carter’s “This Week in China’s History” column marks two years false no 0:00 No no Mental health under lockdown: A clinical psychologist in Shanghai https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/mental-health-under-lockdown-a-clinical-psychologist-in-shanghai/ Thu, 02 Jun 2022 21:00:51 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=226599 A full transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: George: How to Raise an Adult: Break Free of the Overparenting Trap and Prepare Your Kid For Success by Julie Lythcott-Haims Kaiser: Nicholas Confessore's series in the New York Times on Tucker Carlson, "American Nationalist"]]> A full transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: George: How to Raise an Adult: Break Free of the Overparenting Trap and Prepare Your Kid For Success by Julie Lythcott-Haims Kaiser: Nicholas Confessore's series in the New York Times on Tucker Carlson, "American Nationalist"]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/George-Hu.jpg Mental health under lockdown: A clinical psychologist in Shanghai false no 0:00 No no Covering the U.S.-China relations beat with the FT’s Demetri Sevastopulo https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/covering-the-u-s-china-relations-beat-with-the-fts-demetri-sevastopulo/ Thu, 26 May 2022 21:00:30 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=226349 Financial Times. They discuss some of Demetri's scoops, like the news that Vladimir Putin had requested military aid from Xi Jinping, leaked just before National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan's meeting in Switzerland with State Councillor Yang Jiechi and just three weeks after Russia's invasion; and the news that China had tested a hypersonic glide craft in October of last year. But the focus of the discussion is on the Biden administration's China policy and its Indo-Pacific Economic Framework — an Asia strategy that, by all accounts, has met with a tepid response in the region. 1:47 – How Demetri landed a beat as U.S.-China relations correspondent 5:24 – How the FT scooped the story on Putin's military assistance request to Xi Jinping in March 2022 12:05 – The Chinese hypersonic glidecraft 24:42 – The DC China policy scene: A dramatis personae 40:11 – The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework: all guns and no butter 52:54 – The Quad and AUKUS: American-led security arrangements A full transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com Recommendations Demetri: Gunpowder, an Irish gin from County Leitrim; and Roku, a Japanese whiskey by Suntori Kaiser: Chokepoint Capitalism: How Big Tech and Big Content Captured Creative Labor Markets and How We'll Win Them Back, a forthcoming book on how monopolies and monopsonies are ruining culture, by Rebecca Gilbin and Cory Doctorow]]> Financial Times. They discuss some of Demetri's scoops, like the news that Vladimir Putin had requested military aid from Xi Jinping, leaked just before National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan's meeting in Switzerland with State Councillor Yang Jiechi and just three weeks after Russia's invasion; and the news that China had tested a hypersonic glide craft in October of last year. But the focus of the discussion is on the Biden administration's China policy and its Indo-Pacific Economic Framework — an Asia strategy that, by all accounts, has met with a tepid response in the region. 1:47 – How Demetri landed a beat as U.S.-China relations correspondent 5:24 – How the FT scooped the story on Putin's military assistance request to Xi Jinping in March 2022 12:05 – The Chinese hypersonic glidecraft 24:42 – The DC China policy scene: A dramatis personae 40:11 – The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework: all guns and no butter 52:54 – The Quad and AUKUS: American-led security arrangements A full transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com Recommendations Demetri: Gunpowder, an Irish gin from County Leitrim; and Roku, a Japanese whiskey by Suntori Kaiser: Chokepoint Capitalism: How Big Tech and Big Content Captured Creative Labor Markets and How We'll Win Them Back, a forthcoming book on how monopolies and monopsonies are ruining culture, by Rebecca Gilbin and Cory Doctorow]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/demetri.jpg Covering the U.S.-China relations beat with the FT’s Demetri Sevastopulo false no 0:00 No no Too much of a good thing? Connectivity and the age of “unpeace,” with the ECFR’s Mark Leonard https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/too-much-of-a-good-thing-connectivity-and-the-age-of-unpeace-with-the-ecfrs-mark-leonard/ Thu, 19 May 2022 21:00:36 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=225916 The Age of Unpeace: How Connectivity Causes Conflict. Mark talks about how despite the bright promise that increasing connectedness — whether in trade, telecommunications, or movements of individuals — would usher in a world of better mutual understanding and enduring peace, the reality is that this connectedness has made the world more fractured and fractious. He explains how the three "empires of connectivity" — the U.S., China, and the EU — each leverage their extensive connectivity to advance their own interests. He also unpacks his assertion that the world is coming to share China's longstanding ambivalence toward connectedness. 1:05 – Kaiser tells how researching an abortive book project presaged Mark's conclusion that familiarity can breed contempt 7:58 – How Mark came to be a deep ambivalence about connectivity 16:03 – The three "empires of connectivity" and how they leverage or weaponize connectivity 31:41 – How all the connected empires are taking on "Chinese characteristics" 41:41 – How the Russo-Ukrainian War fits into Mark's framework in the book 51:49 – Chinese intellectuals and the shift in their thinking A full transcript of this interview is available on TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Mark: Chinese Hegemony: Grand Strategy and International Institutions in East Asian History by Zhang Feng Kaiser: "A Teacher in China Learns the Limits of Free Expression," the latest piece by Peter Hessler in The New Yorker; and the Israeli spy thriller Tehran on AppleTV.]]> The Age of Unpeace: How Connectivity Causes Conflict. Mark talks about how despite the bright promise that increasing connectedness — whether in trade, telecommunications, or movements of individuals — would usher in a world of better mutual understanding and enduring peace, the reality is that this connectedness has made the world more fractured and fractious. He explains how the three "empires of connectivity" — the U.S., China, and the EU — each leverage their extensive connectivity to advance their own interests. He also unpacks his assertion that the world is coming to share China's longstanding ambivalence toward connectedness. 1:05 – Kaiser tells how researching an abortive book project presaged Mark's conclusion that familiarity can breed contempt 7:58 – How Mark came to be a deep ambivalence about connectivity 16:03 – The three "empires of connectivity" and how they leverage or weaponize connectivity 31:41 – How all the connected empires are taking on "Chinese characteristics" 41:41 – How the Russo-Ukrainian War fits into Mark's framework in the book 51:49 – Chinese intellectuals and the shift in their thinking A full transcript of this interview is available on TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Mark: Chinese Hegemony: Grand Strategy and International Institutions in East Asian History by Zhang Feng Kaiser: "A Teacher in China Learns the Limits of Free Expression," the latest piece by Peter Hessler in The New Yorker; and the Israeli spy thriller Tehran on AppleTV.]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Mark-Leonard-scaled.jpg Too much of a good thing? Connectivity and the age of “unpeace,” with the ECFR’s Mark Leonard false no 0:00 No no The rise and fall of U.S.-China scientific collaboration, with Deborah Seligsohn https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/the-rise-and-fall-of-u-s-china-scientific-collaboration-with-deborah-seligsohn/ Thu, 12 May 2022 21:01:32 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=225511 A full transcript of this podcast is available on TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Deborah: A Buzzfeed story by Peter Aldous about the strange origins of the "lab-leak theory" in the right-wing of the animal rights activist community; and two podcasts — Bloomberg's Odd Lots podcast and the Brookings podcast by David Dollar, Dollar and Sense. Kaiser: The sci-fi thriller Severance on AppleTV.]]> A full transcript of this podcast is available on TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Deborah: A Buzzfeed story by Peter Aldous about the strange origins of the "lab-leak theory" in the right-wing of the animal rights activist community; and two podcasts — Bloomberg's Odd Lots podcast and the Brookings podcast by David Dollar, Dollar and Sense. Kaiser: The sci-fi thriller Severance on AppleTV.]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Deb-Photo.jpg The rise and fall of U.S.-China scientific collaboration, with Deborah Seligsohn false no 0:00 No no Chinese public opinion on the Russo-Ukrainian War, with Yawei Liu and Danielle Goldfarb https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/chinese-public-opinion-on-the-russo-ukrainian-war-with-yawei-liu-and-danielle-goldfarb/ Thu, 05 May 2022 21:01:45 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=225126 A transcript of this podcast is available on TheChinaProject.com Recommendations: Yawei: How China Loses: The Pushback Against Chinese Global Ambitions, by Luke Patey. Danielle: Invisible Women: Data Bias in a World Designed for Men by Caroline Criado Perez. Kaiser: Tokyo Vice: An American Reporter on the Police Beat in Japan by Jake Adelstein]]> A transcript of this podcast is available on TheChinaProject.com Recommendations: Yawei: How China Loses: The Pushback Against Chinese Global Ambitions, by Luke Patey. Danielle: Invisible Women: Data Bias in a World Designed for Men by Caroline Criado Perez. Kaiser: Tokyo Vice: An American Reporter on the Police Beat in Japan by Jake Adelstein]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/sinicaMay5-1.jpg Chinese public opinion on the Russo-Ukrainian War, with Yawei Liu and Danielle Goldfarb false no 0:00 No no China and India share a contested border and an uncomfortable neutrality in the Ukraine War — but not much else https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/china-and-india-share-a-contested-border-and-an-uncomfortable-neutrality-in-the-ukraine-war-but-not-much-else/ Thu, 28 Apr 2022 21:00:42 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=224769 A full transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com Recommendations: Manjari: Bridgerton on Netflix Manoj: The 1995 Bollywood film Dilwale Dulhania Le Jayenge Kaiser: The high school comedy Metal Lords on Netflix; and Matt Sheehan, "The Chinese Way Of Innovation: What Washington Can Learn From Beijing About Investing In Tech" in Foreign Affairs]]> A full transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com Recommendations: Manjari: Bridgerton on Netflix Manoj: The 1995 Bollywood film Dilwale Dulhania Le Jayenge Kaiser: The high school comedy Metal Lords on Netflix; and Matt Sheehan, "The Chinese Way Of Innovation: What Washington Can Learn From Beijing About Investing In Tech" in Foreign Affairs]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/sinica428.jpg China and India share a contested border and an uncomfortable neutrality in the Ukraine War — but not much else false no 0:00 No no China, Europe, and the Russo-Ukrainian War, with Marina Rudyak https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/china-europe-and-the-russo-ukrainian-war-with-marina-rudyak/ Thu, 21 Apr 2022 21:23:26 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=224442 A transcript of this interview is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Marina: Theory U: Leading from the Future as it Emerges, by Otto Scharmer Kaiser: Robert Draper, "This Was Trump Pulling a Putin," in the New York Times Magazine; Fiona Hill, There Is Nothing For You Here: Finding Opportunity in the Twenty-first Century; and Steven Johnson, "AI is Mastering Language. Should We Trust What it Says?" in the New York Times Magazine.]]> A transcript of this interview is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Marina: Theory U: Leading from the Future as it Emerges, by Otto Scharmer Kaiser: Robert Draper, "This Was Trump Pulling a Putin," in the New York Times Magazine; Fiona Hill, There Is Nothing For You Here: Finding Opportunity in the Twenty-first Century; and Steven Johnson, "AI is Mastering Language. Should We Trust What it Says?" in the New York Times Magazine.]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/MarinaLandscapeBW.jpg China, Europe, and the Russo-Ukrainian War, with Marina Rudyak false no 0:00 No no Inside the Shanghai lockdown, with The China Project’s own Chang Che https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/inside-the-shanghai-lockdown-with-supchinas-own-chang-che/ Thu, 14 Apr 2022 21:00:50 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=224038 A transcript of this podcast is available on TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Chang: Tokyo Vice on HBO Max Kaiser: The National Air and Space Museum Steven F. Udvar-Hazy Center in Chantilly, Virginia]]> A transcript of this podcast is available on TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Chang: Tokyo Vice on HBO Max Kaiser: The National Air and Space Museum Steven F. Udvar-Hazy Center in Chantilly, Virginia]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Screen-Shot-2022-04-14-at-2.58.11-PM.png Inside the Shanghai lockdown, with The China Project’s own Chang Che false no 0:00 No no Susan Thornton on the urgent need for diplomacy with China over the Russo-Ukraine war https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/susan-thornton-on-the-urgent-need-for-diplomacy-with-china-over-the-russo-ukraine-war/ Wed, 30 Mar 2022 21:56:59 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=223321 A full transcript of this interview is available on TheChinaProject.com Recommendations: Susan: Butter Lamp, a short film directed by Hu Wei, nominated for Best Live Action Short at the 87th Academy Awards Kaiser: Birria Tacos. Here's a good recipe! (These should come with a doctor's warning)      ]]> A full transcript of this interview is available on TheChinaProject.com Recommendations: Susan: Butter Lamp, a short film directed by Hu Wei, nominated for Best Live Action Short at the 87th Academy Awards Kaiser: Birria Tacos. Here's a good recipe! (These should come with a doctor's warning)      ]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/susanthornton-e1538766515392.webp Susan Thornton on the urgent need for diplomacy with China over the Russo-Ukraine war false no 0:00 No no Chinese international relations scholar Dingding Chen on Beijing’s position in the Russo-Ukrainian War https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/chinese-international-relations-scholar-dingding-chen-on-beijings-position-in-the-russo-ukrainian-war/ Wed, 23 Mar 2022 21:48:48 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=223030 A transcript of this interview is available on TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations Dingding: The late Ezra Vogel's Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China Kaiser: Kingdom of Characters: the Language Revolution That Made China Modern by Jing Tsu]]> A transcript of this interview is available on TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations Dingding: The late Ezra Vogel's Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China Kaiser: Kingdom of Characters: the Language Revolution That Made China Modern by Jing Tsu]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/637_1628574133.png Chinese international relations scholar Dingding Chen on Beijing’s position in the Russo-Ukrainian War false no 0:00 No no China’s soft power collides with the hard realities of the Russo-Ukrainian War: A conversation with Maria Repnikova https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/chinas-soft-power-collides-with-the-hard-realities-of-the-russo-ukrainian-war-a-conversation-with-maria-repnikova/ Wed, 16 Mar 2022 21:03:54 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=222569 This week on Sinica, Kaiser chats with Maria Repnikova, assistant professor of global communications at Georgia State University, who recently published a short book under the Cambridge Elements series called Chinese Soft Power. A native Russian speaker who also reads and speaks Chinese, Maria has been a keen observer of China's response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and offers her perspectives on Chinese media coverage of the war and the impact of China's pro-Russian tilt on Beijing's soft power ambitions. She recently co-authored a piece in The Atlantic arguing that China's apparent pro-Russian position is about one thing only: the United States and China's opposition to American unipolar hegemony.

    4:25 – Definitions of soft power: Joseph Nye's and China's 8:49 – The Chinese discourse on soft power: three major schools 14:09 – How talking about soft power allows the airing of hard truths 23:24 – Chinese soft power in the global South 37:49 – How badly has the Russo-Ukraine War eroded Chinese soft power? 41:44 – How Russian media has been talking about China since the invasion of Ukraine began 44:50 – Why China's pro-Russia lean is really all about America 54:40 – Is Russia's media style the future of Chinese media? On the "RTification" of Chinese media A full transcript of this podcast is available on TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Maria: Prototype Nation by Silvia Lindtner; and an anti-recommendation for the show Inventing Anna, which is streaming on Netflix Kaiser: Season 5 of the show The Last Kingdom; and the sequel to Vikings, called Vikings: Valhalla. Both are on Netflix.]]>
    This week on Sinica, Kaiser chats with Maria Repnikova, assistant professor of global communications at Georgia State University, who recently published a short book under the Cambridge Elements series called Chinese Soft Power. A native Russian speaker who also reads and speaks Chinese, Maria has been a keen observer of China's response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and offers her perspectives on Chinese media coverage of the war and the impact of China's pro-Russian tilt on Beijing's soft power ambitions. She recently co-authored a piece in The Atlantic arguing that China's apparent pro-Russian position is about one thing only: the United States and China's opposition to American unipolar hegemony.

    4:25 – Definitions of soft power: Joseph Nye's and China's 8:49 – The Chinese discourse on soft power: three major schools 14:09 – How talking about soft power allows the airing of hard truths 23:24 – Chinese soft power in the global South 37:49 – How badly has the Russo-Ukraine War eroded Chinese soft power? 41:44 – How Russian media has been talking about China since the invasion of Ukraine began 44:50 – Why China's pro-Russia lean is really all about America 54:40 – Is Russia's media style the future of Chinese media? On the "RTification" of Chinese media A full transcript of this podcast is available on TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Maria: Prototype Nation by Silvia Lindtner; and an anti-recommendation for the show Inventing Anna, which is streaming on Netflix Kaiser: Season 5 of the show The Last Kingdom; and the sequel to Vikings, called Vikings: Valhalla. Both are on Netflix.]]>
    https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/EPFBQ1tX0AEVRhN.jpeg China’s soft power collides with the hard realities of the Russo-Ukrainian War: A conversation with Maria Repnikova false no 0:00 No no
    China’s Ukraine conundrum, with Evan Feigenbaum https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/chinas-ukraine-conundrum-with-evan-feigenbaum/ Wed, 09 Mar 2022 22:06:30 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=222218 A transcript of this interview is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Evan: Summer Kitchens, a Ukrainian cookbook by Olia Hercules Kaiser: Fareed Zakaria on the Ezra Klein Show from March 4, 2022; and the new Steven Spielberg remake of West Side Story]]> A transcript of this interview is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Evan: Summer Kitchens, a Ukrainian cookbook by Olia Hercules Kaiser: Fareed Zakaria on the Ezra Klein Show from March 4, 2022; and the new Steven Spielberg remake of West Side Story]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/EvanFeigenbaum_highres-1-scaled.jpg China’s Ukraine conundrum, with Evan Feigenbaum false no 0:00 No no Biden’s China policy needs to be more than “Trump lite:” A conversation with Jeff Bader https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/bidens-china-policy-needs-to-be-more-than-trump-lite-a-conversation-with-jeff-bader/ Thu, 03 Mar 2022 22:05:05 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=221852 Obama and China’s Rise: An Insider’s Account of America’s Asia Strategy. In this conversation, he offers a candid critique of the Biden China policy to date. Note that this conversation was taped in mid-February — before the Russian invasion of Ukraine began, and before the Department of Justice announced the end of the "China Initiative." 3:23 – How viewing China over 40 years of rapid development has shaped the way Jeff thinks about China 8:54 – Jeff Bader's critique of the Biden administration's China policy 19:40 – Is it important to have a China strategy? 24:55 – Right-sizing China's ambitions: Is Rush Doshi right? 31:17 – Defining China's legitimate interests 38:31 – Has China already concluded that the U.S., irrespective of who is in power, seeks to thwart China's rise? 43:16 – How can China participate in the rules-based international order? 47:52 – Is it still possible for Biden to change his tune on China? 52:57 – How much room does Biden have politically? Can he exploit to electorate's partisan divide on China? 59:54 – What is the "low-hanging fruit" that Biden could pluck to signal a lowering of temperature? 1:12:09 – Jeff Bader's precepts for better understanding of — and better policy toward — China A transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com Recommendations Jeff: Autumn in the Heavenly Kingdom, a book by Stephen Platt about the Taiping Civil War focusing on Hong Rengan. Kaiser: Re-recommending two previous guests' recommendations: Iaian McGilchrists's The Master and his Emissary recommended by Anthea Roberts; and Unfabling the East: The Enlightenment's Encounter with Asia by Jurgen Osterhammel, recommended by Dan Wang.]]> Obama and China’s Rise: An Insider’s Account of America’s Asia Strategy. In this conversation, he offers a candid critique of the Biden China policy to date. Note that this conversation was taped in mid-February — before the Russian invasion of Ukraine began, and before the Department of Justice announced the end of the "China Initiative." 3:23 – How viewing China over 40 years of rapid development has shaped the way Jeff thinks about China 8:54 – Jeff Bader's critique of the Biden administration's China policy 19:40 – Is it important to have a China strategy? 24:55 – Right-sizing China's ambitions: Is Rush Doshi right? 31:17 – Defining China's legitimate interests 38:31 – Has China already concluded that the U.S., irrespective of who is in power, seeks to thwart China's rise? 43:16 – How can China participate in the rules-based international order? 47:52 – Is it still possible for Biden to change his tune on China? 52:57 – How much room does Biden have politically? Can he exploit to electorate's partisan divide on China? 59:54 – What is the "low-hanging fruit" that Biden could pluck to signal a lowering of temperature? 1:12:09 – Jeff Bader's precepts for better understanding of — and better policy toward — China A transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com Recommendations Jeff: Autumn in the Heavenly Kingdom, a book by Stephen Platt about the Taiping Civil War focusing on Hong Rengan. Kaiser: Re-recommending two previous guests' recommendations: Iaian McGilchrists's The Master and his Emissary recommended by Anthea Roberts; and Unfabling the East: The Enlightenment's Encounter with Asia by Jurgen Osterhammel, recommended by Dan Wang.]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/bidenchina.jpg Biden’s China policy needs to be more than “Trump lite:” A conversation with Jeff Bader false no 0:00 No no Veteran diplomat Bill Klein recalls the turbulent Trump years at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/veteran-diplomat-bill-klein-recalls-the-turbulent-trump-years-at-the-u-s-embassy-in-beijing/ Thu, 24 Feb 2022 22:27:18 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=220168 A transcript of this interview is available on TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Bill: Project Hail Mary, a science fiction novel by Andy Weir. Kaiser: "The Modern Chinese Novel," an online course available free on YouTube by Christopher Rea.]]> A transcript of this interview is available on TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Bill: Project Hail Mary, a science fiction novel by Andy Weir. Kaiser: "The Modern Chinese Novel," an online course available free on YouTube by Christopher Rea.]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Beijing_ART_koons_SOM_imageweb_944_1.jpeg Veteran diplomat Bill Klein recalls the turbulent Trump years at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing false no 0:00 No no What China is reading and why it matters: A conversation with author Megan Walsh https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/what-china-is-reading-and-why-it-matters-a-conversation-with-author-megan-walsh/ Thu, 17 Feb 2022 22:08:00 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=219062 The Subplot: What China Is Reading and Why It Matters. The book offers an accessible overview of China's literary scene, from better-known writers like Mò Yán 莫言 and Yán Liánkē 阎连科 to writers working in fiction genres like crime and sci-fi, and from migrant worker poets to the largely anonymous legions of writers churning out vast amounts of internet fiction. Megan talks about the burden of politics in the life of writers, the wild popularity of dānměi 耽美 (gay-male-themed web fiction), and the surprising streak of techno-optimism in Chinese science fiction. 7:09 – The long shadow of the May Fourth Movement 12:09 – Politics and the western gaze 17:51 – Why Yan Lianke is Megan's favorite Chinese writer 26:51 – The literary scene in Beijing in the 2000s 29:05 – China's ginormous and mostly terrible internet fiction industry 39:19 – What makes Chinese science fiction Chinese? A transcript of this interview is available on TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Megan: Yiyun Li's memoir, Dear Friend, from My Life I Write to You in Your Life; and the New Zealand singer-songwriter Aldous Harding Kaiser: The Audible Original epistolary audio drama When You Finish Saving the World by Jesse Eisenberg]]> The Subplot: What China Is Reading and Why It Matters. The book offers an accessible overview of China's literary scene, from better-known writers like Mò Yán 莫言 and Yán Liánkē 阎连科 to writers working in fiction genres like crime and sci-fi, and from migrant worker poets to the largely anonymous legions of writers churning out vast amounts of internet fiction. Megan talks about the burden of politics in the life of writers, the wild popularity of dānměi 耽美 (gay-male-themed web fiction), and the surprising streak of techno-optimism in Chinese science fiction. 7:09 – The long shadow of the May Fourth Movement 12:09 – Politics and the western gaze 17:51 – Why Yan Lianke is Megan's favorite Chinese writer 26:51 – The literary scene in Beijing in the 2000s 29:05 – China's ginormous and mostly terrible internet fiction industry 39:19 – What makes Chinese science fiction Chinese? A transcript of this interview is available on TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Megan: Yiyun Li's memoir, Dear Friend, from My Life I Write to You in Your Life; and the New Zealand singer-songwriter Aldous Harding Kaiser: The Audible Original epistolary audio drama When You Finish Saving the World by Jesse Eisenberg]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/91kDWsSJqCL-1-scaled.jpg What China is reading and why it matters: A conversation with author Megan Walsh false no 0:00 No no China’s ideological landscape, with Jason Wu https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/chinas-ideological-landscape-with-jason-wu/ Thu, 10 Feb 2022 22:40:53 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=218284 A transcript of this podcast is available on TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Jason: The campus novels Lucky Jim by Kingsley Amis and Straight Man by Richard Russo; and the two-person board game Twilight Struggle Kaiser: The Magic Mountain by Thomas Mann]]> A transcript of this podcast is available on TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Jason: The campus novels Lucky Jim by Kingsley Amis and Straight Man by Richard Russo; and the two-person board game Twilight Struggle Kaiser: The Magic Mountain by Thomas Mann]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/jason-wu-podcast.jpg China’s ideological landscape, with Jason Wu false no 0:00 No no Why the law matters in China, with Jeremy Daum of Yale’s Paul Tsai China Law Center https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/why-the-law-matters-in-china-with-jeremy-daum-of-yales-paul-tsai-china-law-center/ Thu, 03 Feb 2022 22:04:21 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=217975 A transcript of this interview is available on TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Jeremy: The Fixer, a novel by Bernard Malamud Kaiser: Going back to basics: Chinese stir-fry lessons on the YouTube channel "Chinese Cooking Demystified"]]> A transcript of this interview is available on TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Jeremy: The Fixer, a novel by Bernard Malamud Kaiser: Going back to basics: Chinese stir-fry lessons on the YouTube channel "Chinese Cooking Demystified"]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Re_publica_19_-_Day_1_47788945781-1.jpg Why the law matters in China, with Jeremy Daum of Yale’s Paul Tsai China Law Center false no 0:00 No no Personality and political discontent in China, with Rory Truex https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/personality-and-political-discontent-in-china-with-rory-truex/ Thu, 27 Jan 2022 22:21:17 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=217224 A transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Rory: The work of the Center for Security in Emerging Technology (CSET); and the Fan Brothers' oeuvre of children's books, including The Night Gardner and The Barnabus Project Kaiser: The immensely popular daily word game Wordle]]> A transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Rory: The work of the Center for Security in Emerging Technology (CSET); and the Fan Brothers' oeuvre of children's books, including The Night Gardner and The Barnabus Project Kaiser: The immensely popular daily word game Wordle]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/2ca0f1e8cd42b06de22188b2e30d4c5b.jpeg Personality and political discontent in China, with Rory Truex false no 0:00 No no Dan Wang on China in 2021: “Common prosperity,” cultural stunting, and shortcomings of the “modal China story” https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/dan-wang-on-china-in-2021-common-prosperity-cultural-stunting-and-shortcomings-of-the-modal-china-story/ Thu, 20 Jan 2022 22:01:02 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=216990 this year's annual letter. Dan's letters have become something of an institution: wide-ranging, insightful, and always contentious, his missives are read by a great many observers of contemporary China and spark some lively conversations. This year's letter contrasts the major megacities that Dan has lived in (Beijing, Shanghai, and the "Greater Bay Area" of the Pearl River Delta), examines Xi Jinping's efforts to shift the energies of China's technologists and entrepreneurs away from the consumer internet and toward deep tech, ponders the causes of China's "cultural stunting" and the challenges that China faces, and has not yet overcome, in creating cultural products that the rest of the world wants, and warns of the dangers of focusing only on China's weaknesses and problems and ignoring its prodigious capabilities. Tune in for a fascinating conversation with one of the Sinosphere's more original thinkers. 4:15 – Dan appraises Beijing, Shanghai, and the PRD Greater Bay Area 20:48 – How to think about the "common prosperity" agenda (a.k.a. the Red New Deal) 39:21 – The tradeoff between efficiency and resilience: China as an inefficient but anti-fragile economy 45:34 – Should the United States be learning from China? The case for reform of American institutions 50:38 – A technocratic resurgence in China? The rise of a "Beihang Clique" 58:17 – The causes of "cultural stunting" in China A transcript of this podcast is available on TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Dan: Charles Dickens, Bleak House, and Jurgen Osterhammel, Unfabling the East: The Enlightenment's Encounter with Asia Kaiser: Ritchie Robertson, The Enlightenment: The Pursuit of Happiness, 1680 to 1790]]> this year's annual letter. Dan's letters have become something of an institution: wide-ranging, insightful, and always contentious, his missives are read by a great many observers of contemporary China and spark some lively conversations. This year's letter contrasts the major megacities that Dan has lived in (Beijing, Shanghai, and the "Greater Bay Area" of the Pearl River Delta), examines Xi Jinping's efforts to shift the energies of China's technologists and entrepreneurs away from the consumer internet and toward deep tech, ponders the causes of China's "cultural stunting" and the challenges that China faces, and has not yet overcome, in creating cultural products that the rest of the world wants, and warns of the dangers of focusing only on China's weaknesses and problems and ignoring its prodigious capabilities. Tune in for a fascinating conversation with one of the Sinosphere's more original thinkers. 4:15 – Dan appraises Beijing, Shanghai, and the PRD Greater Bay Area 20:48 – How to think about the "common prosperity" agenda (a.k.a. the Red New Deal) 39:21 – The tradeoff between efficiency and resilience: China as an inefficient but anti-fragile economy 45:34 – Should the United States be learning from China? The case for reform of American institutions 50:38 – A technocratic resurgence in China? The rise of a "Beihang Clique" 58:17 – The causes of "cultural stunting" in China A transcript of this podcast is available on TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Dan: Charles Dickens, Bleak House, and Jurgen Osterhammel, Unfabling the East: The Enlightenment's Encounter with Asia Kaiser: Ritchie Robertson, The Enlightenment: The Pursuit of Happiness, 1680 to 1790]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/dan_wang2.jpg Dan Wang on China in 2021: “Common prosperity,” cultural stunting, and shortcomings of the “modal China story” false no 0:00 No no Mental models for understanding complexity, with Anthea Roberts and Nicolas Lamp https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/mental-models-for-understanding-complexity-with-anthea-roberts-and-nicolas-lamp/ Thu, 13 Jan 2022 22:04:40 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=216806 What we think about China depends in large measure on how we think about China. As a nation of 1.4 billion people in the throes of world-historic change, it's more important than ever to examine our own mental models when it comes to our understanding of China. This week on the Sinica Podcast, Kaiser kicks off an informal series on "thinking about thinking about China" with a conversation with Anthea Roberts and Nicolas Lamp, co-authors of the book Six Faces of Globalization: Who Wins, Who Loses, and Why it Matters. While the book focuses on globalization, in which China has been a central actor, it's really a book about ways to approach all complex issues — and will equip you with immensely useful ways to conceptualize any number of problems related to China. Kaiser calls the book "an upgrade to [his] mental operating system." Please enjoy this fascinating discussion with two brilliant scholars. 5:36 – What are the building blocks of a "narrative?" 8:08 – The six main narratives on globalization laid out 26:23 – The challenge of articulating problematic or objectionable narratives in good faith 53:54 – How China fits into the six "Western" narratives on globalization 56:55 – Chinese perspectives on globalization 1:11:58 – Different metaphors for integrative complexity 1:21:01 – Disciplines and training that prepare or predispose people toward complexity 1:24:33 – Name-checking the influences A transcript of this conversation is available on TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Anthea: The Master and His Emissary, by Ian McGilchrist Nicolas: The Once and Future Workerby Oren Cass; and the China Trade Monitor website, run by Simon Lester and Huan Zhu. Kaiser: "China's Reform Generation Adapts to Life in the Middle Class," by Peter Hessler Other Links: This episode mentions a great many books and authors. Here's a partial list! Isaiah Berlin, The Hedgehog and the Fox Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Slow and Fast Howard Gardner, Multiple Intelligences: New Horizons in Theory and Practice; and his memoir, A Synthesizing Mind Philip Tetlock and Dan Gardner, Superforecasting: The Art and Science of Prediction Jonathan Haidt, The Righteous Mind: Why Good People are Divided by Politics and Religion Paul Blustein, Schism: China, America, and the Fracturing of the Global Trading System Julia Galef, The Scout Mindset: Why Some People See Things Clearly and Others Don't David Epstein, Range: Why Generalists Triumph in a Specialized World C.P. Snow, The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution Edward O. Wilson, Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge George Lakoff, Moral Politics: How Liberals and Conservatives Think Gareth Morgan, Images of Organization]]> What we think about China depends in large measure on how we think about China. As a nation of 1.4 billion people in the throes of world-historic change, it's more important than ever to examine our own mental models when it comes to our understanding of China. This week on the Sinica Podcast, Kaiser kicks off an informal series on "thinking about thinking about China" with a conversation with Anthea Roberts and Nicolas Lamp, co-authors of the book Six Faces of Globalization: Who Wins, Who Loses, and Why it Matters. While the book focuses on globalization, in which China has been a central actor, it's really a book about ways to approach all complex issues — and will equip you with immensely useful ways to conceptualize any number of problems related to China. Kaiser calls the book "an upgrade to [his] mental operating system." Please enjoy this fascinating discussion with two brilliant scholars. 5:36 – What are the building blocks of a "narrative?" 8:08 – The six main narratives on globalization laid out 26:23 – The challenge of articulating problematic or objectionable narratives in good faith 53:54 – How China fits into the six "Western" narratives on globalization 56:55 – Chinese perspectives on globalization 1:11:58 – Different metaphors for integrative complexity 1:21:01 – Disciplines and training that prepare or predispose people toward complexity 1:24:33 – Name-checking the influences A transcript of this conversation is available on TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Anthea: The Master and His Emissary, by Ian McGilchrist Nicolas: The Once and Future Workerby Oren Cass; and the China Trade Monitor website, run by Simon Lester and Huan Zhu. Kaiser: "China's Reform Generation Adapts to Life in the Middle Class," by Peter Hessler Other Links: This episode mentions a great many books and authors. Here's a partial list! Isaiah Berlin, The Hedgehog and the Fox Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Slow and Fast Howard Gardner, Multiple Intelligences: New Horizons in Theory and Practice; and his memoir, A Synthesizing Mind Philip Tetlock and Dan Gardner, Superforecasting: The Art and Science of Prediction Jonathan Haidt, The Righteous Mind: Why Good People are Divided by Politics and Religion Paul Blustein, Schism: China, America, and the Fracturing of the Global Trading System Julia Galef, The Scout Mindset: Why Some People See Things Clearly and Others Don't David Epstein, Range: Why Generalists Triumph in a Specialized World C.P. Snow, The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution Edward O. Wilson, Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge George Lakoff, Moral Politics: How Liberals and Conservatives Think Gareth Morgan, Images of Organization]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Screen-Shot-2022-01-13-at-11.30.20-AM-1.jpg Mental models for understanding complexity, with Anthea Roberts and Nicolas Lamp false no 0:00 No no The sociologist watching the China-watchers: A conversation with David McCourt https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/the-sociologist-watching-the-china-watchers-a-conversation-with-david-mccourt/ Thu, 06 Jan 2022 22:13:41 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=216534 A transcript of this conversation is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations:  David: Gregoire Chamayou, The Ungovernable Society: A Genealogy of Authoritarian Liberalism Kaiser: The works of the great American political scientist Robert Jervis, who died on December 9, especially Perception and Misperception in International Politics and System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life]]> A transcript of this conversation is available at TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations:  David: Gregoire Chamayou, The Ungovernable Society: A Genealogy of Authoritarian Liberalism Kaiser: The works of the great American political scientist Robert Jervis, who died on December 9, especially Perception and Misperception in International Politics and System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Screen-Shot-2022-01-06-at-11.15.16-AM.png The sociologist watching the China-watchers: A conversation with David McCourt false no 0:00 No no Damien Ma of MacroPolo on China’s economic and political outlook https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/damien-ma-of-macropolo-on-chinas-economic-and-political-outlook/ Thu, 30 Dec 2021 22:06:19 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=216314 A transcript of this conversation is available on TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Damien: Derek Thompson, "America is Running on Fumes," in The Atlantic. Kaiser: Peter Jackson's epic Beatles documentary Get Back on Disney+]]> A transcript of this conversation is available on TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Damien: Derek Thompson, "America is Running on Fumes," in The Atlantic. Kaiser: Peter Jackson's epic Beatles documentary Get Back on Disney+]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/DamienMaBW.jpeg Damien Ma of MacroPolo on China’s economic and political outlook false no 0:00 No no The investigative team from MIT Technology Review that found major flaws with the DoJ’s China Initiative https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/the-investigative-team-from-mit-technology-review-that-found-major-flaws-with-the-dojs-china-initiative/ Thu, 23 Dec 2021 18:35:47 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=216120 A transcript of this podcast is available on TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Eileen: America for Beginners, a novel by Leah Franqui Jess: The Expanse, a science fiction series on Amazon Prime Kaiser: Cloud Cuckoo Land, a novel by Anthony Doerr]]> A transcript of this podcast is available on TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Eileen: America for Beginners, a novel by Leah Franqui Jess: The Expanse, a science fiction series on Amazon Prime Kaiser: Cloud Cuckoo Land, a novel by Anthony Doerr]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/chinainitiative.jpg The investigative team from MIT Technology Review that found major flaws with the DoJ’s China Initiative false no 0:00 No no FOCAC 2021 in Dakar, Senegal, and B3W — the U.S. counter to China’s BRI? https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/focac-2021-in-dakar-senegal-and-b3w-the-u-s-counter-to-chinas-bri/ Thu, 16 Dec 2021 22:10:14 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=215180 A transcript of this episode is available on TheChinaProject.com Recommendations: Jeremy: Political Pilgrims: Western Intellectuals in Search of the Good Society by Paul Hollander Anzetse:  Market Power and Role of the Private Sector by the China-Africa Business Council; and "Africa's economic transformation: the role of Chinese investment," by Linda Calabrese and Xiaoyang Tang Eric:  "Guānxì: Power, Networking, and Influence in China-Africa Relations," by Paul Nantulya Kaiser: Beware of Pity, a novel by Stefan Zweig]]> A transcript of this episode is available on TheChinaProject.com Recommendations: Jeremy: Political Pilgrims: Western Intellectuals in Search of the Good Society by Paul Hollander Anzetse:  Market Power and Role of the Private Sector by the China-Africa Business Council; and "Africa's economic transformation: the role of Chinese investment," by Linda Calabrese and Xiaoyang Tang Eric:  "Guānxì: Power, Networking, and Influence in China-Africa Relations," by Paul Nantulya Kaiser: Beware of Pity, a novel by Stefan Zweig]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/focac.jpeg FOCAC 2021 in Dakar, Senegal, and B3W — the U.S. counter to China’s BRI? false no 0:00 No no Sinica presents the best of China Stories 2021 https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/sinica-presents-the-best-of-china-stories-2021/ Thu, 09 Dec 2021 20:48:53 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=214788 Peter Hessler's last class, published in Sixth Tone, written by He Yujia, and read by Elyse Ribbons 25:07 – Luo Jialing, a.k.a. Liza Hardoon, and the height of global Shanghai, written by James Carter, published in The China Project, and read by John D. Van Fleet 37:22 – Qianlong Emperor: The worst poet in Chinese history?, written by Sun Jiahui, published in The World of Chinese, and read by Cliff Larsen 46:52 – Partners in profit, published by Week in China, and read by Sylvia Franke 52:36 – Shot heard round the world: China's Olympic return, written by Sam Davies, published in The World of Chinese, and read by Sarah Kutulakos 58:32 – China's culture wars, now playing on Bilibili, written by Shen Lu, published in Protocol China, and read by Kaiser Kuo 1:07:23 – I sacrificed 16 years to the mines, as told to Gushi FM in Chinese by Chen Nianxi, translated by Nathaniel J. Gan, published in The World of Chinese, and read by Elyse Ribbons 1:34:50 – Family values, excerpted from One Thousand Years of Joys and Sorrows, by Ai Weiwei, published in The Wire China, and read by Kaiser Kuo]]> Peter Hessler's last class, published in Sixth Tone, written by He Yujia, and read by Elyse Ribbons 25:07 – Luo Jialing, a.k.a. Liza Hardoon, and the height of global Shanghai, written by James Carter, published in The China Project, and read by John D. Van Fleet 37:22 – Qianlong Emperor: The worst poet in Chinese history?, written by Sun Jiahui, published in The World of Chinese, and read by Cliff Larsen 46:52 – Partners in profit, published by Week in China, and read by Sylvia Franke 52:36 – Shot heard round the world: China's Olympic return, written by Sam Davies, published in The World of Chinese, and read by Sarah Kutulakos 58:32 – China's culture wars, now playing on Bilibili, written by Shen Lu, published in Protocol China, and read by Kaiser Kuo 1:07:23 – I sacrificed 16 years to the mines, as told to Gushi FM in Chinese by Chen Nianxi, translated by Nathaniel J. Gan, published in The World of Chinese, and read by Elyse Ribbons 1:34:50 – Family values, excerpted from One Thousand Years of Joys and Sorrows, by Ai Weiwei, published in The Wire China, and read by Kaiser Kuo]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/chinastories.jpg Sinica presents the best of China Stories 2021 false no 0:00 No no Revisiting the Red New Deal, with Lizzi Lee and Jude Blanchette (live at NEXTChina 2021) https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/revisiting-the-red-new-deal-with-lizzi-lee-and-jude-blanchette-live-at-nextchina-2021/ Thu, 02 Dec 2021 23:36:25 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=214350 NEXTChina 2021 conference on November 10-11. Don't miss this one! 3:53 – A reappraisal and clarification of the Red New Deal 9:02 – Kaiser's hypothesis about why Xi Jinping is pushing such far-reaching changes now 10:29 – Lizzi Lee offers her take on the timing 14:41 – Jude on why "Red New Deal" doesn't quite go far enough in describing the changes afoot 18:50 – Lizzi on the dangers of bursting the real estate bubble 27:26 – Has Xi Jinping left any off-ramps? A transcript of this episode is available at TheChinaProject.com.]]> NEXTChina 2021 conference on November 10-11. Don't miss this one! 3:53 – A reappraisal and clarification of the Red New Deal 9:02 – Kaiser's hypothesis about why Xi Jinping is pushing such far-reaching changes now 10:29 – Lizzi Lee offers her take on the timing 14:41 – Jude on why "Red New Deal" doesn't quite go far enough in describing the changes afoot 18:50 – Lizzi on the dangers of bursting the real estate bubble 27:26 – Has Xi Jinping left any off-ramps? A transcript of this episode is available at TheChinaProject.com.]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/xi-jinping-unstoppable.jpg Revisiting the Red New Deal, with Lizzi Lee and Jude Blanchette (live at NEXTChina 2021) false no 0:00 No no The Carter Center’s survey on Chinese perception, with Yawei Liu and Michael Cerny https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/the-carter-centers-survey-on-chinese-perception-with-yawei-liu-and-michael-cerny/ Fri, 26 Nov 2021 00:23:13 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=214210 A transcript of this interview is available at TheChinaProject.com Recommendations: Michael: Freakonomics by Steven Levitt and Stephen Dubner; and Causal Inference: The Mixtape by Scott Cunningham Yawei: How the Red Sun Rose by Gao Hua;, translated by Stacey Mosher; and The Battle of Chosin, a documentary film from PBS Kaiser: Y: The Last Man, a post-apocalyptic TV show from FX, available on Hulu]]> A transcript of this interview is available at TheChinaProject.com Recommendations: Michael: Freakonomics by Steven Levitt and Stephen Dubner; and Causal Inference: The Mixtape by Scott Cunningham Yawei: How the Red Sun Rose by Gao Hua;, translated by Stacey Mosher; and The Battle of Chosin, a documentary film from PBS Kaiser: Y: The Last Man, a post-apocalyptic TV show from FX, available on Hulu]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Screen-Shot-2021-11-25-at-12.34.34-PM-1.png The Carter Center’s survey on Chinese perception, with Yawei Liu and Michael Cerny false no 0:00 No no Peter Hessler live at the NEXTChina 2021 Conference in New York https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/peter-hessler-live-at-the-nextchina-2021-conference-in-new-york/ Thu, 18 Nov 2021 22:00:58 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=213401 The New Yorker — despite earlier criticism that his coverage of China's COVID-19 response had been too favorable to Beijing. Pete joins Kaiser and Jeremy to discuss his latest book, The Buried: An Archaeology of the Egyptian Revolution, his approach to writing on China, his interactions with his students, and the real reasons for his departure from China. 3:18 – How Egypt sheds light on China 7:00 – Language-learning as a device in Pete Hessler's writing 9:50 – How Pete kept in touch with over 100 students from Fuling — the making of a longitudinal cohort study 18:33 – How Pete is viewed in China vs. in Egypt 25:10 – Pete's writing on Chinese entrepreneurship 29:02 – Why Pete & Leslie moved to Chengdu — and why they had to leave A transcript of this podcast is available on TheChinaProject.com.]]> The New Yorker — despite earlier criticism that his coverage of China's COVID-19 response had been too favorable to Beijing. Pete joins Kaiser and Jeremy to discuss his latest book, The Buried: An Archaeology of the Egyptian Revolution, his approach to writing on China, his interactions with his students, and the real reasons for his departure from China. 3:18 – How Egypt sheds light on China 7:00 – Language-learning as a device in Pete Hessler's writing 9:50 – How Pete kept in touch with over 100 students from Fuling — the making of a longitudinal cohort study 18:33 – How Pete is viewed in China vs. in Egypt 25:10 – Pete's writing on Chinese entrepreneurship 29:02 – Why Pete & Leslie moved to Chengdu — and why they had to leave A transcript of this podcast is available on TheChinaProject.com.]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/IMG_7064-1-scaled.jpg Peter Hessler live at the NEXTChina 2021 Conference in New York false no 0:00 No no Psychologist George Hu of the United Family Mental Health Network on mental health in China https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/psychologist-george-hu-of-the-united-family-mental-health-network-on-mental-health-in-china/ Thu, 11 Nov 2021 16:23:19 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=213190 A transcript of this interview is available on TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Jeremy: Entangled LifeHow Fungi Make Our Worlds, Change Our Minds & Shape Our Futures by Merlin Sheldrake George: Crazy Like Us: The Globalization of the American Psyche by Ethan Watters Kaiser: Awakening from Dukkha from the Inner Mongolian band Nine Treasures]]> A transcript of this interview is available on TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Jeremy: Entangled LifeHow Fungi Make Our Worlds, Change Our Minds & Shape Our Futures by Merlin Sheldrake George: Crazy Like Us: The Globalization of the American Psyche by Ethan Watters Kaiser: Awakening from Dukkha from the Inner Mongolian band Nine Treasures]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/china-gaokao.jpg Psychologist George Hu of the United Family Mental Health Network on mental health in China false no 0:00 No no The worldview of Wang Huning, the Party’s leading theoretician https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/the-worldview-of-wang-huning-the-partys-leading-theoretician/ Thu, 04 Nov 2021 21:10:59 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=212568 America Against America 31:04 – Wang Huning's concepts of cultural security and cultural sovereignty 46:36 – Wang and Document Number Nine 55:39 – Chinese conceptions of democracy A transcript of this podcast is available on TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Matt: The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control by Karl Deutsch; and The Logic of Images in International Relations by Robert Jervis. Joe: Now that more Americans recognize that China is not becoming "more like us," they need a deeper understanding of China, and not one just rooted in hostility and militarism. Tim: In Memory of Memory by Maria Stepanova. Kaiser: River of Stars by Guy Gavriel Kay]]> America Against America 31:04 – Wang Huning's concepts of cultural security and cultural sovereignty 46:36 – Wang and Document Number Nine 55:39 – Chinese conceptions of democracy A transcript of this podcast is available on TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Matt: The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control by Karl Deutsch; and The Logic of Images in International Relations by Robert Jervis. Joe: Now that more Americans recognize that China is not becoming "more like us," they need a deeper understanding of China, and not one just rooted in hostility and militarism. Tim: In Memory of Memory by Maria Stepanova. Kaiser: River of Stars by Guy Gavriel Kay]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/xi-jinping-wang-huning.jpg The worldview of Wang Huning, the Party’s leading theoretician false no 0:00 No no Bonus Episode: Introducing the China Sports Insider Podcast! https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/bonus-episode-introducing-the-china-sports-insider-podcast/ Thu, 04 Nov 2021 21:05:33 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=212557 Dan Wolken. He's covered four Olympics, and he's coming to Beijing. What does he make of the playbook? (19:06) And we end with the saga of China's men’s national ice hockey team. Their story is getting a lot of attention from foreign media. At the Olympic tournament they'll be in a group with Canada, USA, and Germany, and there's a real chance they’ll get blown out. How did we get here? What’s the way out? (41:06) Update: Since we recorded this, the IIHF has announced that China will not be kicked out of the Olympic tournament. For more stories read China Sports Insider Find Mark Dreyer on Twitter Find Haig Balian on Twitter Learn about the Olympic playbooks]]> Dan Wolken. He's covered four Olympics, and he's coming to Beijing. What does he make of the playbook? (19:06) And we end with the saga of China's men’s national ice hockey team. Their story is getting a lot of attention from foreign media. At the Olympic tournament they'll be in a group with Canada, USA, and Germany, and there's a real chance they’ll get blown out. How did we get here? What’s the way out? (41:06) Update: Since we recorded this, the IIHF has announced that China will not be kicked out of the Olympic tournament. For more stories read China Sports Insider Find Mark Dreyer on Twitter Find Haig Balian on Twitter Learn about the Olympic playbooks]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/CSI1-2-scaled.jpg Bonus Episode: Introducing the China Sports Insider Podcast! false no 0:00 No no It’s Complicated: Getting our heads around a changing China https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/its-complicated-getting-our-heads-around-a-changing-china/ Thu, 28 Oct 2021 21:08:47 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=212222 A transcript of this episode is available on TheChinaProject.com.]]> A transcript of this episode is available on TheChinaProject.com.]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/CTH-program-page_3.png It’s Complicated: Getting our heads around a changing China false no 0:00 No no Did tariffs make a difference in Trump’s trade war? https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/did-tariffs-make-a-difference-in-trumps-trade-war/ Thu, 21 Oct 2021 21:01:35 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=211897 “Political Risk and Firm Exit: Evidence from the US-China Trade War.” They share their findings and explore the paper’s policy implications. 4:16 – Sam and Jack offer their thoughts on U.S. Trade Representative Ambassador Katherine Tai’s recent speech on U.S.-China trade 10:05 – Distinguishing between tariffs and other aspects of the trade war 13:46 – Previously, on the U.S.-China Trade War: a brief recap of the trade war to date 18:35 – The Foreign Invested Enterprises in China dataset 23:14 – A summary of the paper’s findings: tariffs did not increase the likelihood of firms exiting 47:15 – What explains the relative reticence of affected firms when it comes to voicing opposition to tariffs? 55:36 – What would you tell Katherine Tai and Gina Raimondo if they were your captive audience? A transcript of this interview is available on TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Sam: The podcast Invisibilia, and specifically, a recent episode called “International Friend of Mystery.” Jack: The Masters of Chinese Economics and Political Affairs (MCEPA) degree program at UC San Diego's School of Global Policy and Strategy, and Amitav Ghosh’s River of Smoke (part of the Ibis series). Kaiser: A Song for Arbonne, a semi-historical fantasy novel by Guy Gavriel Kay.]]> “Political Risk and Firm Exit: Evidence from the US-China Trade War.” They share their findings and explore the paper’s policy implications. 4:16 – Sam and Jack offer their thoughts on U.S. Trade Representative Ambassador Katherine Tai’s recent speech on U.S.-China trade 10:05 – Distinguishing between tariffs and other aspects of the trade war 13:46 – Previously, on the U.S.-China Trade War: a brief recap of the trade war to date 18:35 – The Foreign Invested Enterprises in China dataset 23:14 – A summary of the paper’s findings: tariffs did not increase the likelihood of firms exiting 47:15 – What explains the relative reticence of affected firms when it comes to voicing opposition to tariffs? 55:36 – What would you tell Katherine Tai and Gina Raimondo if they were your captive audience? A transcript of this interview is available on TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Sam: The podcast Invisibilia, and specifically, a recent episode called “International Friend of Mystery.” Jack: The Masters of Chinese Economics and Political Affairs (MCEPA) degree program at UC San Diego's School of Global Policy and Strategy, and Amitav Ghosh’s River of Smoke (part of the Ibis series). Kaiser: A Song for Arbonne, a semi-historical fantasy novel by Guy Gavriel Kay.]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/us-china-trade.jpg Did tariffs make a difference in Trump’s trade war? false no 0:00 No no How Taiwan propelled China’s economic rise, with Shelley Rigger https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/how-taiwan-propelled-chinas-economic-rise-with-shelley-rigger/ Thu, 14 Oct 2021 21:18:51 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=211578 A transcript of this interview is available on TheChinaProject.com   Recommendations:  Shelley: Giri/Haji, a joint BBC-Japanese crime drama on Netflix. Kaiser: Jonathan Franzen’s new novel, Crossroads]]> A transcript of this interview is available on TheChinaProject.com   Recommendations:  Shelley: Giri/Haji, a joint BBC-Japanese crime drama on Netflix. Kaiser: Jonathan Franzen’s new novel, Crossroads]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/maxresdefault2.jpg How Taiwan propelled China’s economic rise, with Shelley Rigger false no 0:00 No no Can China meet its ambitious emissions targets? https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/can-china-meet-its-ambitious-emissions-targets/ Thu, 07 Oct 2021 21:12:23 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=211289 A transcript of this interview is available on TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Michael: The Chair, a Netflix show starring Sandra Oh. Kaiser: Bewilderment, the new novel by the Pulitzer Prize-winning author of The Overstory, Richard Powers Mentioned in the show: Valerie Karplus’s paper on China’s ETS; New York Times Magazine piece on The Many Saints of Newark, a Sopranos prequel.]]> A transcript of this interview is available on TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Michael: The Chair, a Netflix show starring Sandra Oh. Kaiser: Bewilderment, the new novel by the Pulitzer Prize-winning author of The Overstory, Richard Powers Mentioned in the show: Valerie Karplus’s paper on China’s ETS; New York Times Magazine piece on The Many Saints of Newark, a Sopranos prequel.]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/china-emissions-smokestacks-reuters.jpg Can China meet its ambitious emissions targets? false no 0:00 No no How the Chinese state handles labor unrest, with Manfred Elfstrom https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/how-the-chinese-state-handles-labor-unrest-with-manfred-elfstrom/ Thu, 30 Sep 2021 22:35:52 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=210999 A transcript of this interview is available on TheChinaProject.com Recommendations: Manfred: Elizabeth Perry’s book Anyuan: Mining China’s Revolutionary Tradition; and James Green’s The Devil Is Here in These Hills: West Virginia’s Coal Miners and their Battle for Freedom. Kaiser: The Ezra Klein Show, and particularly the episode featuring Adam Tooze, “Economics Needs to Reckon with What it Doesn’t Know.” ]]> A transcript of this interview is available on TheChinaProject.com Recommendations: Manfred: Elizabeth Perry’s book Anyuan: Mining China’s Revolutionary Tradition; and James Green’s The Devil Is Here in These Hills: West Virginia’s Coal Miners and their Battle for Freedom. Kaiser: The Ezra Klein Show, and particularly the episode featuring Adam Tooze, “Economics Needs to Reckon with What it Doesn’t Know.” ]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/ELFSTROM-cover-737e269a.jpeg How the Chinese state handles labor unrest, with Manfred Elfstrom false no 0:00 No no The benefits of engagement with China, defined: An audit of the S&ED https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/the-benefits-of-engagement-with-china-defined-an-audit-of-the-sed/ Thu, 23 Sep 2021 21:07:31 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=210684 A transcript of this interview is available on TheChinaProject.com.  Recommendations: Rorry: The Good Place (a TV show by Michael Schur) and the eponymous podcast hosted by Tara Brach. Dan: Silence: The Power of Quiet in a World Full of Noise, by Thich Nhat Hanh, and The China Hustle, a documentary on China-focused short sellers, by Jed Rothstein. Susan: The Incredible Dr. Pol, a reality show about a veterinarian on National Geographic; Hidden Forces, a podcast hosted by Demetri Kofinas; and China and Japan: Facing History, the last book by the great scholar Ezra Vogel. Kaiser: Wildland: The Making of America’s Fury, by Evan Osnos, especially in audiobook form, read by the author, and Grand Tamasha, a podcast about current affairs in India, hosted by Milan Vaishnav. ]]> A transcript of this interview is available on TheChinaProject.com.  Recommendations: Rorry: The Good Place (a TV show by Michael Schur) and the eponymous podcast hosted by Tara Brach. Dan: Silence: The Power of Quiet in a World Full of Noise, by Thich Nhat Hanh, and The China Hustle, a documentary on China-focused short sellers, by Jed Rothstein. Susan: The Incredible Dr. Pol, a reality show about a veterinarian on National Geographic; Hidden Forces, a podcast hosted by Demetri Kofinas; and China and Japan: Facing History, the last book by the great scholar Ezra Vogel. Kaiser: Wildland: The Making of America’s Fury, by Evan Osnos, especially in audiobook form, read by the author, and Grand Tamasha, a podcast about current affairs in India, hosted by Milan Vaishnav. ]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/SED_5-25-10_4644657761.jpeg The benefits of engagement with China, defined: An audit of the S&ED false no 0:00 No no What’s the deal with the Red New Deal? https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/whats-the-deal-with-the-red-new-deal/ Thu, 16 Sep 2021 20:05:59 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=210404 Chinese-language YouTube channel Wall Street Today, and Jude Blanchette, Freeman Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), to talk about the spate of regulatory actions, new rules, and Party-led initiatives that, taken together, we at The China Project have started calling the “Red New Deal.” Can these be understood as different facets of a larger, overarching program to remake China’s economy and society? Or are they better understood as distinct moves by different bureaucracies within the Party-state that happen to coincide in time? Listen in as we try to sort through what it all means. 11:42 - Lizzi’s contrarian take on whether the new regulation adds up to something bigger 15:00 - The logic of the political calendar in China 22:56 - What did the response to the Li Guangman viral post mean? 33:14 - Kevin Rudd’s take on what it all means – the “red thread” 43:32 - No, this isn’t the Cultural Revolution 53:00 - Is this a return to true communism? 57:34 - Is Xi Jinping China’s biggest tiger mom? A transcript of this interview is available on TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations Jeremy: NüVoices Podcast: Barabara Demick on Eat the Buddha, the final NüVoices episode on The China Project; and the Vice video on YouTube, How China's Queer Youth Built An Underground Ballroom Scene. Lizzi: Desmond Shum’s book Red Roulette: An Insider's Story of Wealth, Power, Corruption, and Vengeance in Today's China. Jude: The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System by Milovan Djilas. Kaiser: Shutdown: How COVID Shook the World Economy by Adam Tooze; Reservation Dogs (TV show from FX).]]> Chinese-language YouTube channel Wall Street Today, and Jude Blanchette, Freeman Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), to talk about the spate of regulatory actions, new rules, and Party-led initiatives that, taken together, we at The China Project have started calling the “Red New Deal.” Can these be understood as different facets of a larger, overarching program to remake China’s economy and society? Or are they better understood as distinct moves by different bureaucracies within the Party-state that happen to coincide in time? Listen in as we try to sort through what it all means. 11:42 - Lizzi’s contrarian take on whether the new regulation adds up to something bigger 15:00 - The logic of the political calendar in China 22:56 - What did the response to the Li Guangman viral post mean? 33:14 - Kevin Rudd’s take on what it all means – the “red thread” 43:32 - No, this isn’t the Cultural Revolution 53:00 - Is this a return to true communism? 57:34 - Is Xi Jinping China’s biggest tiger mom? A transcript of this interview is available on TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations Jeremy: NüVoices Podcast: Barabara Demick on Eat the Buddha, the final NüVoices episode on The China Project; and the Vice video on YouTube, How China's Queer Youth Built An Underground Ballroom Scene. Lizzi: Desmond Shum’s book Red Roulette: An Insider's Story of Wealth, Power, Corruption, and Vengeance in Today's China. Jude: The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System by Milovan Djilas. Kaiser: Shutdown: How COVID Shook the World Economy by Adam Tooze; Reservation Dogs (TV show from FX).]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/1310038461_16251555879631n.jpeg What’s the deal with the Red New Deal? false no 0:00 No no The state of the field: U.S. China programs, with Rosie Levine and Jan Berris of the NCUSCR https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/the-state-of-the-field-u-s-china-programs-with-rosie-levine-and-jan-berris-of-the-ncuscr/ Thu, 09 Sep 2021 18:05:52 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=210126 A transcript of this interview is available on TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations Jan: Going back to summer camp, going off the grid, and re-reading Hemingway Rosie: "Why does it cost so much to build thins in America?" from Vox; a Freakomics interview with Pete Buttigieg and Elaine Chao, the current and former Secretaries of Transportation. Kaiser: Ezra Klein's recent interview with Robert Wright on Afghanistan, China, and U.S. foreign policy; and the 1975 Steven Spielberg film Jaws, which is the favorite film of Jude Blanchette, interviewed recently in The Wire China.  ]]> A transcript of this interview is available on TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations Jan: Going back to summer camp, going off the grid, and re-reading Hemingway Rosie: "Why does it cost so much to build thins in America?" from Vox; a Freakomics interview with Pete Buttigieg and Elaine Chao, the current and former Secretaries of Transportation. Kaiser: Ezra Klein's recent interview with Robert Wright on Afghanistan, China, and U.S. foreign policy; and the 1975 Steven Spielberg film Jaws, which is the favorite film of Jude Blanchette, interviewed recently in The Wire China.  ]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Logo-NCUSCR-red.jpeg The state of the field: U.S. China programs, with Rosie Levine and Jan Berris of the NCUSCR false no 0:00 No no The paradox of vast corruption and fast growth in China’s “Gilded Age” https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/the-paradox-of-vast-corruption-and-fast-growth-in-chinas-gilded-age/ Thu, 02 Sep 2021 16:20:36 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=209949 A transcript of this interview is available on TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations Yuen Yuen: The documentary film Generation Wealth.  Kaiser: The Netflix miniseries The Chair  and the podcast Chinese Whispers by Cindy Yu.  ]]> A transcript of this interview is available on TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations Yuen Yuen: The documentary film Generation Wealth.  Kaiser: The Netflix miniseries The Chair  and the podcast Chinese Whispers by Cindy Yu.  ]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/EbYENISXgAA4Uj2.jpeg The paradox of vast corruption and fast growth in China’s “Gilded Age” false no 0:00 No no Harvard’s William Overholt on Esquel, cotton sanctions, and forced Uyghur labor https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/harvards-william-overholt-on-esquel-cotton-sanctions-and-forced-uyghor-labor/ Thu, 26 Aug 2021 14:00:32 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=209725 William (Bill) Overholt, senior research fellow at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government and a veteran China-watcher whose career has run the gamut from investment banking to academia to the leading think tanks. Bill recently weighed in on the U.S. Department of Commerce’s decision to place Esquel, a leading textile manufacturer headquartered in Hong Kong, on its entity list of companies alleged to be using forced labor from Xinjiang, lamenting that “it’s quite possible that the U.S. government has imposed sanctions on the world’s most socially responsible company and one that has been particularly beneficial to the Uyghurs.” Bill also discusses recent essays on other problems in American China policy. 7:17: First impressions of Esquel, its technology, and its working conditions for Uyghurs 21:47: Targeted sanctions vs. blanket sanctions 35:06: Lack of China expertise in the highest ranks of the Biden administration’s foreign policy team 44:43: Why the United States should return to an economic strategy A transcript of this episode is available on TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Bill: Newsletters and podcasts from The China Project; articles from The Wire China; and the article “The Chinese Debt Trap is a Myth” published in The Atlantic, by Deborah Brautigam and Meg Rithmire. Kaiser: The novel The Lions of al-Rassan, by Guy Gavriel Kay.]]> William (Bill) Overholt, senior research fellow at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government and a veteran China-watcher whose career has run the gamut from investment banking to academia to the leading think tanks. Bill recently weighed in on the U.S. Department of Commerce’s decision to place Esquel, a leading textile manufacturer headquartered in Hong Kong, on its entity list of companies alleged to be using forced labor from Xinjiang, lamenting that “it’s quite possible that the U.S. government has imposed sanctions on the world’s most socially responsible company and one that has been particularly beneficial to the Uyghurs.” Bill also discusses recent essays on other problems in American China policy. 7:17: First impressions of Esquel, its technology, and its working conditions for Uyghurs 21:47: Targeted sanctions vs. blanket sanctions 35:06: Lack of China expertise in the highest ranks of the Biden administration’s foreign policy team 44:43: Why the United States should return to an economic strategy A transcript of this episode is available on TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Bill: Newsletters and podcasts from The China Project; articles from The Wire China; and the article “The Chinese Debt Trap is a Myth” published in The Atlantic, by Deborah Brautigam and Meg Rithmire. Kaiser: The novel The Lions of al-Rassan, by Guy Gavriel Kay.]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/Esquel-2-scaled.jpeg Harvard’s William Overholt on Esquel, cotton sanctions, and forced Uyghur labor false no 0:00 No no Historian Adam Tooze on why China’s modern history should matter to Americans https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/historian-adam-tooze-on-why-chinas-modern-history-should-matter-to-americans/ Thu, 19 Aug 2021 14:00:32 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=209501 A transcript of this episode is available on TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Adam: Stalingrad, by Vasily Grossman. Kaiser: The Spanish-language television series The Legend of El Cid.]]> A transcript of this episode is available on TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Adam: Stalingrad, by Vasily Grossman. Kaiser: The Spanish-language television series The Legend of El Cid.]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/Screen-Shot-2021-08-19-at-12.38.26-PM.png Historian Adam Tooze on why China’s modern history should matter to Americans false no 0:00 No no Peter Martin on ‘China’s Civilian Army: The Making of Wolf Warrior Diplomacy’ https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/peter-martin-on-chinas-civilian-army-the-making-of-wolf-warrior-diplomacy/ Thu, 12 Aug 2021 14:00:32 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=209268 China’s Civilian Army: The Making of Wolf Warrior Diplomacy. This highly readable and informative book tells the story of China’s diplomatic corps from its creation ex nihilo under the guidance of Zhōu Ēnlái 周恩来 during the Communist Party’s years in Yan’an in the 1930s and 1940s through the foundation of the P.R.C., the vicissitudes of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, and the period of reform and opening up to the current, more assertive, and often pugilistic present under Xí Jìnpíng 习近平. Peter also offers his take on last week’s interview on Sinica with Ambassador Huáng Píng 黄屏, the consul general of China’s New York consulate. 7:48: The centrality of the national humiliation narrative to the institutional foundations of China’s Foreign Ministry 15:02: The contributions and diplomatic styles of prominent contemporaries such as Qián Qíchēn 钱其琛, Dài Bǐngguó 戴秉国, Yáng Jiéchí 杨洁篪, and Wáng Yì 王毅 24:46: The rise of Foreign Ministry Spokesman Zhào Lìjiān 赵立坚 47:28: Understanding Chinese diplomacy’s hard turn amidst a culture of discipline A transcript of this episode is available on TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations:  Jeremy: Hummingbird feeders with homemade sugar water nectar. Peter: The podcast series Dolly Parton's America.  Kaiser: The movie The Green Knight, based on the Arthurian legend, directed by David Lowery. ]]> China’s Civilian Army: The Making of Wolf Warrior Diplomacy. This highly readable and informative book tells the story of China’s diplomatic corps from its creation ex nihilo under the guidance of Zhōu Ēnlái 周恩来 during the Communist Party’s years in Yan’an in the 1930s and 1940s through the foundation of the P.R.C., the vicissitudes of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, and the period of reform and opening up to the current, more assertive, and often pugilistic present under Xí Jìnpíng 习近平. Peter also offers his take on last week’s interview on Sinica with Ambassador Huáng Píng 黄屏, the consul general of China’s New York consulate. 7:48: The centrality of the national humiliation narrative to the institutional foundations of China’s Foreign Ministry 15:02: The contributions and diplomatic styles of prominent contemporaries such as Qián Qíchēn 钱其琛, Dài Bǐngguó 戴秉国, Yáng Jiéchí 杨洁篪, and Wáng Yì 王毅 24:46: The rise of Foreign Ministry Spokesman Zhào Lìjiān 赵立坚 47:28: Understanding Chinese diplomacy’s hard turn amidst a culture of discipline A transcript of this episode is available on TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations:  Jeremy: Hummingbird feeders with homemade sugar water nectar. Peter: The podcast series Dolly Parton's America.  Kaiser: The movie The Green Knight, based on the Arthurian legend, directed by David Lowery. ]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/Screen-Shot-2021-08-11-at-2.50.13-PM.png Peter Martin on ‘China’s Civilian Army: The Making of Wolf Warrior Diplomacy’ false no 0:00 No no A conversation with Ambassador Huang Ping, consul general of the P.R.C.’s New York Consulate https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/a-conversation-with-ambassador-huang-ping-consul-general-of-the-prcs-new-york-consulate/ Thu, 05 Aug 2021 21:48:46 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=209097 A transcript of this episode is available on TheChinaProject.com.]]> A transcript of this episode is available on TheChinaProject.com.]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/huang-ping-2.jpg A conversation with Ambassador Huang Ping, consul general of the P.R.C.’s New York Consulate false no 0:00 No no Reflecting on China’s poverty reduction with Bill Bikales https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/reflecting-on-chinas-poverty-reduction-with-bill-bikales/ Thu, 29 Jul 2021 20:06:32 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=208646 A transcript of this episode is available on TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations:  Bill: Destiny of the Republic, by Candice Millard, and the car-sharing company Turo.  Kaiser: The audiobook version of The Ill-Made Knight, by Christian Cameron, and the 9/11 Memorial & Museum.]]> A transcript of this episode is available on TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations:  Bill: Destiny of the Republic, by Candice Millard, and the car-sharing company Turo.  Kaiser: The audiobook version of The Ill-Made Knight, by Christian Cameron, and the 9/11 Memorial & Museum.]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Shanty_housing_in_Hong_Kong.jpeg Reflecting on China’s poverty reduction with Bill Bikales false no 0:00 No no A data-driven dive into Chinese politics, with Stanford’s Yiqing Xu https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/a-data-driven-dive-into-chinese-politics-with-stanfords-yiqing-xu/ Thu, 22 Jul 2021 20:06:32 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=208370 Yiqing Xu, an assistant professor of political science at Stanford University, about his work in applying modern methods in political science to the politics of contemporary China. In a wide-ranging conversation, they discuss qualitative vs. quantitative approaches and how the debate parallels the debate between the area studies approach to China and the discipline-centered approach, as well as the pitfalls of the current data obsession in the social sciences. They also look at some of Yiqing’s recent scholarship on China’s ideological landscape, and preview a longitudinal comparative study looking at Chinese students at elite universities in China and their compatriots studying in the United States. 7:44: The role of social scientists and the quantitative vs. qualitative methods debate in the political science field 19:18: Mapping ideology in China with the “Chinese Political Compass” data set  31:21: Why policy preferences in authoritarian states matter 40:33: How discrimination in the United States impacts Chinese students’ attitudes toward the political system in China  A transcript of this episode is available on TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations:  Yiqing: The iconic Japanese rock band X Japan.  Kaiser: The album Discipline (1981) by the progressive rock band King Crimson.]]> Yiqing Xu, an assistant professor of political science at Stanford University, about his work in applying modern methods in political science to the politics of contemporary China. In a wide-ranging conversation, they discuss qualitative vs. quantitative approaches and how the debate parallels the debate between the area studies approach to China and the discipline-centered approach, as well as the pitfalls of the current data obsession in the social sciences. They also look at some of Yiqing’s recent scholarship on China’s ideological landscape, and preview a longitudinal comparative study looking at Chinese students at elite universities in China and their compatriots studying in the United States. 7:44: The role of social scientists and the quantitative vs. qualitative methods debate in the political science field 19:18: Mapping ideology in China with the “Chinese Political Compass” data set  31:21: Why policy preferences in authoritarian states matter 40:33: How discrimination in the United States impacts Chinese students’ attitudes toward the political system in China  A transcript of this episode is available on TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations:  Yiqing: The iconic Japanese rock band X Japan.  Kaiser: The album Discipline (1981) by the progressive rock band King Crimson.]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/clay-banks-U0-r0JMypE0-unsplash-scaled.jpg A data-driven dive into Chinese politics, with Stanford’s Yiqing Xu false no 0:00 No no Avoiding ideological conflict with Beijing: Thomas Pepinsky and Jessica Chen Weiss https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/avoiding-ideological-conflict-with-beijing-thomas-pepinsky-and-jessica-chen-weiss/ Thu, 15 Jul 2021 21:14:38 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=208124 Thomas Pepinsky and Jessica Chen Weiss, both professors of government at Cornell University, about their recent essay in Foreign Affairs, “The Clash of Systems? Washington Should Avoid Ideological Competition With Beijing.” In that essay, they argue that, despite all the talk of Chinese authoritarianism as an existential threat to American democracy, Beijing is mostly on the defensive, and does not seek to export its political system. This is not to say that American democracy is not under threat: It very much is — but not from China. Tom, a specialist on Southeast Asia, looks at the ASEAN countries and their relations with Beijing to show that ideological affinity is not a predictor of close ties to China. And Jessica offers an update to her influential 2019 essay on China’s effort to “make the world safe for autocracy.” 8:08: Defining ideology and ideological competition  19:57: Beijing’s transactional conduct with nations in Southeast Asia and the geostrategic implications 25:20: How the current rhetoric in the United States fuels Sinophobia and anti-Asian racism 36:01: China as the disgruntled stakeholder  A transcript of this episode is available on TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Tom: The French television shows Lupin and The Bureau.  Jessica: “The Ezra Klein Show” podcast interview with Jamila Michener, and anything written by Yangyang Cheng. Kaiser: Music to read by: The Goldberg Variations (particularly the 1982 version performed by Glenn Gould and the version performed by Lang Lang), The Well-Tempered Clavier, and The French Suites, by Johann Sebastian Bach, and the YouTube series “What Makes This Song Great?,” by Rick Beato.]]> Thomas Pepinsky and Jessica Chen Weiss, both professors of government at Cornell University, about their recent essay in Foreign Affairs, “The Clash of Systems? Washington Should Avoid Ideological Competition With Beijing.” In that essay, they argue that, despite all the talk of Chinese authoritarianism as an existential threat to American democracy, Beijing is mostly on the defensive, and does not seek to export its political system. This is not to say that American democracy is not under threat: It very much is — but not from China. Tom, a specialist on Southeast Asia, looks at the ASEAN countries and their relations with Beijing to show that ideological affinity is not a predictor of close ties to China. And Jessica offers an update to her influential 2019 essay on China’s effort to “make the world safe for autocracy.” 8:08: Defining ideology and ideological competition  19:57: Beijing’s transactional conduct with nations in Southeast Asia and the geostrategic implications 25:20: How the current rhetoric in the United States fuels Sinophobia and anti-Asian racism 36:01: China as the disgruntled stakeholder  A transcript of this episode is available on TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Tom: The French television shows Lupin and The Bureau.  Jessica: “The Ezra Klein Show” podcast interview with Jamila Michener, and anything written by Yangyang Cheng. Kaiser: Music to read by: The Goldberg Variations (particularly the 1982 version performed by Glenn Gould and the version performed by Lang Lang), The Well-Tempered Clavier, and The French Suites, by Johann Sebastian Bach, and the YouTube series “What Makes This Song Great?,” by Rick Beato.]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/49390945738_078166b677_o-scaled.jpg Avoiding ideological conflict with Beijing: Thomas Pepinsky and Jessica Chen Weiss false no 0:00 No no How China escaped shock therapy: Isabella Weber unpacks the debates of the 1980s https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/how-china-escaped-shock-therapy-isabella-weber-unpacks-the-debates-of-the-1980s/ Thu, 08 Jul 2021 20:06:32 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=207887 Isabella Weber, an assistant professor of economics at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, about her new book, How China Escaped Shock Therapy: The Market Reform Debate. Meticulously researched and persuasively argued, her book makes important contributions to our understanding of a critical period in China’s recent history — the decade of the 1980s — when a fierce debate took place between “package reformers” supporting sweeping price liberalization and gradualists who argued that state participation in the market was critical to dampen inflation and maintain social stability. It also sheds light on the run-up to the student-led demonstrations of 1989. 12:20: Debunking a conventional wisdom on China’s economy 22:05: The relationship between states and markets 40:01: A universal need for reform in the early 1980s 1:10:47: Student intellectuals in 1988 and the “full steam ahead” camp For a condensed article pulled from this conversation, click below: https://thechinaproject.com/2021/07/08/reexamining-chinese-economic-reform-from-the-1980s-to-present/ Recommendations: Isabella: The movie Rashomon, directed by Akira Kurosawa, and Cold War, directed by Paweł Aleksander Pawlikowski. Kaiser: The Chinese Communist Party: A Century in Ten Lives, edited by Timothy Cheek, Klaus Mühlhahn, and Hans van de Ven. The following has been edited for brevity and clarity. The full transcript appears on the episode page in the link above. Kaiser Kuo: Let's start, Isabella, with a very simple question, and a big one. What is “shock therapy,” and who were the economists behind the idea of shock therapy? Isabella: Shock therapy really is a policy package that in its most standard articulation was composed of four elements. Price liberalization that was meant to be as fast as possible, aided by macroeconomic austerity — that is, tight monetary policy and fiscal restraint. And then followed up with trade liberalization and privatization. The shocking element in shock therapy was really the big bang in price liberalization, the setting free of prices, more or less overnight. It was very much acknowledged that this initial shock would be painful. But the idea was that this would be necessary in order to lay the foundations for a future better system. Kaiser: Was there a conventional wisdom about China's economic reforms that you were seeking to displace, or to force a reconsideration of, when you began your work? Isabella: I think that very broadly speaking, a lot of the thinking about the 1980s has been framed in terms of the transition from socialism to capitalism, and in terms of a struggle between conservatives and reformers. What I'm trying to show in the book is that beneath this big binary, there was a struggle within the market reform camp that might be just as consequential. Because if we look at the different outcomes of transition across countries, we find that the ways in which countries have transitioned to the market actually matters. Within China in the ’80s, as it so happens, those who were arguing against shock therapy actually ended up losing out in ’89. So, in the ’90s, and in the ways in which this history has been written, their side generally has not been portrayed as prominently as I think it should have been. At the same time, for those who stood at the more radical side of market reforms, it was of course also quite convenient to own the 1980s, and to own the legacy of successful reforms. So therefore, this very severe split of the 1980s, I think, has been studied much less than its importance would imply. Kaiser: You use the word “escaped” in the title of your book, How China Escaped Shock Therapy. It's a normative word. There are implications in there, of course, that shock therapy would have been bad. Can you talk about your choice of this word, escape? Isabella: In the title, there are two terms that need explanation. We have already talked about shock therapy. I have used shock therapy as the reference, even though in the 1980s the term shock therapy was not yet dominant, or prominent, in China’s own debates. Kaiser: They call it “package reform” — pèitào gǎigé 配套改革 — right? Isabella: Yes. "Package reform is creating a blueprint for reform and then implementing that blueprint in a more or less planned fashion, and as fast as possible. In the interviews that I’ve led, many people have correlated this peitao gaige, the idea of a package reform, to shock therapy. So there is a link from the perspective of those who were involved, retrospectively. But I think there’s also a very clear logical link between the policy measures being debated in China and the same kind of logic — shock therapy — as it was implemented in other socialist countries shortly after. In particular, the book is really focused on price reform, and the question of whether or not to implement a big bang in price reform. This was thought of as the critical first shocking element in shock therapy — it would shock an old, undesirable system into a new kind of system, a market system, a market equilibrium. It is a question of debate whether in the 1980s shock therapy — or to be more precise, a big bang in price reform — would have been problematic for the further success of reform. And on some level, by using “escape” in the title, I imply that implementing shock therapy in the 1980s would have had negative economic consequences, or would have been likely to produce negative economic outcomes. In particular, it probably would have resulted in quite rapid inflation that would have had the potential to undermine the reform project. In some sense, I think that the events of 1988 and 1989 provide some proof in that direction. But more fundamentally, it seems to me that most cases that we can study where such rapid price liberalizations were implemented, the outcomes were quite negative. And in fact, this even applies to the West German case that has been heralded by the shock therapists as this miraculous, instantaneous success of the creation of a free-market economy. Kaiser: What I find really interesting is that conventional wisdom said in the early ’80s, you had these reformers pitted against these conservatives, people who didn't want to change. But I think in your interviews with the actual economists and the officials, you find that the sense of urgency, of a need for reform, was pretty universal. It wasn't just the result of ideological battles or theoretical insights, but it was just plain old imperative. It was not a matter of whether to implement reforms, but what kinds of reforms to implement. Isabella: I, of course, interview the reform economists, so I do have a biased sample. But within this camp of reform economists, there were very different views about how to reform, and there was consensus about the need for reform. Material progress and improving the lives of the masses had always been part of the ambition of the revolution. So someone like Chén Yún 陈云 at the CCP Work Conference of 1978, in the pivotal year of 1978, is quoted to have said that if we don't resolve the problem of clothing and feeding the still-large numbers of peasants that are underfed and not well-clothed, we will face a situation where local cadres will be leading the peasants to the gates of the cities, demanding food and better living conditions. Kaiser: A theme that you sound again and again in your book is how the CCP leadership really understood all too well how hyperinflation in the waning years of KMT rule eroded KMT legitimacy. Even the very ardent liberalizers, like Zhào Zǐyáng 赵紫阳, feared inflation as a result of price liberalization. How deep was this fear? Isabella: I think on the part of officials and the leadership in particular, there was an acute awareness of the importance of prices for political and social stability. There was also an acute awareness around the changes in prices of so-called "heavy goods." And the important goods could be quite small goods, indeed. For example, there was a debate around changing the price for matches. Now, if we think about matches, we think, Oh, this is an extremely cheap good. And one that we really don't care much about, whether the price of matches goes up 10% or 20% or not, right? But we have to remember that in China, in the early ’80s, people were still predominantly cooking, and also the country had heating with wood stoves and fire. So matches were an absolute staple in the consumption basket. And given just how poor the country still was, the price of matches would actually have aroused quite a lot of resistance. So again, to illustrate, to quote from one of the World Bank notes, there’s one person who, after a number of days of meetings and discussions, noted that the communist dictator could not change the price of matches by two cents. Kaiser: In your book, there are these battle lines that are drawn. And it's this battle of 1986, which you detail in chapter seven of your book, which I think is one of the big moments of drama. The character that emerges as the most difficult to read is Zhao Ziyang, who was at the time the premier. What role does he play in these debates? Because it's very contested. The accounts in his own memoir, Prisoner of the State, do not square with what many of your interview subjects say. And those interview subjects don't necessarily agree with one another, either. How do you approach this contested legacy, and how do you come out of it? What's your read on this mysterious figure of Zhao Ziyang? Isabella: Zhao Ziyang is an incredibly important figure of the 1980s, and is probably a somewhat conflicted figure. I mean, he seems to be taking these questions extraordinarily seriously, but as one of his secretaries was saying in an interview, he would be approaching these discussions in the fashion in which he had later experienced graduate seminars at an American university. So there was always an openness to discuss both sides and to very seriously consider both sides, and to really engage with the arguments that both sides were presenting. And I think this was sometimes his strength and his weakness in that it probably would have been very hard to carve out that very distinct approach to reform that emerged in China without a leader that had that open-mindedness. At the same time, this resulted in him being torn between different approaches again and again, and also kind of moving from one side to the other, and thereby creating a certain tension. Kaiser: We'll fast forward a little bit through the debate of 1986. The upshot is that the protagonists, if you will, prevail in ’86. And there are all sorts of really interesting reasons why. The next big battle is 1988. Maybe you can help me understand this better because there's something that's always kind of nagged me about ’88. The students and intellectuals who supported package reforms, they were very much in the full-steam-ahead camp. They were able to use inflation as a mobilizational tool for the movement to bring people into the street, when the very policies they had supported — hit the gas, don't hit the brakes, hit the gas, plow through the barrier — was what was giving rise to inflation. Isabella: In 1988, it became clear that reform, unlike the first years had suggested, did not stand to benefit everybody; some would not only be benefiting more, but others would actually be losing from reform. And the gradual dismantling of the communes was the first time that urban, rural incomes actually diverted. So a pretty deep tension was building up in the system, where the downsides of marketization and the social harshness of marketization started to become apparent. To answer your question more directly about 1989, I'm not so sure if it's so straightforward that the protesters were unanimously in favor of package reform. I think we have to remember that rapid price rises in situations of deep political tensions have unleashed very far-reaching protests in all sorts of contexts. I mean, most prominently in history, of course the French Revolution, but also the Arab Spring, triggered by the rapid rise of the price of bread. The “yellow vests” in France were triggered by the increase of the price for gas. This pattern of price rises that hit people hard because they affect their consumption patterns being a trigger for much bigger protests is not at all unique to China. I’m not arguing 1989 is just another bread riot. My point is that I don't think the protesters had some kind of scheme where they were using inflation in order to protest. Kaiser: I'm not saying it was deliberate. The interesting thing is, you could make the same argument with corruption, that the inherent price disparities in a dual-track system (where households produced for the state and also the market) laid the groundwork for it. And so, I think a lot of people would say that it was these gradualists, in their insistence on maintaining the dual-track system, who made it possible for these levels of corruption, which were then used instrumentally to bring people into the streets. Isabella: I think that corruption's extremely important and that the dual-track people probably underestimated just how explosive the corruption tendencies unleashed by that system were. Kaiser: Did the divisions between the package-reform camp and the gradualists endure, and did they manifest themselves later? It’s tempting for me to draw a line from the package-reform guys to the Shanghai clique during the era of Jiāng Zémín 江泽民 and Zhū Róngjī 朱镕基 because they are still the same: they’re neoliberal, pro-free trade, pro-coastal development, pro-FDI. And then the gradualists, do they kind of evolve into people who were more concerned with rural development, more concerned with unbalanced economic growth, inequality? Isabella: I’m not sure about the direct mapping, but I think as a general principle, it is the case that a struggle between two different ways of thinking about reform continues throughout the ’90s, even though most of the dual-track reformers of the ’80s disappeared from the scene. It is not a continuity in terms of the precise persons, but in terms of the struggles that evolved in the ’90s. And in the 1990s, the big struggle is over state-owned enterprise reform. A new struggle emerged over how much privatization, how much of GDP, should be under state ownership. Kaiser: What you argue in your book is that China not only escaped shock therapy, it also escaped binary thinking on shock therapy, on the kind of thinking that says, "Free market good, planned economy bad.” But this kind of binary thinking still seems to have a grip on many people who study China. There’s this instinct that so many of us have — and I’m sure I’ve been guilty of it too — where we just hear, “Well, this guy is a champion of free market, of market liberalization, therefore I root for him or her.” What do you say to people who still frame things this way? Because I feel like that's a pernicious tendency, still. Isabella: Thanks for this question. I think it's quite ironic that on the part of those who have been cheering for free markets, China's reform success is all a miracle of freeing up the market potential. Whereas on the left, those who think that China has gone too far and become too capitalist, they often ironically arrive at a similar conclusion, where they then think that China has become neoliberal, which confirms the idea that it’s all been about free marketism. What I'm trying to do with this book is to challenge us to see beyond equating neoliberalism with marketization: to see that marketization can take very different forms and that marketization itself — the process of it, the forms — is fiercely contested. China's process of marketization deserves study in its own right, rather than simply being subsumed under one label or another. https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/how-china-escaped-shock-therapy-isabella-weber-unpacks-the-debates-of-the-1980s/]]> Isabella Weber, an assistant professor of economics at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, about her new book, How China Escaped Shock Therapy: The Market Reform Debate. Meticulously researched and persuasively argued, her book makes important contributions to our understanding of a critical period in China’s recent history — the decade of the 1980s — when a fierce debate took place between “package reformers” supporting sweeping price liberalization and gradualists who argued that state participation in the market was critical to dampen inflation and maintain social stability. It also sheds light on the run-up to the student-led demonstrations of 1989. 12:20: Debunking a conventional wisdom on China’s economy 22:05: The relationship between states and markets 40:01: A universal need for reform in the early 1980s 1:10:47: Student intellectuals in 1988 and the “full steam ahead” camp For a condensed article pulled from this conversation, click below: https://thechinaproject.com/2021/07/08/reexamining-chinese-economic-reform-from-the-1980s-to-present/ Recommendations: Isabella: The movie Rashomon, directed by Akira Kurosawa, and Cold War, directed by Paweł Aleksander Pawlikowski. Kaiser: The Chinese Communist Party: A Century in Ten Lives, edited by Timothy Cheek, Klaus Mühlhahn, and Hans van de Ven. The following has been edited for brevity and clarity. The full transcript appears on the episode page in the link above. Kaiser Kuo: Let's start, Isabella, with a very simple question, and a big one. What is “shock therapy,” and who were the economists behind the idea of shock therapy? Isabella: Shock therapy really is a policy package that in its most standard articulation was composed of four elements. Price liberalization that was meant to be as fast as possible, aided by macroeconomic austerity — that is, tight monetary policy and fiscal restraint. And then followed up with trade liberalization and privatization. The shocking element in shock therapy was really the big bang in price liberalization, the setting free of prices, more or less overnight. It was very much acknowledged that this initial shock would be painful. But the idea was that this would be necessary in order to lay the foundations for a future better system. Kaiser: Was there a conventional wisdom about China's economic reforms that you were seeking to displace, or to force a reconsideration of, when you began your work? Isabella: I think that very broadly speaking, a lot of the thinking about the 1980s has been framed in terms of the transition from socialism to capitalism, and in terms of a struggle between conservatives and reformers. What I'm trying to show in the book is that beneath this big binary, there was a struggle within the market reform camp that might be just as consequential. Because if we look at the different outcomes of transition across countries, we find that the ways in which countries have transitioned to the market actually matters. Within China in the ’80s, as it so happens, those who were arguing against shock therapy actually ended up losing out in ’89. So, in the ’90s, and in the ways in which this history has been written, their side generally has not been portrayed as prominently as I think it should have been. At the same time, for those who stood at the more radical side of market reforms, it was of course also quite convenient to own the 1980s, and to own the legacy of successful reforms. So therefore, this very severe split of the 1980s, I think, has been studied much less than its importance would imply. Kaiser: You use the word “escaped” in the title of your book, How China Escaped Shock Therapy. It's a normative word. There are implications in there, of course, that shock therapy would have been bad. Can you talk about your choice of this word, escape? Isabella: In the title, there are two terms that need explanation. We have already talked about shock therapy. I have used shock therapy as the reference, even though in the 1980s the term shock therapy was not yet dominant, or prominent, in China’s own debates. Kaiser: They call it “package reform” — pèitào gǎigé 配套改革 — right? Isabella: Yes. "Package reform is creating a blueprint for reform and then implementing that blueprint in a more or less planned fashion, and as fast as possible. In the interviews that I’ve led, many people have correlated this peitao gaige, the idea of a package reform, to shock therapy. So there is a link from the perspective of those who were involved, retrospectively. But I think there’s also a very clear logical link between the policy measures being debated in China and the same kind of logic — shock therapy — as it was implemented in other socialist countries shortly after. In particular, the book is really focused on price reform, and the question of whether or not to implement a big bang in price reform. This was thought of as the critical first shocking element in shock therapy — it would shock an old, undesirable system into a new kind of system, a market system, a market equilibrium. It is a question of debate whether in the 1980s shock therapy — or to be more precise, a big bang in price reform — would have been problematic for the further success of reform. And on some level, by using “escape” in the title, I imply that implementing shock therapy in the 1980s would have had negative economic consequences, or would have been likely to produce negative economic outcomes. In particular, it probably would have resulted in quite rapid inflation that would have had the potential to undermine the reform project. In some sense, I think that the events of 1988 and 1989 provide some proof in that direction. But more fundamentally, it seems to me that most cases that we can study where such rapid price liberalizations were implemented, the outcomes were quite negative. And in fact, this even applies to the West German case that has been heralded by the shock therapists as this miraculous, instantaneous success of the creation of a free-market economy. Kaiser: What I find really interesting is that conventional wisdom said in the early ’80s, you had these reformers pitted against these conservatives, people who didn't want to change. But I think in your interviews with the actual economists and the officials, you find that the sense of urgency, of a need for reform, was pretty universal. It wasn't just the result of ideological battles or theoretical insights, but it was just plain old imperative. It was not a matter of whether to implement reforms, but what kinds of reforms to implement. Isabella: I, of course, interview the reform economists, so I do have a biased sample. But within this camp of reform economists, there were very different views about how to reform, and there was consensus about the need for reform. Material progress and improving the lives of the masses had always been part of the ambition of the revolution. So someone like Chén Yún 陈云 at the CCP Work Conference of 1978, in the pivotal year of 1978, is quoted to have said that if we don't resolve the problem of clothing and feeding the still-large numbers of peasants that are underfed and not well-clothed, we will face a situation where local cadres will be leading the peasants to the gates of the cities, demanding food and better living conditions. Kaiser: A theme that you sound again and again in your book is how the CCP leadership really understood all too well how hyperinflation in the waning years of KMT rule eroded KMT legitimacy. Even the very ardent liberalizers, like Zhào Zǐyáng 赵紫阳, feared inflation as a result of price liberalization. How deep was this fear? Isabella: I think on the part of officials and the leadership in particular, there was an acute awareness of the importance of prices for political and social stability. There was also an acute awareness around the changes in prices of so-called "heavy goods." And the important goods could be quite small goods, indeed. For example, there was a debate around changing the price for matches. Now, if we think about matches, we think, Oh, this is an extremely cheap good. And one that we really don't care much about, whether the price of matches goes up 10% or 20% or not, right? But we have to remember that in China, in the early ’80s, people were still predominantly cooking, and also the country had heating with wood stoves and fire. So matches were an absolute staple in the consumption basket. And given just how poor the country still was, the price of matches would actually have aroused quite a lot of resistance. So again, to illustrate, to quote from one of the World Bank notes, there’s one person who, after a number of days of meetings and discussions, noted that the communist dictator could not change the price of matches by two cents. Kaiser: In your book, there are these battle lines that are drawn. And it's this battle of 1986, which you detail in chapter seven of your book, which I think is one of the big moments of drama. The character that emerges as the most difficult to read is Zhao Ziyang, who was at the time the premier. What role does he play in these debates? Because it's very contested. The accounts in his own memoir, Prisoner of the State, do not square with what many of your interview subjects say. And those interview subjects don't necessarily agree with one another, either. How do you approach this contested legacy, and how do you come out of it? What's your read on this mysterious figure of Zhao Ziyang? Isabella: Zhao Ziyang is an incredibly important figure of the 1980s, and is probably a somewhat conflicted figure. I mean, he seems to be taking these questions extraordinarily seriously, but as one of his secretaries was saying in an interview, he would be approaching these discussions in the fashion in which he had later experienced graduate seminars at an American university. So there was always an openness to discuss both sides and to very seriously consider both sides, and to really engage with the arguments that both sides were presenting. And I think this was sometimes his strength and his weakness in that it probably would have been very hard to carve out that very distinct approach to reform that emerged in China without a leader that had that open-mindedness. At the same time, this resulted in him being torn between different approaches again and again, and also kind of moving from one side to the other, and thereby creating a certain tension. Kaiser: We'll fast forward a little bit through the debate of 1986. The upshot is that the protagonists, if you will, prevail in ’86. And there are all sorts of really interesting reasons why. The next big battle is 1988. Maybe you can help me understand this better because there's something that's always kind of nagged me about ’88. The students and intellectuals who supported package reforms, they were very much in the full-steam-ahead camp. They were able to use inflation as a mobilizational tool for the movement to bring people into the street, when the very policies they had supported — hit the gas, don't hit the brakes, hit the gas, plow through the barrier — was what was giving rise to inflation. Isabella: In 1988, it became clear that reform, unlike the first years had suggested, did not stand to benefit everybody; some would not only be benefiting more, but others would actually be losing from reform. And the gradual dismantling of the communes was the first time that urban, rural incomes actually diverted. So a pretty deep tension was building up in the system, where the downsides of marketization and the social harshness of marketization started to become apparent. To answer your question more directly about 1989, I'm not so sure if it's so straightforward that the protesters were unanimously in favor of package reform. I think we have to remember that rapid price rises in situations of deep political tensions have unleashed very far-reaching protests in all sorts of contexts. I mean, most prominently in history, of course the French Revolution, but also the Arab Spring, triggered by the rapid rise of the price of bread. The “yellow vests” in France were triggered by the increase of the price for gas. This pattern of price rises that hit people hard because they affect their consumption patterns being a trigger for much bigger protests is not at all unique to China. I’m not arguing 1989 is just another bread riot. My point is that I don't think the protesters had some kind of scheme where they were using inflation in order to protest. Kaiser: I'm not saying it was deliberate. The interesting thing is, you could make the same argument with corruption, that the inherent price disparities in a dual-track system (where households produced for the state and also the market) laid the groundwork for it. And so, I think a lot of people would say that it was these gradualists, in their insistence on maintaining the dual-track system, who made it possible for these levels of corruption, which were then used instrumentally to bring people into the streets. Isabella: I think that corruption's extremely important and that the dual-track people probably underestimated just how explosive the corruption tendencies unleashed by that system were. Kaiser: Did the divisions between the package-reform camp and the gradualists endure, and did they manifest themselves later? It’s tempting for me to draw a line from the package-reform guys to the Shanghai clique during the era of Jiāng Zémín 江泽民 and Zhū Róngjī 朱镕基 because they are still the same: they’re neoliberal, pro-free trade, pro-coastal development, pro-FDI. And then the gradualists, do they kind of evolve into people who were more concerned with rural development, more concerned with unbalanced economic growth, inequality? Isabella: I’m not sure about the direct mapping, but I think as a general principle, it is the case that a struggle between two different ways of thinking about reform continues throughout the ’90s, even though most of the dual-track reformers of the ’80s disappeared from the scene. It is not a continuity in terms of the precise persons, but in terms of the struggles that evolved in the ’90s. And in the 1990s, the big struggle is over state-owned enterprise reform. A new struggle emerged over how much privatization, how much of GDP, should be under state ownership. Kaiser: What you argue in your book is that China not only escaped shock therapy, it also escaped binary thinking on shock therapy, on the kind of thinking that says, "Free market good, planned economy bad.” But this kind of binary thinking still seems to have a grip on many people who study China. There’s this instinct that so many of us have — and I’m sure I’ve been guilty of it too — where we just hear, “Well, this guy is a champion of free market, of market liberalization, therefore I root for him or her.” What do you say to people who still frame things this way? Because I feel like that's a pernicious tendency, still. Isabella: Thanks for this question. I think it's quite ironic that on the part of those who have been cheering for free markets, China's reform success is all a miracle of freeing up the market potential. Whereas on the left, those who think that China has gone too far and become too capitalist, they often ironically arrive at a similar conclusion, where they then think that China has become neoliberal, which confirms the idea that it’s all been about free marketism. What I'm trying to do with this book is to challenge us to see beyond equating neoliberalism with marketization: to see that marketization can take very different forms and that marketization itself — the process of it, the forms — is fiercely contested. China's process of marketization deserves study in its own right, rather than simply being subsumed under one label or another. https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/how-china-escaped-shock-therapy-isabella-weber-unpacks-the-debates-of-the-1980s/]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Shock-Therapy.jpg How China escaped shock therapy: Isabella Weber unpacks the debates of the 1980s false no 0:00 No no The Chinese Communist Party at 100 https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/the-chinese-communist-party-at-100/ Thu, 01 Jul 2021 17:58:10 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=207676 Timothy Cheek of the University of British Columbia, political scientist Elizabeth Perry of Harvard, and our very own Jeremy Goldkorn, editor-in-chief of The China Project, in a wide-ranging discussion of the Chinese Communist Party on the occasion of its 100th birthday. The three each contributed chapters to a new volume called The Chinese Communist Party: A Century in 10 Lives, edited by Timothy Cheek, Klaus Mülhahn, and Hans van de Ven. Don’t miss this one! 8:59: Cosmopolitan traditions within the CCP 13:10: Continuity and change within the Party 20:19: The oscillations between flexibility and rigidity 34:25: Intellectuals and their relationship with the Party 50:37: Wang Guangmei and the Peach Garden Experience A full transcript of this episode is available on TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Jeremy: The Dairy Restaurant, by Ben Katchor.  Elizabeth: Middle Class Shanghai: Reshaping U.S.-China Engagement, by Cheng Li, and The Wuhan Lockdown, by Yang Guobin.   Timothy: The Internationale, performed by heavy metal band Tang Dynasty.  Kaiser: The July/August edition of Foreign Affairs, especially the pieces by Wang Jisi and Yan Xuetong.]]> Timothy Cheek of the University of British Columbia, political scientist Elizabeth Perry of Harvard, and our very own Jeremy Goldkorn, editor-in-chief of The China Project, in a wide-ranging discussion of the Chinese Communist Party on the occasion of its 100th birthday. The three each contributed chapters to a new volume called The Chinese Communist Party: A Century in 10 Lives, edited by Timothy Cheek, Klaus Mülhahn, and Hans van de Ven. Don’t miss this one! 8:59: Cosmopolitan traditions within the CCP 13:10: Continuity and change within the Party 20:19: The oscillations between flexibility and rigidity 34:25: Intellectuals and their relationship with the Party 50:37: Wang Guangmei and the Peach Garden Experience A full transcript of this episode is available on TheChinaProject.com. Recommendations: Jeremy: The Dairy Restaurant, by Ben Katchor.  Elizabeth: Middle Class Shanghai: Reshaping U.S.-China Engagement, by Cheng Li, and The Wuhan Lockdown, by Yang Guobin.   Timothy: The Internationale, performed by heavy metal band Tang Dynasty.  Kaiser: The July/August edition of Foreign Affairs, especially the pieces by Wang Jisi and Yan Xuetong.]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/ccp-100-anniversary.jpg The Chinese Communist Party at 100 false no 0:00 No no China’s population conundrum, with UNC demographer Yong Cai https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/chinas-population-conundrum-with-unc-demographer-yong-cai/ Thu, 24 Jun 2021 19:31:07 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=207402 A Village With My Name: A Family History of China's Opening to the World, by Scott Tong.  Kaiser: The Kominsky Method, available on Netflix, and All the Light We Cannot See: A Novel, by Anthony Doerr.]]> A Village With My Name: A Family History of China's Opening to the World, by Scott Tong.  Kaiser: The Kominsky Method, available on Netflix, and All the Light We Cannot See: A Novel, by Anthony Doerr.]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/10164753823_c3e90e9eb7_o.jpg China’s population conundrum, with UNC demographer Yong Cai false no 0:00 No no COVID-19 origins revisited, with Deborah Seligsohn https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/covid-19-origins-revisited-with-deborah-seligsohn/ Thu, 17 Jun 2021 19:38:46 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=207225 Deborah Seligsohn was last on Sinica, in April, the lab leak hypothesis seemed suddenly to gain traction — at least in American media. This week, Kaiser invites Deborah back to the show to talk about why the possibility that SARS-CoV-2 escaped from the Wuhan Institute of Virology, a notion long regarded by virologists as less probable than zoonotic transmission, has burst back into the conversation. Deborah served as the State Department’s Environment, Science, Technology and Health Counselor in the U.S. Embassy in Beijing from 2003 to 2007. She is an assistant professor of political science at Villanova University in Philadelphia.  3:00: The persistence of the lab leak theory 11:40: Navigating the political and institutional landscape within China  25:36: A view from Beijing’s perspective 31:02: Eliciting cooperation from Beijing, and what should our priorities be Recommendations: Deborah: The podcast This Week in Virology, particularly episodes 760 and 762, which touch on the COVID-19 pandemic.  Kaiser: Richard L. Watkins, a candidate running for the U.S. Senate in North Carolina.]]> Deborah Seligsohn was last on Sinica, in April, the lab leak hypothesis seemed suddenly to gain traction — at least in American media. This week, Kaiser invites Deborah back to the show to talk about why the possibility that SARS-CoV-2 escaped from the Wuhan Institute of Virology, a notion long regarded by virologists as less probable than zoonotic transmission, has burst back into the conversation. Deborah served as the State Department’s Environment, Science, Technology and Health Counselor in the U.S. Embassy in Beijing from 2003 to 2007. She is an assistant professor of political science at Villanova University in Philadelphia.  3:00: The persistence of the lab leak theory 11:40: Navigating the political and institutional landscape within China  25:36: A view from Beijing’s perspective 31:02: Eliciting cooperation from Beijing, and what should our priorities be Recommendations: Deborah: The podcast This Week in Virology, particularly episodes 760 and 762, which touch on the COVID-19 pandemic.  Kaiser: Richard L. Watkins, a candidate running for the U.S. Senate in North Carolina.]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Wuhan-Virology.jpg COVID-19 origins revisited, with Deborah Seligsohn false no 0:00 No no Journalist Andrew Jones on China’s space program https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/journalist-andrew-jones-on-chinas-space-program/ Thu, 10 Jun 2021 19:29:27 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=207050 The Expanse, available on Amazon Prime Video, the FIRST UP daily newsletter from Space News, the Axios Space newsletter, and the podcast Moonrise by the Washington Post. Kaiser: The Silmarillion by J.R.R. Tolkien.]]> The Expanse, available on Amazon Prime Video, the FIRST UP daily newsletter from Space News, the Axios Space newsletter, and the podcast Moonrise by the Washington Post. Kaiser: The Silmarillion by J.R.R. Tolkien.]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Tianwen-1920px.jpg Journalist Andrew Jones on China’s space program false no 0:00 No no Chinese college students in the U.S., with Yingyi Ma https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/chinese-college-students-in-the-u-s-with-yingyi-ma/ Thu, 03 Jun 2021 21:07:49 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=206788 Ambitious and Anxious: How Chinese College Students Succeed and Struggle in American Higher Education. Yingyi’s book, which focuses on the specific experiences of Chinese undergraduates, examines the push-and-pull factors that have made studying abroad — and studying in the U.S. in particular — a “new education gospel” for many parents in China. She discusses why after 2006 Chinese students surged into American colleges and universities, and how despite their eagerness to build “cosmopolitan capital” by studying in the U.S., they’ve faced challenges in navigating American higher education. 6:56: A duality of ambition and anxiety 13:00: “Cosmopolitan capital” and globalization 39:57: The sacrifices made by Chinese families and researchers 43:58: American higher education and Chinese undergraduate students 46:14: With regard to education, the grass is always greener on the other side Recommendations:  Yingyi: Invisible China: How the Urban-Rural Divide Threatens China’s Rise, by Scott Rozelle and Natalie Hell, the popular Chinese-language podcast Story FM, and the Chinese TV show A Love for Separation. Kaiser: The app Weee!, specializing in Asian and Hispanic food delivery.]]> Ambitious and Anxious: How Chinese College Students Succeed and Struggle in American Higher Education. Yingyi’s book, which focuses on the specific experiences of Chinese undergraduates, examines the push-and-pull factors that have made studying abroad — and studying in the U.S. in particular — a “new education gospel” for many parents in China. She discusses why after 2006 Chinese students surged into American colleges and universities, and how despite their eagerness to build “cosmopolitan capital” by studying in the U.S., they’ve faced challenges in navigating American higher education. 6:56: A duality of ambition and anxiety 13:00: “Cosmopolitan capital” and globalization 39:57: The sacrifices made by Chinese families and researchers 43:58: American higher education and Chinese undergraduate students 46:14: With regard to education, the grass is always greener on the other side Recommendations:  Yingyi: Invisible China: How the Urban-Rural Divide Threatens China’s Rise, by Scott Rozelle and Natalie Hell, the popular Chinese-language podcast Story FM, and the Chinese TV show A Love for Separation. Kaiser: The app Weee!, specializing in Asian and Hispanic food delivery.]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Sinica-June-3-2021-scaled.jpeg Chinese college students in the U.S., with Yingyi Ma false no 0:00 No no China, Russia, and the U.S.: Does the ‘strategic triangle’ still matter? https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/china-russia-and-the-u-s-does-the-strategic-triangle-still-matter/ Thu, 27 May 2021 21:09:59 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=206512 Ali Wyne, a senior analyst with Eurasia Group's Global Macro practice, to discuss the motivations, the capabilities, and the strategies of Beijing and Moscow in their dealings with Washington — and with each other. 3:54: What of the rules-based international order? 15:04: The relationship between China and Russia 27:35: Inflection points in the early 2000s 48:52: Strategies and tactics employed by China and Russia  Recommendations: Ali: Stronger: Adapting America's China Strategy in an Age of Competitive Interdependence, by Ryan Hass, and the documentary series Chasing Life, by Sanjay Gupta.  Kaiser: The audiobook for The Committed, written by Viet Thanh Nguyen and narrated by Francois Chau.]]> Ali Wyne, a senior analyst with Eurasia Group's Global Macro practice, to discuss the motivations, the capabilities, and the strategies of Beijing and Moscow in their dealings with Washington — and with each other. 3:54: What of the rules-based international order? 15:04: The relationship between China and Russia 27:35: Inflection points in the early 2000s 48:52: Strategies and tactics employed by China and Russia  Recommendations: Ali: Stronger: Adapting America's China Strategy in an Age of Competitive Interdependence, by Ryan Hass, and the documentary series Chasing Life, by Sanjay Gupta.  Kaiser: The audiobook for The Committed, written by Viet Thanh Nguyen and narrated by Francois Chau.]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Putin-Xi.jpg China, Russia, and the U.S.: Does the ‘strategic triangle’ still matter? false no 0:00 No no Orville Schell on his novel, My Old Home: A Novel of Exile https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/orville-schell-on-his-novel-my-old-home-a-novel-of-exile/ Thu, 20 May 2021 19:14:03 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=206363 My Old Home: A Novel of Exile is a bildungsroman that follows the life of Li Wende and his father, Li Shutong, from the early days of the Cultural Revolution to the tragedy of Tiananmen in 1989. This week on Sinica, Kaiser chats with Orville about the windows on China that nonfiction is unable to open but that fiction can; the challenges of writing a novel after a lifetime of publishing nonfiction; and continuity and change in modern Chinese history. Recommendations: Orville: The works of the famous writer and essayist Lu Xun, 1000 Years of Joys and Sorrows, by Ai Weiwei (set for release in November 2021), and Blood Letters: The Untold Story of Lin Zhao, a Martyr in Mao's China, by Lian Xi. Kaiser: Interior Chinatown: A Novel, by Charles Yu.]]> My Old Home: A Novel of Exile is a bildungsroman that follows the life of Li Wende and his father, Li Shutong, from the early days of the Cultural Revolution to the tragedy of Tiananmen in 1989. This week on Sinica, Kaiser chats with Orville about the windows on China that nonfiction is unable to open but that fiction can; the challenges of writing a novel after a lifetime of publishing nonfiction; and continuity and change in modern Chinese history. Recommendations: Orville: The works of the famous writer and essayist Lu Xun, 1000 Years of Joys and Sorrows, by Ai Weiwei (set for release in November 2021), and Blood Letters: The Untold Story of Lin Zhao, a Martyr in Mao's China, by Lian Xi. Kaiser: Interior Chinatown: A Novel, by Charles Yu.]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Orville-My-Old-Home.jpg Orville Schell on his novel, My Old Home: A Novel of Exile false no 0:00 No no Margaret Lewis on ethnic profiling in the DOJ’s China Initiative https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/margaret-lewis-on-ethnic-profiling-in-the-dojs-china-initiative/ Thu, 13 May 2021 20:19:00 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=206072 Margaret (Maggie) Lewis, a professor of law at Seton Hall University, about her work on the U.S. Department of Justice’s “China Initiative.” Launched under former attorney general Jeff Sessions in November 2018, the China Initiative sought to bring criminal cases against perpetrators of industrial espionage benefiting China, but as Maggie argues, it has in fact resulted in discriminatory ethnic profiling and the criminalization of what she calls “China-ness.” Listen to the end to hear Kaiser’s impression of Cookie Monster as a death metal vocalist. 8:24: Viewing China as an existential threat 17:44: Where the framing and implementation of the China Initiative falls short 28:11: Prosecuting “China-ness” 37:38: The impact on American competitiveness Recommendations: Maggie: What Do You Do With an Idea?, What Do You Do With a Problem?, and What Do You Do With a Chance?, by Kobi Yamada; also, Beautiful Oops!, by Barney Saltzberg.  Kaiser: The album Blackwater Park, by the Swedish progressive metal band Opeth.]]> Margaret (Maggie) Lewis, a professor of law at Seton Hall University, about her work on the U.S. Department of Justice’s “China Initiative.” Launched under former attorney general Jeff Sessions in November 2018, the China Initiative sought to bring criminal cases against perpetrators of industrial espionage benefiting China, but as Maggie argues, it has in fact resulted in discriminatory ethnic profiling and the criminalization of what she calls “China-ness.” Listen to the end to hear Kaiser’s impression of Cookie Monster as a death metal vocalist. 8:24: Viewing China as an existential threat 17:44: Where the framing and implementation of the China Initiative falls short 28:11: Prosecuting “China-ness” 37:38: The impact on American competitiveness Recommendations: Maggie: What Do You Do With an Idea?, What Do You Do With a Problem?, and What Do You Do With a Chance?, by Kobi Yamada; also, Beautiful Oops!, by Barney Saltzberg.  Kaiser: The album Blackwater Park, by the Swedish progressive metal band Opeth.]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Sinica-May-13-scaled.jpg Margaret Lewis on ethnic profiling in the DOJ’s China Initiative false no 0:00 No no China’s Heart of Darkness https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/chinas-heart-of-darkness/ Thu, 06 May 2021 20:07:50 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=205362 Zhā Jiànyīng 查建英 and Geremie R. Barmé, editor of China Heritage. The three discuss the overlooked salience of the words of Han Fei in understanding modern China, the concept of legalism and its relation to the contemporary interpretation of fazhi (法治 fǎzhì), or rule of law, and the churn of being caught between the United States and China as relations between the two great powers continue to sour.]]> Zhā Jiànyīng 查建英 and Geremie R. Barmé, editor of China Heritage. The three discuss the overlooked salience of the words of Han Fei in understanding modern China, the concept of legalism and its relation to the contemporary interpretation of fazhi (法治 fǎzhì), or rule of law, and the churn of being caught between the United States and China as relations between the two great powers continue to sour.]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Han-Feizi.png China’s Heart of Darkness false no 0:00 No no U.S.-China climate cooperation in a competitive age https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/u-s-china-climate-cooperation-in-a-competitive-age/ Thu, 29 Apr 2021 23:33:50 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=205047 Blockchain Chicken Farm by Xiaowei Wang. Alex: The Environment China podcast, Working: Researching, Interviewing, Writing by Robert Caro, and the highly informative Twitter feed of carbon analyst Yan Qin. Kaiser: The Free World: Art and Thought in the Cold War, The Steven Spielberg movie called Ready Player One.]]> Blockchain Chicken Farm by Xiaowei Wang. Alex: The Environment China podcast, Working: Researching, Interviewing, Writing by Robert Caro, and the highly informative Twitter feed of carbon analyst Yan Qin. Kaiser: The Free World: Art and Thought in the Cold War, The Steven Spielberg movie called Ready Player One.]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/51133294486_6307772d2a_o.jpg U.S.-China climate cooperation in a competitive age false no 0:00 No no Searching for the six Chinese survivors of the ‘Titanic’ https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/searching-for-the-six-chinese-survivors-of-the-titanic/ Thu, 22 Apr 2021 19:41:24 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=204782 The Six. The film, directed by Jones and produced by James Cameron, focuses on Schwankert’s search for the six Chinese men who survived the sinking of the Titanic on the night of April 14, 1912. Tracing the fate of the men takes Schwankert from New York’s Chinatown to the dells of Wisconsin, from Canada to Australia, and from England to Guangdong Province. What his team discovers is the moving story of racial prejudice, the Chinese immigrant experience, and profound personal bravery. Originally scheduled to be released last year shortly after we taped, The Six is now finally out in Chinese theaters, with U.S. release dates to be announced. It marks the second collaboration between Jones and Schwankert — we discussed their earlier film, The Poseidon Project, with Schwankert on this program in 2014. 5:12: The journey from conception to completion of the film 14:21: The cultural significance of the Titanic in China 26:46: What were the survivors doing on the Titanic? 46:01: A story of immigration and the Chinese experience Recommendations: Jeremy: The South African news website Daily Maverick. Arthur: Two documentaries: Still Tomorrow, by Fan Jian, and Sleep Furiously, by Gideon Koppel. Steven: Menno Moto: A Journey Across the Americas in Search of My Mennonite Identity, by Cameron Dueck, and Confucius and Opium: China Book Reviews, by Isham Cook. Kaiser: The comedy television series The Good Place.]]> The Six. The film, directed by Jones and produced by James Cameron, focuses on Schwankert’s search for the six Chinese men who survived the sinking of the Titanic on the night of April 14, 1912. Tracing the fate of the men takes Schwankert from New York’s Chinatown to the dells of Wisconsin, from Canada to Australia, and from England to Guangdong Province. What his team discovers is the moving story of racial prejudice, the Chinese immigrant experience, and profound personal bravery. Originally scheduled to be released last year shortly after we taped, The Six is now finally out in Chinese theaters, with U.S. release dates to be announced. It marks the second collaboration between Jones and Schwankert — we discussed their earlier film, The Poseidon Project, with Schwankert on this program in 2014. 5:12: The journey from conception to completion of the film 14:21: The cultural significance of the Titanic in China 26:46: What were the survivors doing on the Titanic? 46:01: A story of immigration and the Chinese experience Recommendations: Jeremy: The South African news website Daily Maverick. Arthur: Two documentaries: Still Tomorrow, by Fan Jian, and Sleep Furiously, by Gideon Koppel. Steven: Menno Moto: A Journey Across the Americas in Search of My Mennonite Identity, by Cameron Dueck, and Confucius and Opium: China Book Reviews, by Isham Cook. Kaiser: The comedy television series The Good Place.]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Titanic-Karl-Beutel.jpg Searching for the six Chinese survivors of the ‘Titanic’ false no 0:00 No no Beethoven in Beijing https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/beethoven-in-beijing/ Thu, 15 Apr 2021 19:34:15 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=204429 Great Performances will broadcast the world premiere of the documentary Beethoven in Beijing, which tells the story of classical music in China over the last half century through the lens of the Philadelphia Orchestra’s storied relationship with the country, from its first performances in the P.R.C. in 1973 until its most recent tour, in 2018. Along the way, the film profiles established Chinese musicians and composers, like Tán Dùn 谭盾 and Láng Lǎng 郎朗, and introduces us to new Chinese talent, like the composer Peng-Peng Gong 龚天鹏.  This week, Kaiser chats with three individuals involved with the film: co-director Jennifer Lin, a veteran Philadelphia Inquirer reporter and the author of the 2017 book Shanghai Faithful; producer Cài Jīndōng 蔡金冬, a professor of music and arts at Bard College, the director of the US-China Music Institute, and a former conductor of the Stanford Symphony Orchestra; and Sheila Melvin, a script consultant for Beethoven in Beijing and the co-author, along with her husband, Cai, of Rhapsody in Red and Beethoven in China, both books about classical music in the People’s Republic of China.  Recommendations: Sheila: This viola concerto, performed by the Shanghai Philharmonic.  Jindong: The works of Zhōu Lóng 周龙. Kaiser: A day in the life of Abed Salama, by Nathan Thrall, and Surviving the crackdown in Xinjiang, by Raffi Khatchadourian.]]> Great Performances will broadcast the world premiere of the documentary Beethoven in Beijing, which tells the story of classical music in China over the last half century through the lens of the Philadelphia Orchestra’s storied relationship with the country, from its first performances in the P.R.C. in 1973 until its most recent tour, in 2018. Along the way, the film profiles established Chinese musicians and composers, like Tán Dùn 谭盾 and Láng Lǎng 郎朗, and introduces us to new Chinese talent, like the composer Peng-Peng Gong 龚天鹏.  This week, Kaiser chats with three individuals involved with the film: co-director Jennifer Lin, a veteran Philadelphia Inquirer reporter and the author of the 2017 book Shanghai Faithful; producer Cài Jīndōng 蔡金冬, a professor of music and arts at Bard College, the director of the US-China Music Institute, and a former conductor of the Stanford Symphony Orchestra; and Sheila Melvin, a script consultant for Beethoven in Beijing and the co-author, along with her husband, Cai, of Rhapsody in Red and Beethoven in China, both books about classical music in the People’s Republic of China.  Recommendations: Sheila: This viola concerto, performed by the Shanghai Philharmonic.  Jindong: The works of Zhōu Lóng 周龙. Kaiser: A day in the life of Abed Salama, by Nathan Thrall, and Surviving the crackdown in Xinjiang, by Raffi Khatchadourian.]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Philadelphia-Orchestra.jpg Beethoven in Beijing false no 0:00 No no China’s new youth, with Alec Ash and Stephanie Studer https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/chinas-new-youth-with-alec-ash-and-stephanie-studer/ Thu, 08 Apr 2021 16:30:06 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=204108 special report in the magazine about China’s “Post-90s” generation; and with Alec Ash, author of the book Wish Lanterns, which looks at a cohort of Chinese youth born between 1985 and 1990. The two explore the apparent contradictions between, on the one hand, the cosmopolitanism and socially progressive attitudes of young Chinese today and, on the other, their increasingly assertive national identity.  9:15: Social liberalism and nationalism 10:55: Less impressed by the west 27:38: China’s millennials and their western counterparts 38:06: A progressive generation and regressive regime  43:12: How state actors affect post-90’s discourse Read more about China’s new youth here on The China Project, by Alec Ash.  Recommendations: Stephanie: Frank Dorn’s jigsaw map of 1936 Beijing, available on the Beijing Postcards website. Alec: He recommends traveling to Dali, Yunnan, as well as trying the provincial cuisine.  Kaiser: The column Beijing Lights, published on the Spittoon Collective website.]]> special report in the magazine about China’s “Post-90s” generation; and with Alec Ash, author of the book Wish Lanterns, which looks at a cohort of Chinese youth born between 1985 and 1990. The two explore the apparent contradictions between, on the one hand, the cosmopolitanism and socially progressive attitudes of young Chinese today and, on the other, their increasingly assertive national identity.  9:15: Social liberalism and nationalism 10:55: Less impressed by the west 27:38: China’s millennials and their western counterparts 38:06: A progressive generation and regressive regime  43:12: How state actors affect post-90’s discourse Read more about China’s new youth here on The China Project, by Alec Ash.  Recommendations: Stephanie: Frank Dorn’s jigsaw map of 1936 Beijing, available on the Beijing Postcards website. Alec: He recommends traveling to Dali, Yunnan, as well as trying the provincial cuisine.  Kaiser: The column Beijing Lights, published on the Spittoon Collective website.]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/shutterstock_1590224638-scaled.jpg China’s new youth, with Alec Ash and Stephanie Studer false no 0:00 No no China’s COVID-19 response and the virus’s origins, with Deborah Seligsohn https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/chinas-covid-19-response-and-the-viruss-origins-with-deborah-seligsohn/ Thu, 01 Apr 2021 20:38:27 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=203881 Deborah Seligsohn, who served as the State Department’s Environment, Science, Technology and Health Counselor at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing from 2003 to 2007. She is now an assistant professor of political science at Villanova University in Philadelphia, where she currently teaches a course on pandemics and politics. She recalls her firsthand experience with China’s SARS response in 2003, shares her views on how much China improved in the intervening years after SARS and before COVID-19, and talks about how, when, and why China mishandled its initial response to the novel coronavirus in the winter of 2019–2020. Deborah also offers her critical perspective on the persistent “lab-leak” theory. This show was recorded on March 12, with an addendum recorded on March 29, in which Deborah addresses some of the news relating to the search for COVID’s origins that came out in the intervening weeks. 6:50: Understanding the origins of COVID-19 34:16: Chinese scientists’ unwillingness to share data  43:54: The World Health Organization’s handling of the virus 54:36: The lab-leak theory Recommendations: Deborah: Coronation, by Ai Weiwei, and the podcast In The Bubble: From The Frontlines. Kaiser: The rise of made-in-China diplomacy, Peter Hessler’s latest piece in The New Yorker.]]> Deborah Seligsohn, who served as the State Department’s Environment, Science, Technology and Health Counselor at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing from 2003 to 2007. She is now an assistant professor of political science at Villanova University in Philadelphia, where she currently teaches a course on pandemics and politics. She recalls her firsthand experience with China’s SARS response in 2003, shares her views on how much China improved in the intervening years after SARS and before COVID-19, and talks about how, when, and why China mishandled its initial response to the novel coronavirus in the winter of 2019–2020. Deborah also offers her critical perspective on the persistent “lab-leak” theory. This show was recorded on March 12, with an addendum recorded on March 29, in which Deborah addresses some of the news relating to the search for COVID’s origins that came out in the intervening weeks. 6:50: Understanding the origins of COVID-19 34:16: Chinese scientists’ unwillingness to share data  43:54: The World Health Organization’s handling of the virus 54:36: The lab-leak theory Recommendations: Deborah: Coronation, by Ai Weiwei, and the podcast In The Bubble: From The Frontlines. Kaiser: The rise of made-in-China diplomacy, Peter Hessler’s latest piece in The New Yorker.]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/AdobeStock_330531979-scaled.jpeg China’s COVID-19 response and the virus’s origins, with Deborah Seligsohn false no 0:00 No no Ryan Hass on his new book, ‘Stronger’ https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/ryan-hass-on-his-new-book-stronger/ Thu, 25 Mar 2021 19:53:37 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=203662 Ryan Hass, the Michael H. Armacost Chair at the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institute, a senior adviser at the Scowcroft Group and McLarty Associates, and the China Director at the National Security Council during the second Obama administration. Ryan’s new book, Stronger: Adapting America's China Strategy in an Age of Competitive Interdependence, lays out a great approach to right-sizing the challenges that China poses in the decades ahead and identifies a set of sensible U.S. responses: running faster instead of trying to trip the other guy, regaining confidence, avoiding declinism and defeatism, and not turning China into an enemy.  4:42: What’s changed after Trump 25:37: How interdependence with China raises American interests 29:31: A firm and steady approach to America’s foremost competitor 43:54: Risk reduction and crisis management vis-à-vis China Recommendations: Ryan: Any publication by William J. Burns, the current director of the CIA.  Kaiser: Works by Susan B. Glasser, particularly those narrated by Julia Whelan.]]> Ryan Hass, the Michael H. Armacost Chair at the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institute, a senior adviser at the Scowcroft Group and McLarty Associates, and the China Director at the National Security Council during the second Obama administration. Ryan’s new book, Stronger: Adapting America's China Strategy in an Age of Competitive Interdependence, lays out a great approach to right-sizing the challenges that China poses in the decades ahead and identifies a set of sensible U.S. responses: running faster instead of trying to trip the other guy, regaining confidence, avoiding declinism and defeatism, and not turning China into an enemy.  4:42: What’s changed after Trump 25:37: How interdependence with China raises American interests 29:31: A firm and steady approach to America’s foremost competitor 43:54: Risk reduction and crisis management vis-à-vis China Recommendations: Ryan: Any publication by William J. Burns, the current director of the CIA.  Kaiser: Works by Susan B. Glasser, particularly those narrated by Julia Whelan.]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/AdobeStock_188939047-scaled.jpeg Ryan Hass on his new book, ‘Stronger’ false no 0:00 No no The parallel world of Chinese tech, with Lillian Li https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/the-parallel-world-of-chinese-tech-with-lillian-li/ Thu, 18 Mar 2021 21:20:08 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=203502 Lillian Li, who moved to China from the U.K. last year and has been looking at China’s tech ecosystem from a unique perspective — combining an investor’s eye, an academic background studying development, a grounding in Chinese language and culture, and a comparative instinct. Lillian shares her views on how technology platforms have become institutions, how the U.S. and China have responded to this development in starkly different ways, and the major features that distinguish the technology ecosystems of the West and China.  10:19: Waiting on the next era of technology 25:06: The challenges faced by institutions 34:48: The future of the tech-government relationship 39:44: Two parallel worlds, China and the U.S.  47:10: Scale is no longer guaranteed Recommendations:  Lillian: But What If We're Wrong?: Thinking About the Present As If It Were the Past, by Chuck Klosterman.  Kaiser: Middlemarch, by George Eliot, and Pride and Prejudice, by Jane Austen.]]> Lillian Li, who moved to China from the U.K. last year and has been looking at China’s tech ecosystem from a unique perspective — combining an investor’s eye, an academic background studying development, a grounding in Chinese language and culture, and a comparative instinct. Lillian shares her views on how technology platforms have become institutions, how the U.S. and China have responded to this development in starkly different ways, and the major features that distinguish the technology ecosystems of the West and China.  10:19: Waiting on the next era of technology 25:06: The challenges faced by institutions 34:48: The future of the tech-government relationship 39:44: Two parallel worlds, China and the U.S.  47:10: Scale is no longer guaranteed Recommendations:  Lillian: But What If We're Wrong?: Thinking About the Present As If It Were the Past, by Chuck Klosterman.  Kaiser: Middlemarch, by George Eliot, and Pride and Prejudice, by Jane Austen.]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/shutterstock_1045429402-scaled.jpg The parallel world of Chinese tech, with Lillian Li false no 0:00 No no Cheng Lei: The detention and arrest of an Australian CGTN reporter https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/cheng-lei-the-detention-and-arrest-of-an-australian-cgtn-reporter/ Thu, 11 Mar 2021 20:46:20 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=203198 Revolutions, a history podcast exploring political revolutions, hosted by Mike Duncan.  Don: The Construction of Guilt in China: An Empirical Account of Routine Chinese Injustice, by Yu Mou, The Price of Peace: Money, Democracy and the Life of John Maynard Keynes, by Zachary D. Carter, and the search software X1. Bill: The politics of being Chinese in Australia, a comprehensive survey of attitudes and experiences of the Chinese-Australian community, by Jennifer Hsu.  Kaiser: The British History Podcast, hosted by Jamie Jeffers.]]> Revolutions, a history podcast exploring political revolutions, hosted by Mike Duncan.  Don: The Construction of Guilt in China: An Empirical Account of Routine Chinese Injustice, by Yu Mou, The Price of Peace: Money, Democracy and the Life of John Maynard Keynes, by Zachary D. Carter, and the search software X1. Bill: The politics of being Chinese in Australia, a comprehensive survey of attitudes and experiences of the Chinese-Australian community, by Jennifer Hsu.  Kaiser: The British History Podcast, hosted by Jamie Jeffers.]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Cheng-Lei-CGTN-Sinica.jpg Cheng Lei: The detention and arrest of an Australian CGTN reporter false no 0:00 No no Getting Chinese politics wrong, with Jude Blanchette https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/getting-chinese-politics-wrong-with-jude-blanchette/ Thu, 04 Mar 2021 21:08:01 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=202945 The Plague Cycle: The Unending War Between Humanity and Infectious Disease, by Charles Kenny, and The War on the Uyghurs: China's Internal Campaign Against a Muslim Minority, by Sean R. Roberts. Jude: Cabin Porn: Inspiration for Your Quiet Place Somewhere, by Steven Leckart and Zach Klein.  Kaiser: Two essays by Thomas Meaney: The canonization of Richard Holbrooke and The limits of Barack Obama’s idealism.]]> The Plague Cycle: The Unending War Between Humanity and Infectious Disease, by Charles Kenny, and The War on the Uyghurs: China's Internal Campaign Against a Muslim Minority, by Sean R. Roberts. Jude: Cabin Porn: Inspiration for Your Quiet Place Somewhere, by Steven Leckart and Zach Klein.  Kaiser: Two essays by Thomas Meaney: The canonization of Richard Holbrooke and The limits of Barack Obama’s idealism.]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/2021-March-4-Sinica.jpg Getting Chinese politics wrong, with Jude Blanchette false no 0:00 No no Julie Klinger on China’s rare earth frontier https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/julie-klinger-on-chinas-rare-earth-frontier/ Thu, 25 Feb 2021 21:29:21 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=202650 The Probiotic Planet: Using Life to Manage Life, by Jamie Lorimer. Kaiser: “The chip choke point,” by Tim De Chant, in The Wire China (listen to the article on China Stories).]]> The Probiotic Planet: Using Life to Manage Life, by Jamie Lorimer. Kaiser: “The chip choke point,” by Tim De Chant, in The Wire China (listen to the article on China Stories).]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/shutterstock_749222119-scaled.jpg Julie Klinger on China’s rare earth frontier false no 0:00 No no Journalist Te-Ping Chen on her short fiction collection, Land of Big Numbers https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/journalist-te-ping-chen-on-her-short-fiction-collection-land-of-big-numbers/ Thu, 18 Feb 2021 22:21:59 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=202344 Te-Ping Chen to talk about her just-released collection of short fiction, Land of Big Numbers: Stories. Featuring 10 short stories all set in China or featuring Chinese characters, it showcases both the author’s keen eye for detailed observation and her imaginative powers and offers an unfailingly empathetic look at China from a wide range of disparate angles. Te-Ping even reads a passage from one short story, “Lulu,” which was previously published in The New Yorker. 10:51: A real-life inspiration for her fiction 28:30: A reading from “Lulu” 37:10: The cultural disconnect between China and the U.S. 43:16: Te-Ping’s writing and publishing process Recommendations: Te-Ping: A short story collection titled What It Means When a Man Falls From the Sky, by Lesley Nneka Arimah, and My Country and My People, from a collection of essays from the 1930s by Lín Yǔtáng 林语堂. Kaiser: The Index of Self-Destructive Acts, by Christopher Beha. ]]> Te-Ping Chen to talk about her just-released collection of short fiction, Land of Big Numbers: Stories. Featuring 10 short stories all set in China or featuring Chinese characters, it showcases both the author’s keen eye for detailed observation and her imaginative powers and offers an unfailingly empathetic look at China from a wide range of disparate angles. Te-Ping even reads a passage from one short story, “Lulu,” which was previously published in The New Yorker. 10:51: A real-life inspiration for her fiction 28:30: A reading from “Lulu” 37:10: The cultural disconnect between China and the U.S. 43:16: Te-Ping’s writing and publishing process Recommendations: Te-Ping: A short story collection titled What It Means When a Man Falls From the Sky, by Lesley Nneka Arimah, and My Country and My People, from a collection of essays from the 1930s by Lín Yǔtáng 林语堂. Kaiser: The Index of Self-Destructive Acts, by Christopher Beha. ]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Land-of-Big-Numbers.jpg Journalist Te-Ping Chen on her short fiction collection, Land of Big Numbers false no 0:00 No no The Xinjiang camps on Clubhouse https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/the-xinjiang-camps-on-clubhouse/ Thu, 11 Feb 2021 21:27:38 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=202118 Muyi Xiao of the New York Times; and Rayhan Asat, a Uyghur attorney in the U.S. whose brother, a successful tech entrepreneur, has been put in the camps and has been incommunicado for three years. Recommendations: Jeremy: The Ministry for the Future: A Novel, by Kim Stanley Robinson.  Rayhan: The Queen’s Gambit, available on Netflix. Muyi: A type of Wuhan hot dry noodle: 想念武汉热干面 (xiǎngniàn wǔhàn règānmiàn), available for purchase on Yamibuy.  L: The 2012 film No, directed by Pablo Larraín. Kaiser: The book Land of Big Numbers: Stories, by Te-Ping Chen.]]> Muyi Xiao of the New York Times; and Rayhan Asat, a Uyghur attorney in the U.S. whose brother, a successful tech entrepreneur, has been put in the camps and has been incommunicado for three years. Recommendations: Jeremy: The Ministry for the Future: A Novel, by Kim Stanley Robinson.  Rayhan: The Queen’s Gambit, available on Netflix. Muyi: A type of Wuhan hot dry noodle: 想念武汉热干面 (xiǎngniàn wǔhàn règānmiàn), available for purchase on Yamibuy.  L: The 2012 film No, directed by Pablo Larraín. Kaiser: The book Land of Big Numbers: Stories, by Te-Ping Chen.]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/image-2.png The Xinjiang camps on Clubhouse false no 0:00 No no China’s struggle for tech ascendancy, with Dan Wang of Gavekal Dragonomics https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/chinas-struggle-for-tech-ascendancy-with-dan-wang-of-gavekal-dragonomics/ Thu, 04 Feb 2021 20:38:57 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=201853 Gavekal Dragonomics, who also contributes a regular opinion column to Bloomberg. Combining firsthand knowledge of China’s tech sector with broad erudition and a humanist’s perspective, Dan offers a unique take on China’s innovation ecosystem, the country’s efforts to achieve self-sufficiency in technology, and the role of economic growth, fundamental optimism, and inspiration in China’s rise as a tech power. 13:53: The outsize importance of economic growth 25:02: An overemphasis on digital technology 33:55: Reciprocity and technological codependence  49:12: Technology is more than just tools and patents Recommendations: Dan: The works of Marcel Proust, and the ham and mushrooms of Yunnan Province.  Kaiser: The Netflix series Flavorful Origins and Great State: China and the World, by Timothy Brook. Read Dan's 2020 annual letter: http://danwang.co/2020-letter/]]> Gavekal Dragonomics, who also contributes a regular opinion column to Bloomberg. Combining firsthand knowledge of China’s tech sector with broad erudition and a humanist’s perspective, Dan offers a unique take on China’s innovation ecosystem, the country’s efforts to achieve self-sufficiency in technology, and the role of economic growth, fundamental optimism, and inspiration in China’s rise as a tech power. 13:53: The outsize importance of economic growth 25:02: An overemphasis on digital technology 33:55: Reciprocity and technological codependence  49:12: Technology is more than just tools and patents Recommendations: Dan: The works of Marcel Proust, and the ham and mushrooms of Yunnan Province.  Kaiser: The Netflix series Flavorful Origins and Great State: China and the World, by Timothy Brook. Read Dan's 2020 annual letter: http://danwang.co/2020-letter/]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/shutterstock_724767955-scaled.jpg China’s struggle for tech ascendancy, with Dan Wang of Gavekal Dragonomics false no 0:00 No no Talking Taiwan with former national intelligence officer Paul Heer https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/talking-taiwan-with-former-national-intelligence-officer-paul-heer/ Thu, 28 Jan 2021 21:34:00 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=201559 Paul Heer about the conundrum of Taiwan — one of the thorniest and most fraught issues confronting the new Biden foreign policy team as it navigates the U.S.-China relationship. Paul is a Distinguished Fellow at the Center for the National Interest and studies Chinese and East Asian issues. He served as the national intelligence officer for East Asia from 2007 to 2015, and was previously a senior analyst at the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence in its China Issue Group. In December 2020, Paul published two articles about Taiwan policy in The National Interest: “The Strategic Dilemma of Taiwan’s Democracy” and “The Inconvenient Truth About Taiwan’s Place in the World.” This episode’s conversation centers on the diagnosis and recommendations made in those two pieces. 6:48: The democratic David versus the authoritarian Goliath 17:47: Taiwan reunification in the Xí Jìnpíng 习近平 era 36:55: The U.S. position on Taiwan 40:22: The future of one country, two systems Recommendations: Paul: The works of Charles Dickens.  Kaiser: Kindred: Neanderthal Life, Love, Death and Art, by Rebecca Wragg Sykes.]]> Paul Heer about the conundrum of Taiwan — one of the thorniest and most fraught issues confronting the new Biden foreign policy team as it navigates the U.S.-China relationship. Paul is a Distinguished Fellow at the Center for the National Interest and studies Chinese and East Asian issues. He served as the national intelligence officer for East Asia from 2007 to 2015, and was previously a senior analyst at the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence in its China Issue Group. In December 2020, Paul published two articles about Taiwan policy in The National Interest: “The Strategic Dilemma of Taiwan’s Democracy” and “The Inconvenient Truth About Taiwan’s Place in the World.” This episode’s conversation centers on the diagnosis and recommendations made in those two pieces. 6:48: The democratic David versus the authoritarian Goliath 17:47: Taiwan reunification in the Xí Jìnpíng 习近平 era 36:55: The U.S. position on Taiwan 40:22: The future of one country, two systems Recommendations: Paul: The works of Charles Dickens.  Kaiser: Kindred: Neanderthal Life, Love, Death and Art, by Rebecca Wragg Sykes.]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/2021-Jan-28-Sinica-scaled.jpeg Talking Taiwan with former national intelligence officer Paul Heer false no 0:00 No no A new U.S. strategy in East Asia, from the Quincy Institute https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/a-new-u-s-strategy-in-east-asia-from-the-quincy-institute/ Thu, 21 Jan 2021 21:02:41 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=201302 Michael D. Swaine, Jessica J. Lee, and Rachel Esplin Odell authored the report Toward an Inclusive & Balanced Regional Order: A New U.S. Strategy in East Asia, which was published by the Quincy Institute on January 11. In this longer-than-usual episode, they detail their recommendations for how they believe the Biden-Harris administration should approach the region, especially China. 12:17: Sinophobia and Cold War mentalities 23:33: The most pressing issues in East Asia 42:59: Limited disentanglement in U.S.-China technology 52:07: The role of U.S. forces in Japan and South Korea 1:05:30: Taiwan’s “porcupine strategy”  Recommendations: Rachel: Women in Color, an album by Raye Zaragoza, and The Dispossessed, by Ursula K. Le Guin.  Jessica: Lengthy puzzles as a way to provide some respite from laptops and cell phones. Michael: Continuing the trend of non-screen-related activities, Michael recommends taking up oil painting.  Kaiser: Dark Mirror: Edward Snowden and the American Surveillance State, by Barton Gellman.]]> Michael D. Swaine, Jessica J. Lee, and Rachel Esplin Odell authored the report Toward an Inclusive & Balanced Regional Order: A New U.S. Strategy in East Asia, which was published by the Quincy Institute on January 11. In this longer-than-usual episode, they detail their recommendations for how they believe the Biden-Harris administration should approach the region, especially China. 12:17: Sinophobia and Cold War mentalities 23:33: The most pressing issues in East Asia 42:59: Limited disentanglement in U.S.-China technology 52:07: The role of U.S. forces in Japan and South Korea 1:05:30: Taiwan’s “porcupine strategy”  Recommendations: Rachel: Women in Color, an album by Raye Zaragoza, and The Dispossessed, by Ursula K. Le Guin.  Jessica: Lengthy puzzles as a way to provide some respite from laptops and cell phones. Michael: Continuing the trend of non-screen-related activities, Michael recommends taking up oil painting.  Kaiser: Dark Mirror: Edward Snowden and the American Surveillance State, by Barton Gellman.]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/shutterstock_1871715820.jpg A new U.S. strategy in East Asia, from the Quincy Institute false no 0:00 No no China’s judicial decisions database and what it means https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/chinas-judicial-decisions-database-and-what-it-means/ Fri, 15 Jan 2021 00:35:51 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=200901 Rachel Stern, a professor at the UC Berkeley School of Law and in the UC Berkeley political science department, and with Ben Liebman, a professor of law and the director of the Center for Chinese Legal Studies at Columbia University. Both scholars have worked extensively with the database, and share their insights into why the Chinese government has pushed courts to upload cases to the database, and how it might transform the way that courts work in China. 7:19: What’s in the database, and how it’s unique to China 28:00: Pushing back against the techno-dystopian narrative 34:12: Creating a marketplace for legal implications 41:21: The limitations of artificial intelligence   Recommendations: Rachel: A collection of translated essays written by Chinese intellectuals, titled Voices from the Chinese Century: Public Intellectual Debate from Contemporary China; Under Red Skies: Three Generations of Life, Loss, and Hope in China, by Karoline Kan; and the NüVoices podcast. Ben: The works of artist Stuart Robertson.  Kaiser: The popular Chinese talk show Informal Talks (非正式会谈 fēi zhèng shì huì tán), available to watch on YouTube.]]> Rachel Stern, a professor at the UC Berkeley School of Law and in the UC Berkeley political science department, and with Ben Liebman, a professor of law and the director of the Center for Chinese Legal Studies at Columbia University. Both scholars have worked extensively with the database, and share their insights into why the Chinese government has pushed courts to upload cases to the database, and how it might transform the way that courts work in China. 7:19: What’s in the database, and how it’s unique to China 28:00: Pushing back against the techno-dystopian narrative 34:12: Creating a marketplace for legal implications 41:21: The limitations of artificial intelligence   Recommendations: Rachel: A collection of translated essays written by Chinese intellectuals, titled Voices from the Chinese Century: Public Intellectual Debate from Contemporary China; Under Red Skies: Three Generations of Life, Loss, and Hope in China, by Karoline Kan; and the NüVoices podcast. Ben: The works of artist Stuart Robertson.  Kaiser: The popular Chinese talk show Informal Talks (非正式会谈 fēi zhèng shì huì tán), available to watch on YouTube.]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/2021-Jan-14-Sinica.jpg China’s judicial decisions database and what it means false no 0:00 No no Ryan Hass on the Biden administration’s China direction https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/ryan-hass-on-the-biden-administrations-china-direction/ Thu, 07 Jan 2021 20:10:02 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=200439 Ryan Hass, who offers his perspective on the likely direction that the incoming Biden administration will take when it comes to managing the American relationship with China — the most difficult and most consequential of bilateral relationships. Thoughtful and measured as always, Ryan makes a good case for why the Biden team is not, in fact, boxed in by Trump’s antagonism toward China, and will chart a path that will diverge substantially from the one taken during four years of Trump without retreading the path taken during the Obama presidency. 1:56: The structural issues at the heart of U.S.-China tensions 6:59: Can the American political center hold?  12:10: What can be deduced from Biden’s personnel choices 28:34: How the Biden election has changed Beijing’s political calculus 38:36: Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and the Biden administration Recommendations: Ryan: Anything written by John Le Carré.  Kaiser: Ed Yong, a writer for The Atlantic, especially his recent piece How science beat the virus.]]> Ryan Hass, who offers his perspective on the likely direction that the incoming Biden administration will take when it comes to managing the American relationship with China — the most difficult and most consequential of bilateral relationships. Thoughtful and measured as always, Ryan makes a good case for why the Biden team is not, in fact, boxed in by Trump’s antagonism toward China, and will chart a path that will diverge substantially from the one taken during four years of Trump without retreading the path taken during the Obama presidency. 1:56: The structural issues at the heart of U.S.-China tensions 6:59: Can the American political center hold?  12:10: What can be deduced from Biden’s personnel choices 28:34: How the Biden election has changed Beijing’s political calculus 38:36: Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and the Biden administration Recommendations: Ryan: Anything written by John Le Carré.  Kaiser: Ed Yong, a writer for The Atlantic, especially his recent piece How science beat the virus.]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Joe_Biden_visits_China_August_2011_20.jpg Ryan Hass on the Biden administration’s China direction false no 0:00 No no Ian Johnson and Lin Yao on “liberal” Chinese Trump supporters https://thechinaproject.com/podcast/ian-johnson-and-lin-yao-on-liberal-chinese-trump-supporters/ Wed, 06 Jan 2021 16:50:03 +0000 https://supchina.com/?post_type=podcast&p=200384 New York Times and by Lin Yao, a political scientist now earning a law degree at Yale, who writes frequently on Chinese intellectuals and U.S. politics.]]> New York Times and by Lin Yao, a political scientist now earning a law degree at Yale, who writes frequently on Chinese intellectuals and U.S. politics.]]> https://thechinaproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/image-3.png Ian Johnson and Lin Yao on “liberal” Chinese Trump supporters false no 0:00 No no